

A N U G Î T Â.



# INTRODUCTION

TO

## ANUGÎTÂ.

LIKE the Bhagavadgîtâ and the Sanatsugâtîya, the Anugîtâ is one of the numerous episodes of the Mahâbhârata. And like the Sanatsugâtîya, it appears here for the first time in an English, or, indeed, it is believed, in any European garb. It forms part of the Asvamedha Parvan of the Mahâbhârata, and is contained in thirty-six chapters of that Parvan. These chapters—being chapters XVI to LI—together with all the subsequent chapters of the Asvamedha Parvan, form by themselves what in some of our copies is called the Anugîtâ Parvan—a title which affords a parallel to the title Bhagavadgîtâ Parvan, which we have already referred to. The Anugîtâ is not now a work of any very great or extensive reputation. But we do find some few quotations from it in the Bhâshyas of Saṅkarâcârya, and one or two in the Sâṅkhya-sâra of Vigñâna Bhikshu, to which reference will be made hereafter. And it is included in the present volume, partly because it affords an interesting glimpse of sundry old passages of the Upanishad literature in a somewhat modified, and presumably later, form; and partly, perhaps I may say more especially, because it professes to be a sort of continuation, or rather recapitulation, of the Bhagavadgîtâ. At the very outset of the work, we read, that after the great fratricidal war of the Mahâbhârata was over, and the Pândavas had become sole and complete masters of their ancestral kingdom, *Krishna* and *Arguna*—the two interlocutors in the Bhagavadgîtâ—happened to take a stroll together in the great magical palace built for the Pândavas by the demon *Maya*. In the course of the conversation which they held on the occasion, *Krishna* communicated to *Arguna* his wish to return to his own people at *Dvârakâ*, now that the business which had called

him away from them was happily terminated. Arguna, of course, was unable to resist the execution of this wish ; but he requested *Krishna*, before leaving for Dvârakâ, to repeat the instruction which had been already conveyed to him on 'the holy field of Kurukshetra,' but which had gone out of his 'degenerate mind.' *Krishna* thereupon protests that he is not equal to a verbatim recapitulation of the Bhagavad-gîtâ, but agrees, in lieu of that, to impart to Arguna the same instruction in other words, through the medium of a certain 'ancient story'—or purâtana itihâsa. And the instruction thus conveyed constitutes what is called the Anugîtâ, a name which is in itself an embodiment of this anecdote.

Now the first question which challenges investigation with reference to this work is, if we may so call it, the fundamental one—how much is properly included under the name? The question is not one quite easy of settlement, as our authorities upon it are not all reconcilable with one another. In the general list of contents of the Asvamedha Parvan, which is given at the end of that Parvan in the edition printed at Bombay, we read that the first section is the Vyâsa Vâkya, and the second the Samvartamaruttiya. With neither of these have we aught to do here. The list then goes on thus : 'Anugîtâ, Vâsudevâgamana, Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ, Gurusishyasamvâda, Uttankopâkhyâna,' and so forth. With the later sections, again, we are not here concerned. Now let us compare this list with the list which may be obtained from the titles of the chapters in the body of the work itself. With the sixteenth chapter, then, of the Asvamedha Parvan, begins what is here called the Anugîtâ Parvan ; and that chapter and the three following chapters are described as the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth chapters respectively of the Anugîtâ Parvan, which forms part of the Asvamedha Parvan. The title of the twentieth chapter contains a small, but important, addition. It runs thus, 'Such is the twentieth chapter of the Anugîtâ Parvan, forming part of the Asvamedha Parvan—being the Brâhma Gîtâ.' This form is continued down to the thirty-fourth chapter, only Brâhmaṇa



Gîtâ being substituted for Brahma Gîtâ. At the close of the thirty-fifth chapter, there is another alteration caused by the substitution of Gurusishyasamvâda for Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ ; and this continues down to the fifty-first chapter, where the thread of the narrative is again taken up—the philosophical parenthesis, if I may so say, having come to an end. With the fifty-first chapter our present translation also ends. Now it appears from the above comparison, that the list of contents set out above is accurate, save in so far as it mentions Vâsudevâgamana as a distinct section of the Asvamedha Parvan. No such section seems to be in existence. And there appears to be nothing in the Asvamedha Parvan to which that title could be appropriately allotted. The edition printed at Madras agrees in all essential particulars with the Bombay edition ; with this difference, that even at the close of the twentieth chapter, the name is Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ, and not Brahma Gîtâ as it is in the Bombay edition. The Calcutta edition also agrees in these readings. Turning now to a MS. procured for me by my excellent friend Professor Âbâgî Vishṇu Kâthavate at Ahmedabad, and bearing date the 15th of Phâlguna Vadya 1823, Sunday, we find there at the end of the Asvamedha Parvan a list of contents like that which we have seen in the printed edition. The relevant portion of that list is as follows: ‘ Samvartamarut-tîya, Anugîtâ, Gurusishyasamvâda, and Uttankopâkhyâna.’ Here we find neither the erroneous entry of Vâsudevâgamana, nor the correct entry of Brahma Gîtâ, which are both contained in the other list. In another MS. which I have now before me, and which has been lent me by Professor Bhândârkar, who purchased it in Puna for the Government of Bombay—in this MS., which contains the commentary of Arguna Misra, the earlier chapters are described not as chapters of the Anugîtâ Parvan, but of the Anugîtâ contained in the Asvamedha Parvan, and they are numbered there as they are numbered in our translation, not continuously with the numbering of the previous chapters of the Asvamedha Parvan. At the close of chapter IV, we have an explicit statement that the Anugîtâ ends there. Then the Brahma Gîtâ begins. And the first chapter is

described as a chapter of the Brahma Gîtâ in the Asvamedha Parvan. The numbering of each of these chapters of the Brahma Gîtâ is not given in the copy before us—the titles and descriptions of the various chapters being throughout incomplete. Some of the later chapters are described as chapters of the Brâhma Gîtâ, and some as chapters of the Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ; but this discrepancy is probably to be put to the account of the particular copyist who wrote out the copy used by us. With what is chapter XX in our numbering the Gurusishyasaṃvâda begins. This MS. omits all reference to any Anugîtâ Parvan, and fails to number the various chapters. Its list of sections agrees with that in the Bombay edition. It bears no date.

So much for what may be described as our primary sources of information on this subject. Let us now glance at the secondary sources. And, first, Nîlakanṭha in commenting on what is, according to his numbering, chapter XV, stanza 43, apparently distinguishes that chapter from what he speaks of as the Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ and Gurusishyasaṃvâda, which, as he implies, follow after that chapter—thus indicating that he accepted in substance the tradition recorded in the passages we have already set forth, viz. that the first four chapters of our translation form the Anugîtâ, the next fifteen the Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ, and the last seventeen the Gurusishyasaṃvâda. This is also the view of Arguna Misra. At the close of his gloss on chapter IV, he distinctly states that the Anugîtâ ends at that chapter; and again at the close of the gloss on chapter XIX, he explicitly says that the Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ ends there. He also adds the following interesting observation: ‘The feminine form (Gîtâ, namely) is used in consequence of (the word) Upanishad being feminine.’ The full title of that part of the Mahâbhârata would then be, according to this remark of Arguna Misra, ‘the Upanishads sung by the Brâhmaṇa,’ a title parallel to that of the Bhagavadgîtâ, ‘the Upanishads sung by the Deity.’ It is to be further remarked, that the last chapter of the Gurusishyasaṃvâda is called in this commentary the eighteenth chapter of the Gurusishyasaṃvâda, a fact which seems to indicate that Arguna Misra either

found in the MS. which he used, or himself established, a separate numbering for the chapters in the several sections<sup>1</sup> of which the Asvamedha Parvan is made up.

Although the information here set out from these various sources is not easily to be harmonised in all its parts, the preponderance of testimony seems to be in favour of regarding the portion of the Asvamedha Parvan embraced in our translation as containing three distinct sections, viz. the Anugîtâ, the Brâhmaṇa Gîtâ, and the Gurusishyasamvâda. And some indirect support for this conclusion may be derived from one or two other circumstances. In the Sâṅkhya-sâra of Vigñâna Bhikshu—a work which, as we shall see in the sequel, expressly mentions the Anugîtâ—we have a passage cited as from the ‘Bhârata<sup>2</sup>’ which coincides almost precisely with a passage occurring in chapter XXVII of our translation (see p. 335). And in the Bhâshya of Saṅkarâkârya on the Bhagavadgîtâ, chapter XV, stanza 1, we have a citation as from a ‘Purâṇa’ of a passage which coincides pretty closely with one which occurs in chapter XX of our translation (see p. 313). If the discrepancies between the quotations as given by Vigñâna Bhikshu and Saṅkara, and the passages occurring in our text, may be treated merely as various readings—and there is nothing inherently improbable in this being the case—it may be fairly contended, that neither Saṅkara nor Vigñâna Bhikshu would have used the vague expressions, ‘a Purâṇa,’ or even ‘the Bhârata,’ if they could have correctly substituted in lieu of them the specific name Anugîtâ. And this, it may be said, is a contention of some weight, when it is remembered, that both Saṅkara and Vigñâna show, in other parts of their writings, an acquaintance with this very Anugîtâ. If this reasoning is correct,

<sup>1</sup> In the beginning of his gloss on the Anugîtâ he says, that he proposes to explain difficult passages in the Anugîtâ, &c.—Anugîtâdishu. And at the outset of his gloss on the whole Parvan he says, that in the Anugîtâ we have a statement of the miseries of birth, &c. as a protest against worldly life; in the Brahma Gîtâ we have a recommendation of Prâṇâyâma, &c.; and in the Gurusishyasamvâda we have a eulogium on the perception of the self as distinct from Prakṛiti or nature, and incidentally a protest against Pravṛtti or action.

<sup>2</sup> P. 21.

the conclusion to be derived from it must be, that Saṅkara and Vigñāna must have considered the chapters of the Asvamedha Parvan from which their respective quotations are taken as not forming part of the Anugîtâ.

The testimony we have thus collected is apparently of considerable weight. Against it, however, we have to weigh some testimony which appears to me to be entitled, upon the whole, to even greater weight. In the Sāṅkhya-sāra of Vigñāna Bhikṣu, to which we have already referred, we have two quotations<sup>1</sup> from the Anugîtâ which are distinctly stated to be taken from that work. The first occurs in our translation at p. 332, the second at p. 313. Now, if we adopt the conclusion above referred to, regarding the correct titles of the thirty-six chapters which we have translated, it is a mistake to attribute the passages in question to the Anugîtâ. They would, on that view, form part of the Gurusishyasaṃvâda. Again, in his commentary on the Sanatsugâtîya, Saṅkara refers to sundry passages which he expressly says are taken from the Anugîtâ, but which are not contained in the Anugîtâ as limited by the evidence we have considered above. One of the passages referred to is taken from chapter XI of our translation, and others are contained in the comments on Sanatsugâtîya I, 6, and on I, 20 and I, 41<sup>2</sup>. It is difficult to resist the conclusion to which this positive evidence leads. One cannot possibly explain this evidence upon the view which we have first stated; while, on the other hand, the points which apparently support that view are capable of some explanation on the theory that the Anugîtâ includes all the chapters here translated. And that in this wise. The passages which we have referred to as cited by Saṅkara and Vigñāna from a Purāṇa and from the Bhārata may have been actually taken from some other work than the Anugîtâ. Even waiving the fact that the readings are different,—though in regard especially to the quotation given by Saṅkara it is not one to be entirely lost sight of,—there is this fact which is of great and almost conclusive weight on such a point as

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 15, 21. The latter corresponds to Saṅkara's quotation above referred to.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 206 note.

this, namely, that we have many instances of passages common, almost verbatim et literatim, to the Mahâbhârata and other works. For one instance, take the very passage on which a chronological argument has been founded by us in the Introduction to the Sanatsugâtîya<sup>1</sup>. It ought to have been there pointed out, that the stanza about a young man being bound to rise to receive an elderly person, occurs in the Manu Smṛiti<sup>2</sup> also in exactly the same words. The omission to note this circumstance in its proper place in the Introduction to the Sanatsugâtîya was due to a mere inadvertence. But the conclusion there hinted at was expressed in very cautious language, and with many qualifications, out of regard to circumstances such as those which we are now considering. Similar repetitions may be pointed out in other places. The passage about the Kshetragña and Sattva and their mutual relations (see p. 374) occurs, as pointed out in the note there, in at least two other places in the Mahâbhârata. The passage likewise which occurs in Gîtâ, p. 103, about the 'hands, feet, &c., on all sides,' is one which may be seen, to my own knowledge, in about half a dozen places in the Mahâbhârata. Such cases, I believe, may be easily multiplied; and they illustrate and are illustrated by Mr. Freeman's proposition respecting the epic age in Greece, to which we have already alluded. It follows, consequently, that the quotations from Saṅkara and Viṅṇâna, to which we have referred above, do not militate very strongly against the final conclusion at which we have arrived. The testimony of the MSS. and the commentators is of considerably greater force. But Nîlakantha, whatever his merits as an exegete—and even these are often marred by a persistent effort to read his own foregone conclusions into the text he comments on—Nîlakantha is but an indifferent authority in the domain of historical criticism. In his commentary on the Sanatsugâtîya, for instance, he tells us that he has admitted into his text sundry verses which were not in the copy used by Saṅkara, and for which he had none but a very modern voucher, and he very naively adds that he has done so on the principle of collecting all

<sup>1</sup> P. 139, and cf. p. 176 with Vishṇu XXX, 44 seq.

<sup>2</sup> See II, 120.

good things to a focus. Arguna Misra is a very much more satisfactory commentator. But he is not likely to be a writer of a very remote date. I assume, that he must be more recent than Saṅkarâkârya, though I cannot say that I have any very tenable ground for the assumption. But assuming that, I think it more satisfactory to adopt Saṅkarâkârya's nomenclature, and to treat the thirty-six chapters here translated as constituting the Anugîtâ. It is not improbable, if our assumption is correct, that the division of the thirty-six chapters in the manner we have seen may have come into vogue after the date of Vignâna Bhikshu, who, according to Dr. F. E. Hall, 'lived in all probability in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, and whom there is some slight reason for carrying back still further<sup>1</sup>.'

Do these thirty-six chapters, then, form one integral work? Are they all the work of one and the same author? These are the questions which next present themselves for consideration. The evidence bearing upon them, however, is, as might be expected, excessively scanty. Of external evidence, indeed, we have really none, barring Saṅkara's statement in his commentary on the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka-upanishad*<sup>2</sup> that the verse which he there quotes from the Anugîtâ has Vyâsa for its author. That statement indicates that Saṅkara accepted the current tradition of Vyâsa's authorship of the Anugîtâ; and such acceptance, presumably, followed from his acceptance of the tradition of Vyâsa's authorship of the entire Mahâbhârata. If that tradition is incorrect, and Vyâsa is not the author of the Anugîtâ, we have no means of ascertaining who is the author. And as to the tradition in question, it is difficult, in the present state of our materials, to form any satisfactory judgment. We therefore proceed at once to consider whether the Anugîtâ is really one work. And I must admit at the outset that I find it difficult to answer this question. There are certainly some circumstances connected with the work which might be regarded as indicating a different authorship of different parts of it. Thus

<sup>1</sup> See Preface, *Sâṅkya-sâra*, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> P. 234.

in an early portion of the work, we find the first personal pronoun is used, where the Supreme Being is evidently intended to be signified, and yet the passage is not put into the mouth of *Kṛishṇa*, but of the *Brāhmaṇa*. A similar passage occurs a little later on also. Now it must be taken to be a somewhat strained interpretation of the words used in the passages in question to suppose that the speaker there used the first personal pronoun, identifying himself for the nonce with the Supreme Being<sup>1</sup>. Again, in a passage still further on, we have the vocative O Pârtha! where the person addressed is not Arguna at all, but the *Brāhmaṇa*'s wife. Now these lapses are susceptible of two explanations—either we are to see in them so many cases of 'Homer nodding,' or we may suppose that they are errors occasioned by one writer making additions to the work of a previous writer, without a vivid recollection of the framework of the original composition into which his own work had to be set<sup>2</sup>. I own, that on balancing the probabilities on the one side and the other, my mind rather leans to the hypothesis of one author making a slip in the plexus of his own story within story, rather than the hypothesis of a deliberate interpolator forgetting the actual scheme of the original work into which he was about to foist his own additions<sup>3</sup>. And this the rather, that we find a similar slip towards the very beginning of the work, where we have the *Brāhmaṇa* Kâsyapa addressed as Parantapa, or destroyer of foes—an epithet which, I think, is exclusively reserved for Kshatriyas, and is, in any case, a very inappropriate one to apply to a humble seeker for spiritual light. This slip appears to me to be incapable of explanation on any theory of interpolation<sup>4</sup>. And hence the other slips above noted can hardly be regarded as supporting any such theory. Another circumstance, not indeed bearing

<sup>1</sup> In fact the *Brāhmaṇa* is not identified with the Supreme Being afterwards. But that fact has not much bearing on the question here.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Wilson's *Dasakumâra-karita*, Introd. p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> The third alternative, that a work independently written was afterwards bodily thrown into the *Mahâbhârata*, is one which in the circumstances here seems to me improbable.

<sup>4</sup> See also pp. 235, 252, 299.

out that theory, but rendering interpolations possible, deserves to be noted. The scheme of the Anugîtâ certainly lends itself to interpolations. A story might without much difficulty be added to the series of story joined to story which it contains. Against this, however, it must not be forgotten, that the Sânti Parvan of the Mahâbhârata and the Yogavâsishtâ exhibit a precisely similar framework of contents, and that the Pañkatantra and the Kathâsaritsâgara, among other works, follow the same model. And from this fact it may be fairly argued, that while there is, doubtless, room for suspecting interpolations in such cases, there is this to be remembered, that with respect to any particular one of these cases, such suspicion can carry us but a very short way. And further, it is to be observed, *valeat quantum*, that the connexion of the several chapters of the Anugîtâ one with the other is not altogether a loose one, save at one or two points only, while they are all linked on to the main body of the narrative, only in what we have treated as the last chapter of the Anugîtâ, without any trace of any other connecting link anywhere else. Upon the whole, therefore, we here conclude, though not without doubt, that the whole of the Anugîtâ is the work of one author.

The next question to be discussed is the important one of the age of the work. The quotations already given above from Saṅkarâkârya's works, and one other which is referred to in the note below<sup>1</sup>, suffice to show that the Anugîtâ must have been some few centuries old in the time of Saṅkarâkârya. For whether we treat the Anugîtâ as a part of the original Mahâbhârata or not, it is not likely that such a scholar as Saṅkara would have accepted the book as a genuine part of the Mahâbhârata, and as a work of Vyâsa, if it had not been in his day of some respectable antiquity, of antiquity sufficient to have thrown the real author into oblivion, and to have substi-

<sup>1</sup> See Saṅkara, *Sârîraka Bhâshya*, p. 726. That, however, may be a quotation from some other work. It may be noted that the passages quoted in the Bhâshya on *Sanatsugâtîya* I, 20 and I, 41 are not to be traced in our copies, though expressly stated there to have been taken from the Anugîtâ.



tuted in his place Vyâsa, who lived at the junction of the Dvâpara and Kali ages<sup>1</sup>, upwards of thirty centuries before the Christian era. The calculation is avowedly a very rough one, but I think we may, as the result of it, safely fix the third century of the Christian era as the latest date at which the Anugîtâ can have been composed. Let us now endeavour to find out whether we can fix the date as lying within any better defined period. It is scarcely needful to say, that the Anugîtâ dates from a period considerably subsequent to the age of the Upanishads. The passages relating to the Prânasamvâda and so forth, which occur originally in the Upanishads, are referred to in the Anugîtâ as 'ancient stories'—an indication that the Upanishads had already come to be esteemed as ancient compositions at the date of the latter work. It is not necessary, therefore, to go through an elaborate examination of the versions of the ancient stories alluded to above, as contained in the Upanishads and in the Anugîtâ, more especially because it is possible for us to show that the Anugîtâ is later than the Bhagavadgîtâ, which latter work, as we have seen, is later than the Upanishads. And to this point we shall now address ourselves. We have already observed upon the story referred to at the opening of this Introduction, which, historically interpreted, indicates the priority of the Bhagavadgîtâ to the Anugîtâ. This conclusion is confirmed by sundry other circumstances, which we must now discuss in some detail, as they are also of use in helping to fix the position of the work in the history of Sanskrit literature and philosophy. First, then, it seems to me, that the state of society mirrored in the Anugîtâ indicates a greater advance in social evolution than we have already seen is disclosed in the Bhagavadgîtâ. Not to mention decorations of houses and so forth, which are alluded to in one passage of the Anugîtâ, we are here told of royal oppressions, of losses of wealth accumulated with great difficulty, and of fierce captivities; we are told, to adapt the language of a modern English poet, of laws grinding the weak, for strong men rule the

law; we have references to the casting of images with liquefied iron, and to the use of elephants as vehicles<sup>1</sup>; and we meet with protests against the amusements of music and dancing, and against the occupation of artisans<sup>2</sup>. True it is, that all these indications put together, fail to constitute what, according to the standard of modern times, would be called a highly artificial state of society. But it seems to me to mark a very perceptible and distinct advance beyond the social condition when mankind was divided into four castes or classes, with such a division of duties, to put it briefly, as that of preparation for a future world, government of this world, agriculture and trade, and service respectively<sup>3</sup>. Artisans, it will be observed, are not even referred to in the Bhagavadgîtâ, nor is there any trace of royal oppressions, or unequal laws. Then as regards music, it may be noted, that there are references to it in the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* and *Kaushîtaki-upanishads*<sup>4</sup>, without any indications of disapprobation. The protest against music, therefore, and the sister art of dancing, is probably to be explained as evoked by some abuses of the two arts which must have come into prevalence about the time of the composition of the Anugîtâ. A similar protest is found recorded in the *Dharmasâstras* of Manu and Âpastamba and Gautama<sup>5</sup>. We shall consider in the sequel the chronological positions of the Anugîtâ with reference to those *Dharmasâstras*. But we have already pointed out that the Gîtâ stands prior to them both<sup>6</sup>.

Look again at the views on caste which are embodied in the Anugîtâ and the Bhagavadgîtâ respectively. The reference to the Kshatriya as representing the quality of passion, while the Brâhmana represents the quality of goodness<sup>7</sup>, seems to place a considerably larger distance between the Brâhmana and the Kshatriya than is suggested by the Bhagavadgîtâ, and thus marks an advance in the direction of the later doctrine on the subject. And in connexion

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Lalita Vistara*, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 325-365.

<sup>3</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 126.

<sup>4</sup> See *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 454, and *Kaushîtaki*, p. 68.

<sup>5</sup> See Bühler's *Âpastamba* I, 1, 3, 11, *Gautama* II, 13, and *Manu* II, 178.

<sup>6</sup> P. 21 seq.

<sup>7</sup> P. 329.

with this, perhaps, the discrepancy between the reading of the *Bhagavadgîtâ* at p. 85, and that of the *Anugîtâ* at p. 255, is not entirely without significance, though much weight would not be due to it, if it stood alone. The expression 'devoted royal sages,' which we find in the one work, makes way for 'well-read Kshatriyas who are intent on their own duties' in the other. Again, although the passage at p. 353 is undoubtedly susceptible of a different interpretation, it seems to me, that the word 'twice-born' there employed, was meant to be interpreted as meaning the *Brâhmaṇas*, and not the three twice-born castes; and if this interpretation is correct, we have here the very proposition upon the absence of which in the *Bhagavadgîtâ* we have already made some observations<sup>1</sup>. That twice-born in the passage in question means *Brâhmaṇa* only, is, of course, not a proved fact. But having regard to the passages noted above and to the passage at p. 320, where reference is made to disparagement of *Brâhmaṇas*—it is not twice-born there—and in the same clause with disparagement of gods and Vedas, it seems to me that the interpretation we have suggested must be taken to be the true one. And it is to be further noted, that this conclusion is corroborated by a comparison of the passage now under consideration with a passage occurring in the *Sânti Parvan*<sup>2</sup>, in the *Râgadharma* section of it, where we read that 'the cow is the first among quadrupeds, gold among metals, a mantra among words, and the *Brâhmaṇa* is the first among bipeds.' The cow and gold occur in the passage in the *Anugîtâ* also, very near the clause we are now discussing. And it is allowable to argue, that reading the two together, twice-born in the *Anugîtâ* must be interpreted to be synonymous with *Brâhmaṇa* in the *Râgadharma*. And the same conclusion is, to my mind, confirmed indirectly by comparing the clause 'the twice-born among men' of the *Anugîtâ* with 'the ruler of men among men' of that *Bhagavadgîtâ*, the teaching of which the former work professes to recapitulate.

<sup>1</sup> P. 24 supra.

See note at p. 353.

A similar inference seems to be derivable from a comparison of the specific doctrines as to the duties of Brâhmanas which are enunciated in the Gîtâ and the Anugîtâ. In the latter work, the famous six duties are expressly mentioned. We have already argued in our Introduction to the Gîtâ, that a comparison of the teaching of that work upon this point with the teaching of Âpastamba and Manu shows the former to have been older than the latter. The six duties mentioned in the Anugîtâ are those also mentioned by Manu and Âpastamba. It follows, therefore, that the Gîtâ is prior to the Anugîtâ also. Whether the Anugîtâ is prior or subsequent to Manu and Âpastamba, is a question which will have to be discussed in the sequel.

The net result of the whole of this comparison appears to me to clearly show the Anugîtâ to be a work of considerably more recent date than the Bhagavadgîtâ. What interval of time lay between the two, is a most interesting, but also a most difficult, question. The differences we have noted appear to me to indicate a pretty wide interval. If I am right in regarding the Gîtâ as a work of what may be called, for practical purposes, the age of the older Upanishads, I am inclined to think that the interval between the Gîtâ and the Anugîtâ must have been one of larger extent than even three or four centuries. For as we have already pointed out, the description of the various 'Itihâsas' mentioned in the Anugîtâ as 'purâtana'—ancient—points to at least three or four centuries having elapsed between the close of the Upanishad period and the composition of the Anugîtâ. It is obvious, however, that this result is not one with which we can rest satisfied. Even if it were more precise and accurate, it would only fix the age of the Anugîtâ with reference to the age of another work itself of unknown and unascertained date. We must therefore endeavour to compare the Anugîtâ with some other work, the date of which is better known. For this purpose, it seems to be not of any great use to refer to the Sâṅkhya and Yoga-sûtras, although it is not improbable that some materials might be forthcoming for a useful comparison between them and the Anugîtâ. Neither the Sâṅkhya nor the Yoga-sûtras can

be said to have their ages fixed with even any approach to accuracy. And in the case of the Sāṅkhya-sūtras, there is the further difficulty presented by the circumstance, that there is room for very serious doubts as to whether the current Sūtras are really of the authorship of Kapila, or whoever else was the original founder of the system. With regard to the Yoga, one or two observations from a different point of view may not, however, be entirely out of place. At p. 248 the Yoga Sāstra is referred to *eo nomine*. What Sāstra is here alluded to? Is it Patañjali's, or some other Sāstra dealing with similar topics? Or, again, is it an entirely different matter that is alluded to, and are we not to see in the expression in question an allusion to any system formally propounded? I own, as stated in the note on the passage, that my mind inclines to the last view. There is not very much to say on either side of the question, as far as I am able to understand it. But the view I incline to appears to have one small circumstance in its favour. At p. 249 we have an allusion to persons who understand the Yoga, and to a certain illustration propounded by them. Now who are these persons? My limited knowledge of Yoga literature has not enabled me to trace the illustration anywhere else than in the Katṛopanishad, and in the Sanatsugâtīya. It seems to me very unlikely, that the illustration can have been put forward in any work older than the Katṛopanishad. And we may, I think, assume it as most probable that the Sanatsugâtīya borrowed it from that work. If so, it is not likely that the Anugîtâ can have referred to any other master of the Yoga than the author of the Katṛopanishad. And then it would seem to follow, that the Anugîtâ must have been composed at a time when, although the Upanishads were looked on with reverence and as works of authority, they were not yet regarded as part and parcel of the Vedic revelation<sup>1</sup>. It is impossible not to perceive, that the train of reasoning here is at every stage hedged round with difficulties and doubts. And the inference therefore to which we are led by it must be accepted with proportionate

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be also the implication of the passage at p. 309, where the rules for final emancipation are alluded to.

caution. But if the reasoning is correct, it seems to be certain, that the Anugîtâ belongs to some period prior to the second, and probable, that it belongs to some period prior to the third century, before Christ. For in the second century before Christ was composed the Mahâbhâshya of Patañjali, in which Rahasyas—which is another name for Upanishads—are mentioned as forming part of the Vedic literature. And in Âpastamba's Dharma-sûtras, which are older than Patañjali, Upanishads<sup>1</sup> are mentioned in the same way. I am aware that it may be said, that because Upanishads as a class of works are mentioned by Patañjali and Âpastamba, it does not follow that any particular Upanishad, such as the Kâtâ, for instance, also existed at that time. This is quite true. But without going now into the general question, it is sufficient to point out, that our argument here is concerned merely with the recognition of the Upanishads as a class of works forming part of the Vedic canon. Such recognition must have come later than the period at which the Anugîtâ could speak of a passage in the Kâtâ-upanishad as the utterance of Yogavids, or persons who understood the Yoga.

Turning now to the materials available for ascertaining the relative chronological positions of the Anugîtâ and the rise of Buddhism, we have again to complain of their unsatisfactory character. We will briefly note the two or three circumstances which appear to have a bearing upon this question. In the first place, we have the word Nirvâṇa used in one passage of the Anugîtâ in the sense of the highest tranquillity, and there the simile of the extinction of the fire is expressly adduced. On this it may be argued, that if the term Nirvâṇa had become the well-understood property of Buddhism, such a use of it as we find here would probably not have occurred. Again, we have the injunction that an ascetic must dwell in a town only for one day and no more, while he may stay at one place during the rains. This is very similar to an injunction prescribed by the Buddhistic teachers also. But

<sup>1</sup> They are also referred to in the Buddhistic Lalita Vistara, p. 65.

this fact furnishes, I think, no safe ground for a chronological inference, more especially because, as pointed out by Dr. Bühler, the Buddhistic injunction is itself only borrowed from the Brahminical rules on the subject<sup>1</sup>. It is impossible, therefore, to say that the *Anugîtâ* borrowed its doctrine from Buddhism. It is, of course, equally impossible on the other hand to say, that Buddhism borrowed its rule from the *Anugîtâ*. And, therefore, we can build no safe inference upon this fact either. We have next the very remarkable passage at chapter XXXIV, where various contradictory and mutually exclusive views of piety are stated, or rather passingly and briefly indicated—a passage which one most devoutly wishes had been clearer than it is. In that passage I can find no reference to Buddhism. True it is that *Nilakantha*'s commentary refers some of the doctrines there stated to Buddhistic schools<sup>2</sup>. But that commentary, unsatisfactory enough in other places, is particularly unsatisfactory here. And its critical accuracy may be judged from its reference to *Saugatas* and *Yogâkâras* apparently as two distinct schools, whereas in truth the *Saugatas* are Buddhists, and *Yogâkâras* one of the four principal Buddhist sects. And it must be further remembered, that the interpretations of *Nilakantha*, upon which his specifications of the different schools are based, are by no means such as necessarily claim acceptance. If then we do not find any reference to Buddhism in this passage, that fact becomes certainly a remarkable one. Still, on the other hand, I am not prepared to apply the 'negative argument' here, and to say that inasmuch as Buddhism is not referred to where so many different opinions are referred to, Buddhism cannot have come into existence at the date of the *Anugîtâ*. It seems to me that the argument will here be a very hazardous one, because if the author of the *Anugîtâ* was, as we may assume he was, an orthodox Hindu, he might well have declined, although not unacquainted with Buddhism, to put into the mouths of the seven sages even as a possible view, that

<sup>1</sup> See *Gautama*, pp. lv and 191.    <sup>2</sup> See also the gloss on chap. XXXIV, st. 14.

which was the view of a school esteemed heretical by the author and his co-religionists. This passage, therefore, also fails to furnish any tangible ground for a chronological inference, at all events in the present state of our knowledge. Lastly, we come to the allusion to those who indulge in constant talk in disparagement of Vedas and Brâhmaṇas, the two being thus bracketed together in the original. That seems, at the first blush, to be a somewhat more distinct allusion to Buddhism than any of those we have noted above. But even that is not unambiguous. If the stanzas quoted by Mâdhavâkârya, in his Sarvadarsanaśaṅgraha in its first section, are the composition of the original founder of the Kârvâka school, or even if they correctly represent the earliest opinions of that school, it is at least quite as likely that the Kârvâkas were the target for the denunciations of the Anugîtâ in the passage in question as that the Buddhists were so. To me, indeed, it appears to be more likely. For Buddha's opinion with regard to the Vedas is, that they are inadequate; with regard to the Brâhmaṇas, that they are in no sense the chosen of God as they claim to be. The opinion of the Kârvâkas, on the other hand, is a far more aggressive one, so to say. According to Mâdhavâkârya, they taught that the Vedas were either simple fatuity or imposture, and that the Brâhmaṇas were impostors. It seems to me much more likely, that this, which I have called a comparatively aggressive attitude, was the one at which the remarks of the Anugîtâ were levelled; and more especially does this appear to be correct when we remember, that the view taught by Gautama Buddha regarding the Vedas and the Brâhmaṇas was propounded by him only in its strongest form; and that even before his time, the doctrine of the inadequacy of the Vedas for the purpose of securing the summum bonum of humanity had been taught by other teachers. It is further to be recollected, that we have evidence showing that other thinkers also than Buddha, or Brîhaspati, had in early days attacked the authority of the Vedas. Kautsa is the name of one who was probably the most distinguished among them. It is certainly possible that his followers



were the people branded as of 'the dark quality' by the *Anugîtâ* in the passage in question. We have, therefore, at least two different recognised bodies of thinkers, and one individual thinker, to whom the words under discussion may apply, and it is plainly unsafe, under these circumstances, to draw any chronological inference based on the hypothesis of one particular body out of those three being the one intended by the author. Before closing this part of the investigation, it may be interesting to note, that the phrase 'turning the wheel,' a phrase now so familiar to us as one of the household words of Buddhism, is used in the *Anugîtâ* with respect to king *Ganaka*. I do not think, however, that either alone, or even coupled with the word *Nirvâṇa*, that phrase can be made the basis of any legitimate deduction in favour of the priority of the *Anugîtâ* to Buddhism. At the outside, the only deduction admissible, if any deduction were admissible, would be, that the *Anugîtâ* was composed prior to the recognition, of *Nirvâṇa* and *Kakrapravartana* as specially Buddhistic words. But priority to such recognition is not, I apprehend, necessarily synonymous with priority to the rise of Buddhism.

The net result of this part of the investigation appears to be, that we have pretty strong grounds for holding the *Anugîtâ* to belong to a period very considerably removed from the period of the Upanishads and the *Bhagavadgîtâ*; but that we have no tangible grounds on which to base any deduction regarding its priority or otherwise to the *Sâṅkhya* and *Yoga* systems of philosophy, or to the great movement of *Gautama Buddha*. There is only one other point, which we can establish in a not entirely unsatisfactory way, and which enables us to draw closer the limits within which the *Anugîtâ* must have been composed. That point is the position of the *Anugîtâ* with reference to *Āpastamba's Dharma-sûtra*. I need not say again, that I accept here the proposition about the age of *Āpastamba* which has been laid down by *Dr. Bühler*, as a sufficiently satisfactory working hypothesis. And accepting that proposition, I venture to suggest the fourth century B.C. as a not unlikely date for the *Anugîtâ*. It appears to me, that a comparison of

the Anugîtâ and the rules of Âpastamba upon one important point which they both deal with shows the priority of the former work. I allude to the rules and regulations touching the four Âsramas or orders contained in the Anugîtâ and in the Dharma-sûtra of Âpastamba. One circumstance strikes us at once on comparing the two works on this point. Âpastamba goes into a very great deal of minute details more than the Anugîtâ, although the latter work does not deal with the topic in any very summary mode. Taking all the differences between the two works together, and the fact that the Anugîtâ sets about the discussion of the topic in a manner which seems intended to be—not, indeed, absolutely exhaustive, but still—very full, I am very strongly inclined to attribute the differences to an actual development and progress of doctrine. I will endeavour to illustrate this view by means of a few detailed instances<sup>1</sup>. And let us first take the order of householders to which the Anugîtâ gives precedence over the others. One of the injunctions laid down by the Anugîtâ is that the householder should always be devoted to his wife. Against this simple precept, we have a very minute series of rules prescribed by Âpastamba, which it is not necessary to refer to specifically, but which may be seen in several of the Sûtras contained in the first *Khandâ* of the first *Patâla* of the second *Prasna*. Compare again the excessive minuteness of the rules regarding the Bali-offering or the reception of guests, as given by Âpastamba, with the simple statement of the Anugîtâ that the five great sacrifices should be performed. There again, I think, we are to see in this difference of treatment the result of a pretty long course of ceremonial progress. Proceeding to the rules regarding the Brahmanin or student, an analogous phenomenon meets us there. Taking first the subject of food, we have a considerable number of detailed injunctions in Âpastamba, compared with the simple rule of the Anugîtâ, that the student should, with the leave of his preceptor, eat his food without decrying it. Again with regard to alms, whereas the Anugîtâ simply

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 358, 360 *infra* with Âpastamba, pp. 9 seq., 103 seq., 114 seq.

says that the student should take his food out of the alms received by him, Âpastamba has an elaborate catena of rules as to how the alms are to be collected, and from whom, and so forth. Take again the provisions in the two works regarding the description of the cloth, staff, and girdle of the student. Âpastamba refers to various opinions on this subject, of which there is not even a trace in the Anugîtâ<sup>1</sup>. It appears that even before Âpastamba's time, distinctions had been laid down as to the description of girdle staff and cloth to be used by the different castes—distinctions of which there is no hint in the Anugîtâ, where all students, of whatever caste, are spoken of under the generic name. These distinctions appear to me to point very strongly to that ceremonial and doctrinal progress of which we have spoken above. The tendency is visible in them to sever the Brâhmaṇas from the other castes—by external marks. And that tendency, it seems to me, must have set in, as the merits which had given the Brâhmaṇa caste its original position at the head of Hindu society were ceasing to be a living reality, and that caste was intrenching itself, so to say, more behind the worth and work of the early founders of its greatness, than the worth and work of their degenerating representatives. These comparisons, taken together, appear to me to warrant the proposition we have already laid down with regard to the priority of the Anugîtâ to Âpastamba. If we have not referred to the rules relating to the two other orders of forester and ascetic, it is because the scope for a comparison of those is very limited. Those rules alone would scarcely authorise the inference drawn above; but I can perceive nothing in them to countervail the effect of the comparisons already made. And it must be remembered, that the rules as to foresters and ascetics would be less apt to undergo change than those as to students and householders.

It appears to me that the view we have now expressed may be also supported by a comparison of the doctrines of the Anugîtâ and Âpastamba touching the duties of Brâhmaṇas. According to Âpastamba, the occupations lawful

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Bühler's Gautama, p. 175.

to Brâhmanas are the famous six referred to in our Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ, and two others superadded, namely, inheritance and gleaning corn in the fields. These last are not mentioned in the Anugîtâ, or in Manu either, and are, even according to Âpastamba, common to Brâhmanas with Kshatriyas and Vaisyas. But as regards the six above referred to, it is worthy of note, that the Anugîtâ apparently groups them into two distinct sets of three. The first set of three consists of those which, in our Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ, we have characterised as constituting rather the rights than the duties of Brâhmanas, and which the Anugîtâ describes as 'means of livelihood for Brâhmanas.' The other set of three consists of real duties, and these the Anugîtâ speaks of as 'pious duties.' This grouping appears to me to furnish powerful corroboration of the view put forward in our Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ. It would seem, that the possession of the moral and spiritual merits which, according to the Gîtâ, constituted the duty of Brâhmanas, in the simple and archaic society there disclosed, was developed, in a more advanced and artificial state of society, into the performance of the 'pious duties' of the Anugîtâ and the duties which are 'the means of livelihood.' Then in the further social evolution, in the course of which the old spiritual view began to be forgotten, and the actual facts of the past began to be transmuted into the dogmatic rules of the future, the occupations of receiving presents, imparting instruction, and officiating at sacrifices, became the special occupations of the Brâhmanas, and the distinction between these occupations from their higher duties was thrown into the background; and accordingly we find no allusion to any such distinction in Âpastamba or Manu, or, as far as I know, in any other later embodiment of the current ideas on the subject<sup>1</sup>. If all this has been correctly argued, the conclusion derivable from it is in entire accord with that which we have already drawn, namely, that the Bhagavadgîtâ, the Anugîtâ, and the Dharma-sûtra of Âpastamba, belong to different

<sup>1</sup> In Gautama X, 1-3, the 'pious duties' are called 'obligatory,' the others 'additional for Brâhmanas.' See the note on the passage in Bühler's edition, and cf. Gautama VIII, 9, 10.

stages of ancient Indian history, and that the stage to which the *Gîtâ* belongs is the earliest, and that to which *Âpastamba* belongs, the latest of such stages.

I am unable to find anything else in the way of internal evidence bearing upon the date of the *Anugîtâ*. It appears to me, that the date to which the investigation we have now gone through leads us, is one which, in the present state of our information, may be fairly accepted as a provisional hypothesis. It does not appear to me to conflict with any ascertained dates, while it is pointed to as probable by the various lines of testimony which we have here considered. We now proceed to discuss one or two other points which may have a bearing upon this topic, but which at present cannot yield us any positive guidance in our search for the date of the *Anugîtâ*. And first among these, let us consider the various names of deities that occur in different parts of the work. We have, then, *Vishnu*, *Sambhu*, *Gishnu*, *Soma*, *Âditya*, *Sûrya*, *Mitra*, *Agni*, *Kandra*, *Rudra*, *Siva*, *Varuna*, *Pragâpati*, *Maghavat*, *Purandara*, *Indra*, *Brahman*, *Satakratu*, *Dharma*, *Nârâyana*, *Vâyu*, *Yama*, *Tvashtri*, *Hari*, *Îsvara*, and lastly *Umâ* under three different names, namely, *Umâ*, *Mâhesvari*, and *Pârvatî*. Now, leaving aside for the moment the three names of *Umâ*, which appear from the passage where they are used to be all three the names of the same goddess, there is no doubt that in the list above set out, some of the names are merely used in different passages, but still to indicate the same being. Thus, *Indra*, *Satakratu*, *Purandara*, and *Maghavat* are really the names of one and the same deity. But when *Soma* is mentioned as the deity presiding over the tongue, and *Kandramas* as the deity presiding over the mind, it becomes doubtful whether the two names do really indicate the same deity, albeit in later Sanskrit *Soma* and *Kandramas* both signify the moon. Similarly, when *Arka* is said to be the deity presiding over the eye, and *Mitra* over another organ, it seems open to question whether *Arka* and *Mitra* both signify the sun there, as they undoubtedly do in classical Sanskrit. True it is, that even in such a recent work as the *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, this mention

of Arka and Mitra as presiding deities of two several organs does occur. But it is plain, that that circumstance can have no bearing on the inquiry before us, for the Sâṅkhya-sâra is avowedly a compilation based on older authorities, and in the particular part under consideration, really reproduces a passage from some older work. It cannot, therefore, be argued, that because Arka and Mitra were identified with one another at the time of the Sâṅkhya-sâra, and yet are mentioned as deities of two separate organs, therefore, they must have also been regarded as one in the older original work where they are also mentioned as deities of two separate organs. And it may, perhaps, be remarked here in passing, that the Vedânta Paribhâṣhâ has *Mṛityu* instead of Mitra, which would get rid of the difficulty here altogether ; while as regards Soma and *Kandramas*, the passage in the Sâṅkhya-sâra reads *Praḥetas* instead of Soma, which would get rid of the other difficulty above pointed out. Whether these discrepancies are owing to any tampering with the lists of organs and deities, at a time when the later identifications between different deities took place, or whether they are to be explained on some other theory. It is impossible at present to say. And, therefore, it is also unnecessary to pursue the inquiry here any further. It must suffice for the present to have drawn attention to the matter.

Akin to this point, though quite distinct from it, is one which arises on a passage where the emancipated being is identified with Vishṇu, Mitra, Agni, Varuṇa, and Pragâpati<sup>1</sup>. Now it is reasonable to suppose, that the deities thus specified here must have been among those held in highest repute at the time, the whole significance of the passage where they are mentioned requiring that that should be so. But in our Pantheon as disclosed by our later literature, Mitra and Agni and Varuṇa occupy but a very subordinate position. Even in Kâlidâsa<sup>2</sup>, the subordination of these deities to our celebrated Trinity seems to be quite

<sup>1</sup> See p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> See inter alia, Kumâra II, 20 seq., and VII, 44 seq., and cf. our *Bhartṛihari* (Bombay Sanskrit Classics), Introd. p. xix.

fully established. But, on the other hand, in the Vedic theogony, they are among the most prominent deities. In the Taittirîya-upanishad, we have in the very first sentence Mitra, Varuṇa, Vishṇu, and Brahman (who may be identified with Pragâpati) all mentioned together, and their blessings invoked. This does not help in fixing a date for the Anugîtâ; but it lends some support to the conclusion already arrived at on that point, by showing that the theogony of the Anugîtâ is not yet very far removed from the theogony of the Vedic times, while it is separated by a considerable interval from the theogony disclosed in the works of even such an early writer of the classical period as Kâlidâsa.

Another point of similar bearing on our present investigation is the mode in which the story of Parasurâma is dealt with in the Anugîtâ. There is in the first place no allusion to his being an incarnation of Vishṇu, nor to the encounter between him and his namesake, the son of Dasaratha and the hero of the Râmâyana. We have, on the contrary, an explicit statement, that after the advice of the 'Pitris' he entirely abandons the slaughter of the Kshatriyas, and resorting to penance thereby achieves final emancipation. We have elsewhere argued<sup>1</sup>, that the theory of Parasurâma being an incarnation of Vishṇu, must have probably originated prior to the time of Bhartrihari, but later than the time of Kâlidâsa. The allusion to Parasurâma in the work before us does not, however, enable us to judge of its chronological position with reference to Kâlidâsa. But the last point discussed renders it unnecessary to consider this question further. It may be noted, by the way, that the Anugîtâ represents Parasurâma, although living in the Âsrama or hermitage of his father, who was a Rishi, as mounting a chariot for the purpose of sweeping away the kinsmen of Kârtavîrya. Whence he obtained a chariot in a hermitage, the Anugîtâ does not explain.

In connexion with the episode of Parasurâma, may be noted the list which occurs in the course of it, of the

<sup>1</sup> See 'Was the Râmâyana copied from Homer?' pp. 56, 57.

degraded Kshatriya tribes, of Dravidas, Sabaras, &c. I am unable to see that those names can give us any further help in our present investigation than in so far as they show that, at the time of the Anugîtâ, there must have been some information about the south of India available in the districts where the author of the Anugîtâ lived. Some of the tribes mentioned appear to have been located far in the south of the Indian peninsula. But this is a point on which we shall have to say something more in discussing the next item of internal evidence to which we shall refer. Here it is enough to point out that some of the tribes mentioned in the Anugîtâ are also referred to in no less a work than the Aitareya-brâhmaza<sup>1</sup>.

We come next to the enumeration of the principal mountains which is contained in one passage of the Anugîtâ. Those mountains are the Himâlaya, the Pâriyâtra, the Sahya, the Vindhya, the Trikûtavat, the Sveta, the Nîla, the Bhâsa, the Koshavav, the Mahendra, the Mâlyavat, and perhaps the Guruskandha. I am not sure whether the last name is intended to be taken as a proper name, or only as an epithet of Mahendra. Now compared with the mountains mentioned in the Bhagavadgîtâ, this is certainly a remarkable list. The Gîtâ mentions only Meru<sup>2</sup> and Himâlaya; while here we have in the Anugîtâ the Sahya, and Malaya, and Trikûtavat, and Nîla (the same, I presume, with the modern Nîlgiri, the Sanatorium of the Madras Presidency), which take us far to the west and south of the Indian peninsula; and the Mahendra and Mâlyavat, which, coupled with the mention of the river Ganges, cover a considerable part of the eastern districts. The Pâriyâtra and Vindhya occupy the regions of Central India. The Anugîtâ, therefore, seems to belong to that period in the history of India, when pretty nearly the whole,

<sup>1</sup> Haug's ed., p. 183. And see generally on these tribes, Wilson's *Vishnu Purâna* (Hall's ed.), vol. ii, p. 170 seq., and *Sânti Parvan* (Moksha), chap. 207, st. 42.

<sup>2</sup> This is also mentioned in the Anugîtâ, but in a different passage. The Nîla is said by Professor Wilson to be a mountain in Orissa. But our suggestion has, I find, been already made by Dr. F. E. Hall also; see on this, and generally, Wilson's *Vishnu Purâna*, vol. iii, p. 141 seq. (ed. Hall). See also *Indian Antiquary*, VI 133 seq.



if not absolutely the whole, of the Indian continent was known to the Sanskrit-speaking population of the country. When was this knowledge reached? It is difficult to fix the precise period; and even if it could be fixed, it would not help us to fix satisfactorily any point of time to which the *Anugîtâ* could be attributed. But it may be pointed out here, that in Patañjali's *Mahâbhâshya* we have evidence of such knowledge having been possessed by the *Âryas* in the second century B.C. In truth, the evidence available in the *Mahâbhâshya* is even fuller than this in the *Anugîtâ*. For Patañjali tells us of a town or city in the south named *Kâñkîpura*<sup>1</sup>; he speaks of the dominions of the *Pândya* kings, and of the *Kola* and *Kerala* districts<sup>2</sup>; he refers also to the large tanks of the south; and he makes allusions to linguistic usages current in the southern and other provinces<sup>3</sup>. Before Patañjali's time there had taken place Mahendra's invasion of Ceylon, and the invading army must have penetrated through the southern provinces. And there had been also put up the great Inscriptions of Asoka, which have attracted so much interest, and are proving such prolific sources of information in various departments of knowledge. One of these inscriptions was at *Gaṇgam*, which is not very far from the Mahendra mountain alluded to in the *Anugîtâ*<sup>4</sup>. All these facts support the conclusion drawn by General Cunningham from the correctness of the information given to Alexander the Great by the Hindus of his time, namely, that 'the Indians, even at that early date in their history, had a very accurate knowledge of the form and extent of their native land<sup>5</sup>.' And not only do they support that conclusion, they show that the knowledge covered other facts regarding

<sup>1</sup> Banâras ed., p. 74 (IV, 2, 2).

<sup>2</sup> P. 60 (IV, 1, 4). See also p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> See *Mahâbhâshya*, p. 82 (I, 1, 5). p. 16 (I, 1, 1); and cf. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. ii, pp. 152, 355.

<sup>4</sup> See Cunningham's *Corpus Inscriptionum*, I, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> See *Ancient Geography of India*, p. 3. And compare also the information collected in the *Periplus of the Eurythryan Sea* (translated by Mr. McRindle), pp. 112-136, where a large number of ports is mentioned as existing on the Indian coasts. The *Periplus* seems to date from about 90 A.D. (see *ibid.* p. 5).

their native land than its form and extent. It follows consequently that this enumeration of mountains does not require the date of the Anugîtâ to be brought down to a later period than the fourth century B.C., and leaves it open to us, therefore, to accept whatever conclusion the other evidence available may seem to justify. On the other hand, it is plain also, that it affords no positive information as to when the Anugîtâ was composed, and therefore we need not dwell any further upon the point on the present occasion.

There are a few other points which arise upon the contents of the Anugîtâ, but which are not, in the present condition of our knowledge, capable of affording any certain guidance in our present investigation. Thus we have the story of Dharma appearing before king Ganaka disguised as a Brâhmaṇa. I am not aware of any case of such disguises occurring in any of the Upanishads, although there are numerous parallel instances throughout the Purânîk literature<sup>1</sup>. It is, however, difficult to draw any definite chronological inference from this fact. There is further the reference to the attack of Râhu on the sun. It is difficult, in the present state of our knowledge, to say for certain, when the theory of eclipses there implied was prevalent. In the *Khândogya-upanishad*<sup>2</sup> we have the emancipated self compared to the moon escaped from the mouth of Râhu. And a text of the Rig-veda, quoted by Mr. Yagñesvara Sâstrin in his *Ārya-vidyâsudhâkara*<sup>3</sup>, speaks of the demon Râhu attacking the sun with darkness. Here again we have another matter of some interest; but I cannot see that any safe deduction can be derived from it, without a more ample knowledge of other relevant matters than is at present accessible. Take again the references to certain practices which look very much like the practices of the Gainas of the present day. Is the Anugîtâ, then, earlier or later than the rise of the Gaina system? It is not safe, I think, to found an answer to this question upon the very narrow basis afforded by the

<sup>1</sup> And see, too, Kâlidâsa Kumâra V, st. 84.

<sup>2</sup> P. 622.

<sup>3</sup> P. 26. In Kâlidâsa's *Raghuvamśa* the true explanation of eclipses is alluded to. See Canto XIV, 40.

passage referred to. But it may be observed, that the precepts laid down in the passage in question are laid down as precepts for orthodox Hindus, and not as the doctrines of a heretical sect. They are also very general, and not so minute as those which the *Gainas* of the present day observe as binding upon them. If, therefore, any conclusion is to be drawn from these precepts, it must be that the *Anugîtâ* must have been composed prior to the rise of *Gainism*; and that *Gainism* must have appropriated and developed this doctrine which it obtained from the current *Brâhmanism*<sup>1</sup>. If this is so, the *Anugîtâ* must be a very ancient work indeed. It is not, however, necessary to further work out this line of argument, having regard to the opinions recently expressed by Mr. Thomas<sup>2</sup>, rehabilitating the views enunciated long ago by Colebrooke and others. If those views are correct, and if *Gainism* was a dominant system in this country prior even to the time of Gautama Buddha, and if, further, we are right in the suggestion—for it is no more, it must be remembered—that the *Anugîtâ* dates from a period prior to the rise of *Gainism*, then it would seem to follow that the *Anugîtâ* belongs to some period prior to the sixth century B.C. All this, however, is at present very hypothetical, and we draw attention to it only that the question may be hereafter considered when fuller materials for expressing a final judgment upon it become accessible. Meanwhile, having regard to the views above alluded to as so elaborately put forward by Mr. Thomas, it is possible for us still to hold that, in the present state of our knowledge, the third or fourth century B.C. is not too early a date to assign to the *Anugîtâ*, even on the assumption that the precepts contained in that work regarding the care to be taken of worms and insects were borrowed by it from the *Gaina* system. With this negative result, we must for the present rest contented.

One other fact of similar nature to those we have now

<sup>1</sup> As the Buddhists did in sundry instances. Cf. inter alia Bühler's *Gautama*, pp. lv and 191. And cf. also 'Was the *Kâmâyāna* copied from Homer?' pp. 48, 49.

<sup>2</sup> See Mr. Thomas's very elaborate discussion of the whole subject in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (New Series), vol. ix, p. 155 seq.

dealt with may, perhaps, be also noticed here. We allude to the stanzas which we find in the Anugîtâ and also in the Sânti Parvan of the Mahâbhârata and in the Manusmṛiti. There is also one which the Anugîtâ has in common with the Parisishṭa of Yâska's Nirukta<sup>1</sup>. It is not possible, I conceive, to say finally whether one of these works borrowed these stanzas from the other of them ; while, on the other hand, it is quite possible, as already argued by us in the Introduction to the Gîtâ, that all these works were only reproducing from some entirely different work, or that the stanzas in question were the common property of the thinkers of the time. We have no means available for deciding between these conflicting hypotheses.

We have thus noticed all the salient points in the evidence, external and internal, which is available for determining the position of the Anugîtâ in our ancient literature. Nobody who has seen even a little of the history of that literature will be surprised at the quantity or quality of that evidence, or the nature of the conclusions legitimately yielded by it. We have endeavoured to express those conclusions in language which should not indicate any greater certainty attaching to them than can fairly be claimed for them. The net result appears to be this. The Anugîtâ may be taken with historical certainty to have been some centuries old in the time of the great Saṅkarâkârya. It was very probably older than the Dharma-sûtras of Âpastamba, but by what period of time we are not in a position at present to define. It was, perhaps, older also than the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, and of the Yoga philosophy ; but on this it is impossible to say anything with any approach to confidence. It is, on the other hand, almost certain that it belongs to a period very considerably removed from the older Upanishads ; probably removed by a distance of some centuries, during which ' stories ' not contained in the Upanishads had not only obtained currency, but also come to be regarded as belonging to antiquity<sup>2</sup>. And yet the period to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Anugîtâ I, 36 with Yâska (ed. Roth), p. 190.

<sup>2</sup> Some of the Purâtana Itihâsas, e.g. that of Nârada and Devamata, are not traceable in any Vedic work known to us. Devamata's name I do not find referred to anywhere else.

which the work belongs was one in which the Upanishads were only revered as the authoritative opinions of eminent men, not as the words of God himself<sup>1</sup>. In this respect, it may be said that the Anugîtâ seems rather to belong to an earlier stratum of thought than even the Sanatsugâtîya, in which a *Gñānakānda*, as forming a part of the Vedic canon, seems to be recognised<sup>2</sup>. But it is abundantly clear, that the Anugîtâ stands at a very considerable chronological distance from the Bhagavadgîtâ.

Such are the results of our investigation. We have not thought it necessary to discuss the verse or the language of the work. But it must in fairness be pointed out, that upon the whole, the verse and language are both pretty near the classical model. There are, it is true, a few instances of the metrical anomalies we have noticed elsewhere, but having regard to the extent of the work, those instances are far from being very numerous. The language and style, too, are not quite smooth and polished; though, judging from them alone, I should rather be inclined to place the Sanatsugâtîya prior to the Anugîtâ. But that suggests a question which we cannot now stop to discuss.

One word, in conclusion, about the translation. The text used has been chiefly that adopted in the commentary of Arguna Misra, a commentary which on the whole I prefer very much to that of Nīlakaṇṭha, which has been printed in the Bombay edition of the Mahābhārata. Arguna Misra, as a rule, affords some explanation where explanation is wanted, and does not endeavour to suit his text to any foregone conclusion. His comments have been of the greatest possible help to me; and my only regret is that the only copy of his commentary which was available to me, and the use of which I owe to the kindness of my friend Professor Bhāṇḍārkar, was not as correct a one as could be desired. I have also looked into the Vishamaslokî, a short work containing notes on difficult passages of the Mahābhārata.

See p. 211 supra.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 146 supra. The Buddhists seem to have borrowed the division of Karma and *Gñānakānda*s. See Dr. Ragendralāla Mitra's *Lalita Vistara* (transl.), p. 21. The division, therefore, was probably older than the first century B. C.

The MS. of it belonging to the Government Collection of MSS. deposited in Deccan College was lent me also by Professor Bhândârkar. The principles adopted in the translation and notes have been the same as those followed in the other pieces contained in this volume.

P. S. I take this opportunity of stating that it is not at all certain that Arguna Misra is the name of the author of the commentary which I have used. I find that in supposing Arguna Misra to be the author, I confounded that commentary, which does not mention its author's name, with the commentary on another section of the Mahâbhârata which does give its author's name as Arguna Misra, and which is also among the MSS. purchased by Professor Bhândârkar for the Government of Bombay. (See with regard to these MSS. Professor Bhândârkar's Report on the Search for Sanskrit MSS. of 7th July, 1880.)

# A N U G Î T Â.

## CHAPTER I.

*Ganamegaya*<sup>1</sup> said :

What conversation, O twice-born one<sup>2</sup>! took place between the high-souled Kesava and Arguna, while they dwelt in that palace<sup>3</sup> after slaying their enemies ?

*Vaisampâyana* said :

The son of *Prithâ*, after becoming possessed of his kingdom (in an) undisturbed (state), enjoyed himself in the company of *Krishna*, full of delight in that heavenly palace. And once, O king! they happened to go, surrounded by their people, and rejoicing, to a certain portion of the palace which resembled heaven. Then Arguna, the son of *Pându*, having surveyed with delight that lovely palace, in the company of *Krishna*, spoke these words : ‘ O you of mighty arms! O you whose mother is *Devakî*<sup>4</sup>! when the battle was about to commence, I became aware of your greatness, and that divine

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<sup>1</sup> This is the prince to whom the *Mahâbhârata*, as we have it, purports to have been related.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. *Vaisampâyana*, who relates the *Mahâbhârata* to *Ganamegaya*.

<sup>3</sup> This appears to have been situated at *Indraprastha*, and to have been the one built for the *Pândavas* by the demon *Maya*, as related in the *Sabhâ Parvan*.

<sup>4</sup> This is a rather unusual form of address.

form of yours<sup>1</sup>. But that, O Kesava ! which through affection (for me) you explained before<sup>2</sup>, has all disappeared, O tiger-like man ! from my degenerate mind. Again and again, however, I feel a curiosity about those topics. But (now), O Mâdhava ! you will be going at no distant date to Dvâarakâ.'

Vaisampâyana said :

Thus addressed, that best of speakers, *Kṛishna*, possessed of great glory, replied in these words after embracing *Arguna*.

Vâsudeva said :

From me, O son of *Prithâ* ! you heard a mystery, and learnt about the eternal<sup>3</sup> (principle), about piety in (its true) form, and about all the everlasting worlds<sup>4</sup>. It is excessively disagreeable to me, that you should not have grasped it through want of intelligence. And the recollection (of it) now again is not possible (to me). Really, O son of *Pându* ! you are devoid of faith and of a bad intellect. And, O *Dhanañgaya* ! it is not possible for me to repeat in full (what I said before). For that doctrine was perfectly adequate for understanding the seat<sup>5</sup> of the Brahman. It is not possible for me to state it again in full in that way. For then accompanied by my mystic power<sup>6</sup>, I declared to you the Supreme Brahman. But I shall relate an ancient story upon

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Bhagavadgîtâ*, chapters X and XI passim.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. in the *Bhagavadgîtâ*.

<sup>3</sup> This may also be taken with piety thus : 'and learnt about the eternal piety in (its true) form.'

<sup>4</sup> As to the plural, see *Saṅkara* on *Mundaka*, p. 320.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 78. For 'understanding' here we might, perhaps, substitute 'attaining.' The original word means both understanding and attaining.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 82.



that subject, so that adhering to this knowledge, you may attain the highest goal. O best of the supporters of piety ! listen to all that I say. (Once), O restrainer of foes ! there came from the heavenly world and the world of Brahman<sup>1</sup>, a Brâhmaṇa difficult to withstand<sup>2</sup>, and he was (duly) honoured by us. (Now) listen, without entertaining any misgivings, O chief of the descendants of Bharata ! O son of Prithâ ! to what he said on being interrogated by us according to heavenly rules<sup>3</sup>.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

O *Krishna* ! O destroyer of Madhu ! I will explain to you accurately what you, out of compassion for (all) beings<sup>4</sup>, have asked me touching the duties (to be performed) for final emancipation. It is destructive of delusion, O Lord ! Listen to me with attention<sup>5</sup>, as I relate it, O Mâdhava ! A certain Brâhmaṇa named Kâsyapa, who had performed (much) penance, and who best understood piety, approached a certain twice-born (person) who had learnt the Scriptures relating to (all) duties<sup>6</sup>, having heard (of him, as one) who had over and over again gone through all knowledge and experience about coming and going<sup>7</sup>, who was well versed in the true nature of all worlds<sup>8</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> This seems to mean not the Supreme Brahman, but the Creator.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sanatsugâtiya, p. 161, 'not to be shaken.'

<sup>3</sup> I suppose this to mean according to the forms proper in the case of such a being as the one in question. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 62, and note there.

<sup>4</sup> This is not easy to understand. Perhaps the allusion is to the doctrine at Gîtâ, pp. 54, 55. <sup>5</sup> Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 447.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. all prescribed acts of piety.

<sup>7</sup> As to knowledge and experience, cf. Gîtâ, p. 57 ; and as to coming and going, cf. *ibid.* p. 84.

<sup>8</sup> I.e. as stated, for instance, at Gîtâ, p. 79, or *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 613.

who knew about happiness and misery<sup>1</sup>, who knew the truth about birth and death<sup>2</sup>, who was conversant with merit and sin, who perceived the migrations of embodied (souls) of high and low (degrees) in consequence of (their) actions, who moved about like an emancipated being, who had reached perfection<sup>3</sup>, who was tranquil, whose senses were restrained, who was illumined with the Brahmic splendour<sup>4</sup>, who moved about in every direction, who understood concealed movements<sup>5</sup>, who was going in company of invisible Siddhas and celestial singers<sup>6</sup>, and conversing and sitting together (with them) in secluded (places), who went about as he pleased, and was unattached (anywhere) like the wind. Having approached him, that talented ascetic possessed of concentration (of mind), that best of the twice-born, wishing to acquire piety, fell at his feet, after seeing that great marvel. And amazed on seeing that marvellous man, the best of the twice-born, Kâsyapa, pleased the preceptor by his great devotion. That was all appropriate<sup>7</sup>, (being) joined to sacred learning and correct conduct. And, O terror of your foes! he pleased that (being) by (his purity of) heart and behaviour (suitable) towards a preceptor<sup>8</sup>. Then being satisfied and pleased, he spoke to the pupil these words, referring to the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 245.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 48, 103.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 162.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. moving about so as not to be seen by everybody.

<sup>6</sup> Literally, 'holders of wheels,' which Arguna Misra interprets to mean '*Kâranas*.' At *Sânti Parvan* (*Moksha Dharma*) CCXLIV, 26 *Nîlakantha* renders *Kakradhara* by *Kakravartin* or Emperor.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. as Kâsyapa was possessed of Vedic lore, and behaved as he ought to behave in his capacity of pupil, it was natural that the other should be pleased.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 176 *seq. supra*.

highest perfection. Hear (them) from me, O Ganârdana !

The Siddha said :

Mortals, O dear friend<sup>1</sup> ! by their actions which are (of) mixed (character), or which are meritorious and pure, attain to this world as the goal, or to residence in the world of the gods<sup>2</sup>. Nowhere is there everlasting happiness ; nowhere eternal residence<sup>3</sup>. Over and over again is there a downfall from a high position attained with difficulty. Overcome by lust and anger, and deluded by desire, I fell into uncomfortable and harassing states (of life), in consequence of (my) committing sin. Again and again death, and again and again birth<sup>4</sup>. I ate numerous (kinds of) food, sucked at various breasts, saw various mothers, and fathers of different sorts ; and, O sinless one ! (I saw) strange pleasures and miseries. Frequently (I suffered) separation from those I loved, association with those I did not love. Loss of wealth also came on me, after I had acquired that wealth with difficulty ; ignominies full of affliction from princes and likewise from kinsmen ; excessively poignant pain, mental and bodily. I also underwent frightful indignities, and fierce deaths and captivities ; (I had a) fall into hell, and torments in the house of Yama<sup>5</sup>. I also suffered much from old age, continual ailments, and numerous misfortunes flowing from the pairs of opposites<sup>6</sup>. Then on one occasion, being much afflicted with misery, I abandoned the whole

<sup>1</sup> The same word as at Gîtâ. p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Khândogya-upanishad*, pp. 356-359. and Gîtâ, p. 84.

<sup>3</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 76, and cf. *Ka/ha*, p. 90.

<sup>4</sup> For the whole of this passage, cf. *Maitrî-upanishad*, p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> See *Manu* VI, 61.

<sup>6</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 48.

course of worldly life, through indifference (to worldly objects), and taking refuge with the formless (principle)<sup>1</sup>. Having learnt about this path in this world, I exercised myself (in it), and hence, through favour of the self<sup>2</sup>, have I acquired this perfection<sup>3</sup>. I shall not come here again<sup>4</sup>; I am surveying the worlds, and the happy migrations<sup>5</sup> of (my) self from the creation of beings to (my attaining) perfection. Thus, O best of the twice-born! have I obtained this highest perfection. From here I go to the next<sup>6</sup> (world), and from there again to the still higher (world)—the imperceptible seat of the Brahman. Have no doubt on that, O terror of your foes<sup>7</sup>! I shall not come back to this mortal world. I am pleased with you, O you of great intelligence! Say, what can I do for you? The time is now come for that which you desired in coming to me. I know for what you have come to me. But I shall be going away in a short time, hence have I given

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<sup>1</sup> Taking refuge, says *Nîlakantha*, in the belief of my being identical with the Brahman, which is to be comprehended by means of the profound contemplation called *Asampragñâta Samâdhi*.

<sup>2</sup> I.e., says *Nîlakantha*, the mind, and he cites *Maitrî*, p. 179. Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 108. The rendering at p. 192 *supra* will also suit (through the self becoming placid). This placidity is defined at *Sânti Parvan* (*Moksha Dharma*) CCXLVII, 11, with which cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 69. See *Gîtâ*, p. 51.

<sup>3</sup> As above described.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 628; see also *ibid.* p. 282.

<sup>5</sup> He calls them happy because they have ended happily, I presume. 'Surveying the worlds' *Nîlakantha* takes to be an index of omniscience. Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 174. See also *Yoga-sûtras* III, 25, and commentary there.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. the world of Brahman, or the *Satyaloka*; and the next step is assimilation into the Brahman.

<sup>7</sup> So read all the copies I have seen, though *Kâsya* is the person addressed.

this hint to you. I am exceedingly pleased, O clever one! with your good conduct. Put (your) questions without uneasiness, I will tell (you) whatever you desire. I highly esteem your intelligence, and greatly respect it, inasmuch as you have made me out<sup>1</sup>; for, O Kâsyapa! you are (a) talented (man).

## CHAPTER II.

Vâsudeva<sup>2</sup> said :

Then grasping his feet, Kâsyapa asked questions very difficult to explain, and all of them that (being), the best of the supporters of piety, did explain.

Kâsyapa said :

How does the body perish, and how, too, is it produced? How does one who moves in this harassing course of worldly life become freed? And (how) does the self, getting rid of nature, abandon the body (produced) from it<sup>3</sup>? And how, being freed from the body, does he attain to the other<sup>4</sup>? How does this man enjoy the good and evil acts done by himself? And where do the acts of one who is released from the body remain?

The Brâhmaṇa said :

Thus addressed, O descendant of *Vrishni*! that Siddha answered these questions in order. Hear me relate what (he said).

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<sup>1</sup> This was difficult, as the Siddha possessed extraordinary powers, such as that of concealed movement, &c. <sup>2</sup> Sic in MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. as to getting rid of nature, *Gîtâ*, pp. 75-106. As to the body produced from nature, cf. *ibid.* p. 112, and pp. 317-318 *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. the Brahman, says *Nilakanṭha*.

The Siddha said :

When those actions, productive of long life and fame<sup>1</sup>, which a man performs here, are entirely exhausted, after his assumption of another body, he performs (actions of an) opposite character, his self being overcome at the exhaustion of life<sup>2</sup>. And his ruin being impending, his understanding goes astray. Not knowing his own constitution<sup>3</sup>, and strength, and likewise the (proper) season, the man not being self-controlled, does unseasonably what is injurious to himself. When he attaches himself to numerous very harassing (actions); eats too much<sup>4</sup>, or does not eat at all; when he takes bad food, or meat<sup>5</sup>, or drinks, or (kinds of food) incompatible with one another, or heavy food in immoderate quantities, or without (previously taken food) being properly digested; or takes too much exercise, or is incontinent; or constantly, through attachment to action, checks the regular course (of the excretions<sup>6</sup>); or takes juicy food<sup>7</sup>; or sleeps by day<sup>8</sup>; or (takes food) not thoroughly prepared; (such a man) himself aggravates the dis-

<sup>1</sup> One reading omits 'fame,' as to which cf. *Taittirîya-upanishad*, p. 129; *Khândogya*, pp. 122-227. As to long life, cf. *Khândogya*, p. 272; exhausted, i.e. by enjoyment of fruit in another world.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Sârîraka Bhâshya*, p. 753 seq., where we have a slightly different view.

<sup>3</sup> Arguna Misra renders the original, *sattva*, by *svabhâva*.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. for all this, *Gîtâ*, pp. 62, 69, 118, which passages, however, are from a slightly different point of view. See also *Khândogya*, p. 526.

<sup>5</sup> A various reading here excludes meat. But cf. *Âpastamba I*, 1, 2, 23; *Gautama II*, 13. <sup>6</sup> So says *Nilakantha*.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. which turns to juice in digestion, much juice being a cause of indigestion, say the commentators.

<sup>8</sup> This is doubtful. The sense may be, 'who takes juicy or not thoroughly prepared food by day and night.' But see *Âsvalâyana Grîhya-sûtra*, p. 90; *Âpastamba I*, 1, 2, 24; *Gautama II*, 13.

orders (in the body) when the time comes<sup>1</sup>. By aggravating the disorders (in) his own (body), he contracts a disease which ends in death, or he even engages in unreasonable (acts), such as hanging<sup>2</sup> (oneself). From these causes, the living<sup>3</sup> body of that creature then perishes. Learn about that correctly as I am about to state it. Heat being kindled in the body, and being urged by a sharp wind<sup>4</sup>, pervades the whole frame, and, verily, checks the (movements of all the) life-winds. Know this truly, that excessively powerful heat, if kindled in the body, bursts open the vital parts—the seats of the soul<sup>5</sup>. Then the soul, full of torments, forthwith falls away from the perishable (body). Know, O best of the twice-born! that (every) creature leaves the body, when the vital parts are burst open, its self being overcome with torments. All beings are constantly distracted with birth and death; and, O chief of the twice-born! are seen abandoning (their) bodies, or entering the womb on the exhaustion of (their previous) actions<sup>6</sup>. Again, a man suffers similar torments, having his joints broken and suffering from

<sup>1</sup> The time of destruction, says Arguna Misra.

<sup>2</sup> Which, say the commentators, leads to death, even without any disease.

<sup>3</sup> So I construe the original, having regard to the question, 'how does the body perish?' The other reading, which is in some respects better, is equivalent to 'the life falls away from the body of that creature.'

<sup>4</sup> This is different, as the commentators point out, from the ordinary life-winds.

<sup>5</sup> The original here is *gîva*, not *âtman*, which we have rendered 'self.' This refers rather to the vital principle. As to the seats, cf. *Yâgñavalkya Smṛiti* III, 93 seq.

<sup>6</sup> I adopt the reading *karmañâm*, which I find in one of the MSS. I consulted. I think it probable that that was the reading before the commentators. The other reading is *marmañâm*.

cold, in consequence of water<sup>1</sup>. As the compact association of the five elements is broken up, the wind in the body, distributed within the five elements<sup>2</sup>, between the upward and downward life-winds, being aggravated by cold, and urged by a sharp wind<sup>3</sup>, goes upwards<sup>4</sup>, abandoning the embodied (self) in consequence of pain. Thus it<sup>5</sup> leaves the body, which appears devoid of breath. Then devoid of warmth, devoid of breath, devoid of beauty, and with consciousness destroyed, the man, being abandoned by the Brahman<sup>6</sup>, is said to be dead. (Then) he ceases to perceive (anything) with those very currents<sup>7</sup> with which the supporter of the body<sup>8</sup> perceives objects of sense. In the same way, it is the eternal soul which preserves in the body the life-winds which are produced from food<sup>9</sup>. Whatever (part of the body) is employed in the collection<sup>10</sup> of that, know

<sup>1</sup> Having spoken of heat, he now speaks of the effects of cold. I am not sure if the water here refers to the water of the 'juicy' substances before referred to.

<sup>2</sup> This means, I presume, within the dissolving body. Cf. *Maitrî-upanishad*, p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> See note 4, last page.

<sup>4</sup> To the head, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>5</sup> That is, the wind, I suppose, and then the breath departs from the body, and the man is said to die. 'Devoid of beauty,' further on, means, disfigured in the state of death.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. the mind, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>7</sup> The senses. Cf. *Svetâsvatara*, p. 288.

<sup>8</sup> See and cf. p. 262 *infra*.

<sup>9</sup> This, says *Arguna Misra*, is in answer to the possible question why this 'sharp wind' does not work with the life-winds. The answer is, that such working requires the presence of the soul, which *Arguna Misra* says here means 'mind.' As to 'production from food,' cf. *Khândogya*, p. 421 seq., and *Taittirîya Âraṇyaka*, p. 893.

<sup>10</sup> Collection of that = turning the food into semen, says *Arguna Misra*, who adds, 'in those vital parts, which are useful for this purpose, the life-wind dwells.'



that to be a vital part, for thus it is seen (laid down) in the Scriptures. Those vital parts being wounded, that (wind) directly comes out therefrom, and entering the bosom of a creature obstructs the heart<sup>1</sup>. Then the possessor of consciousness knows nothing<sup>2</sup>. Having his knowledge enveloped by darkness<sup>3</sup>, while the vitals are still enveloped, the soul<sup>4</sup>, being without a fixed seat, is shaken about by the wind. And then he heaves a very deep and alarming gasp, and makes the unconscious body quiver as he goes out (of it). That soul, dropping out of the body, is surrounded on both sides by his own actions<sup>5</sup>, his own pure and meritorious, as also his sinful (ones). Brâhmanas, possessed of knowledge, whose convictions are correctly (formed) from sacred learning, know him by (his) marks as one who has performed meritorious actions or the reverse. As those who have eyes see a glow-worm disappear here and there in darkness, so likewise do those who have eyes of knowledge. Such a soul, the Siddhas see with a divine eye, departing (from the body), or coming to the birth, or entering into a womb<sup>6</sup>. Its three descriptions<sup>7</sup> of seats are here learnt from the Scriptures. This world is the world of actions<sup>8</sup>, where

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra renders this to mean 'mind.'

<sup>2</sup> As the mind is obstructed, says Arguna Misra. The possessor of consciousness = the self, Arguna.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. pain, Arguna Misra.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. mind, Arguna Misra. <sup>5</sup> Cf. *Brhadâraṇyaka*, p. 843.

<sup>6</sup> See *Aitareya-upanishad*, p. 222, and Saṅkara's commentary there. The coming to the birth is the coming out of the womb into the world. Cf. also *Gītā*, p. 112.

<sup>7</sup> As stated further on, viz. this world, the next world, and the womb. With this compare *Khândogya*, p. 359.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. our *Bhārtrihari* (Bombay series), Notes (*Nītisataka*), p. 27.

creatures dwell. All embodied (selfs), having here performed good or evil (actions), obtain (the fruit). It is here they obtain higher or lower enjoyments by their own actions. And it is those whose actions here are evil, who by their actions go to hell. Harassing is that lower place where men are tormented. Freedom from it is very difficult, and the self should be specially protected from it. Learn from me now the seats in which creatures going up<sup>1</sup> dwell, and which I shall describe truly. Hearing this, you will learn the highest knowledge, and decision regarding action<sup>2</sup>. All (the worlds in) the forms of stars, and this lunar sphere<sup>3</sup>, and also this solar sphere which shines in the world by its own lustre, know these to be the seats of men who perform meritorious actions. All these, verily, fall down again and again in consequence of the exhaustion of their actions<sup>4</sup>. And there, too, in heaven, there are differences of low, high, and middling<sup>5</sup>. Nor, even there, is there satisfaction, (even) after a sight of most magnificent splendour. Thus have I stated to you these seats distinctly. I will after this (proceed to) state to you the production of the foetus<sup>6</sup>. And, O twice-born one! hear that attentively from me as I state it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. on this and 'lower place,' Gîtâ, p. 109; Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, 44.

<sup>2</sup> The readings here are most unsatisfactory. The meaning of the printed reading adopted above would seem to be, 'decision as to what actions should be performed,' &c.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 81, and Sanatsugâtîya, p. 158. <sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84.

<sup>5</sup> Arguna Misra says, 'In heaven=in the next world, low=inferior (?), high=heaven, and middling=the space below the skies (antariksha).' For the three degrees of enjoyment in heaven, see Yôgavâsishtha I, 35 seq.

<sup>6</sup> This is the third of the three seats above referred to.

## CHAPTER III.

There is no destruction here of actions good or not good<sup>1</sup>. Coming to one body after another they become ripened in their respective ways<sup>2</sup>. As a fruitful (tree) producing fruit may yield much fruit, so does merit performed with a pure mind become expanded<sup>3</sup>. Sin, too, performed with a sinful mind, is similarly (expanded). For the self engages in action, putting forward this mind<sup>4</sup>. And now further, hear how<sup>5</sup> a man, overwhelmed with action, and enveloped in desire and anger<sup>6</sup>, enters a womb. Within the womb of a woman, (he) obtains as the result of action a body good or else bad<sup>7</sup>, made up of virile semen and blood. Owing to (his) subtlety and imperceptibility, though he obtains a body appertaining to the Brahman, he is not attached anywhere; hence is he the eternal Brahman<sup>8</sup>. That is the seed of all beings; by that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Maitrî-upanishad, p. 53, and Mundaka, p. 270. And see generally as to this passage, Sârîraka Bhâshya, pp. 751-760.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. they yield their respective fruits; cf. Maitrî, p. 43, and Kândogya, p. 358.

<sup>3</sup> This explains, say the commentators, how even a little merit or sin requires sometimes more than one birth to enjoy and exhaust.

<sup>4</sup> As a king performs sacrifices 'putting forward' a priest, Arguna Misra; and cf. Dhammapada, the first two verses.

<sup>5</sup> Arguna Misra has tathâ, 'in the same way,' instead of this, and renders it to mean 'putting forward' the mind.

<sup>6</sup> Hence he does not get rid of birth and death.

<sup>7</sup> Good=of gods or men; bad=of the lower species of creatures, Arguna.

<sup>8</sup> He, in the preceding sentences, according to Arguna Misra, means the self, through the mind, or 'putting forward' the mind, as said above. In this sentence, he takes 'he' to mean the mind itself; Brahman=the self; and the mind, he says, is called the Brahman, as it, like the self, is the cause of the Kaitanya, intelligence, in all creatures.

all creatures exist. That soul, entering all the limbs of the foetus, part by part, and dwelling in the seat of the life-wind<sup>1</sup>, supports (them) with the mind<sup>2</sup>. Then the foetus, becoming possessed of consciousness, moves about its limbs. As liquefied iron being poured out assumes the form of the image<sup>3</sup>, such you must know is the entrance of the soul into the foetus. As fire entering a ball of iron, heats it, such too, you must understand, is the manifestation of the soul in the foetus. And as a blazing lamp shines in a house, even so does consciousness light up bodies<sup>4</sup>. And whatever action he performs, whether good or bad, everything done in a former body must necessarily be enjoyed (or suffered). Then<sup>5</sup> that is exhausted, and again other (action) is accumulated, so long as the piety which dwells in the practice of concentration of mind for final emancipation<sup>6</sup> has not been learnt. As to that, O best (of men)! I will tell you about that action by which, verily, one going the round of various births, becomes happy. Gifts, penance, life as a Brahmaçârin, adherence to prescribed regulations, restraint of the senses<sup>7</sup>, and also

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the heart.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra says that the soul at the beginning of the sentence means the mind, and mind here means knowledge or intelligence. Cf. p. 238 supra.

<sup>3</sup> In the mould of which, that is to say, it is poured.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 106. The three similes, says Nîlakantha, show that the soul pervades the whole body, is yet imperceptible, and also unattached to the body. Arguna Misra's explanation is different, but I prefer Nîlakantha's.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. by the enjoyment or suffering.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. while he does not possess the knowledge which leads to the piecemeal necessary as a preliminary for final emancipation, and which ultimately destroys action. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 62.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. keeping the senses of hearing &c. from all operations

tranquillity, compassion to (all) beings, self-restraint, and absence of cruelty, refraining from the appropriation of the wealth of others, not acting dishonestly even in thought towards (any) being in this world, serving mother and father, honouring deities and guests, honouring preceptors, pity, purity, constant restraint of the organs<sup>1</sup>, and causing good to be done; this is said to be the conduct of the good<sup>2</sup>. From this is produced piety, which protects people to eternity. Thus one should look (for it) among the good, for among them it constantly abides. The practice to which the good adhere, points out (what) piety (is)<sup>3</sup>. And among them dwells that (course of) action which constitutes eternal piety. He who acquires that, never comes to an evil end<sup>4</sup>. By this are people held in check from making a slip in the paths of piety<sup>5</sup>. But the devotee who is released<sup>6</sup> is esteemed higher than these. For the deliverance from the course of worldly life of the man who acts piously and well, as he should act, takes place after a long time<sup>7</sup>. Thus a creature always meets with (the effects of) the action performed (in a) previous (life). And that<sup>8</sup> is the sole cause by which he comes here (in a) degraded (form). There is

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save those relating to the Brahman. Tranquillity is the same thing as regards the mind.

<sup>1</sup> This I take to mean restraint of the active organs, such as speech, &c. 'Self-restraint' is rendered by *Nīlakantha* to mean 'concentration of mind.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Maitrī*, p. 57; *Khândogya*, p. 136; and *Gîtâ*, pp. 103, 119.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Āpastamba* I, 1, 1, 2; I, 7, 20, 7; *Sakuntalâ*, p. 30 (Williams).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 72.

<sup>5</sup> By this, i.e. by the practice of the good, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>6</sup> From delusion, *Arguna Misra*; emancipated by force of his devotion, *Nīlakantha*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 73; *Khândogya*, pp. 136, 137. <sup>8</sup> Scil. the action.

in the world a doubt as to what originally was the source from which he became invested with a body. And that I shall now proceed to state. Brahman, the grandfather of all people, having made a body for himself, created the whole of the three worlds, moving and fixed<sup>1</sup>. From that he created the Pradhâna, the material cause of all embodied (selves), by which all this is pervaded, and which is known in the world as the highest<sup>2</sup>. This is what is called the destructible<sup>3</sup>; but the other<sup>4</sup> is immortal and indestructible. And Pragâpati, who had been first created, created all creatures and (all) the fixed entities, (having) as regards the moving (creation), a pair separately for each<sup>5</sup> (species). Such is the ancient (tradition) heard (by us). And as regards that, the grandsire fixed a limit of time, and (a rule) about migrations among (various) creatures, and about the return<sup>6</sup>. What I say is all correct and proper, like (what may be said by) any talented person who has in

<sup>1</sup> I.e. animate and inanimate. 'A body for himself' = undeveloped Âkâsa, Nîlakanta. But see Sâṅkhya-sâra, p. 19, and Sâṅkhya Prav. Bhâshya I, 122, and III, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. inter alia Gîtâ, p. 58 and note, and Sâṅkhya-sâra, p. 11. As to the words at the beginning of this sentence, 'from that,' cf. Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 67, where everything is derived from Âkâsa, mentioned in the last note, and Âkâsa from the Brahman.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 113, where there are three principles distinguished from each other.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. the self. Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> A pair, i.e. a male and female for each species, such as man, &c.. Arguna Misra.

<sup>6</sup> Pragâpati fixed the limit of life for every 'moving' creature, and the rule as to going from one species of body into another, and as to going from one world to another. As to a part of 'the ancient tradition,' the first stanza of the Mundaka-upanishad may be compared.

a former birth perceived the self<sup>1</sup>. He who properly perceives pleasure and pain to be inconstant, the body to be an unholy aggregate<sup>2</sup>, and ruin to be connected with action<sup>3</sup>, and who remembers that whatever little there is of happiness is all misery<sup>4</sup>, he will cross beyond the fearful ocean of worldly life, which is very difficult to cross. He who understands the Pradhâna<sup>5</sup>, (though) attacked by birth and death and disease, sees one (principle of) consciousness in all beings possessed of consciousness<sup>6</sup>. Then seeking after the supreme seat, he becomes indifferent to everything<sup>7</sup>. O best (of men)! I will give you accurate instruction concerning it. Learn from me exhaustively, O Brâhmaṇa! the excellent knowledge concerning the eternal imperishable seat, which I am now about to declare.

#### CHAPTER IV.

He who becoming placid<sup>8</sup>, and thinking of nought, may become absorbed in the one receptacle<sup>9</sup>, abandoning each previous (element), he will cross beyond

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra says the strength of the impression in the former birth would give him this knowledge in the subsequent birth.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sanatsugâtîya, p. 155.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. inter alia p. 256 infra.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Otherwise called Prakṛti, or nature.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 124.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 111.

<sup>8</sup> We now begin, as Nîlakantha points out, the answer to the question put above by Kâśyapa about the emancipation of the self. Placid, Arguna Misra renders to mean 'silent, taciturn.' See p. 234 supra.

<sup>9</sup> The path of knowledge, says Arguna Misra; the Brahman, says Nîlakantha. Abandoning each element=absorbing the gross into the subtle elements, and so forth, Nîlakantha; abandoning each elementary mode of worship till one reaches that of contemplating the absolute Brahman, Arguna Misra.

(all) bonds. A man who is a friend of all, who endures all, who is devoted to tranquillity<sup>1</sup>, who has subdued his senses, and from whom fear and wrath have departed, and who is self-possessed<sup>2</sup>, is released. He who moves among all beings as if they were like himself<sup>3</sup>, who is self-controlled, pure, free from vanity<sup>4</sup> and egoism, he is, indeed, released from everything. And he, too, is released who is equable towards both life and death<sup>5</sup>, and likewise pleasure and pain, and gain and loss, and (what is) agreeable and odious<sup>6</sup>. He who is not attached to any one, who contemns no one, who is free from the pairs of opposites, and whose self is free from affections<sup>7</sup>, he is, indeed, released in every way. He who has no enemy, who has no kinsmen, who has no child, who has abandoned piety, wealth, and lust altogether, and who has no desire, is released. He who is not pious and not impious<sup>8</sup>, who casts off (the merit or sin) previously accumulated, whose self is tranquillised by the exhaustion of the primary elements of the body<sup>9</sup>, and who is free from the pairs of opposites, is released. One who does no action<sup>10</sup>, and who has no desire, looks on this universe as

<sup>1</sup> This, in the terminology of the Vedânta, means keeping the mind from everything save 'hearing' &c. about the Brahman.

<sup>2</sup> One who has his mind under his control. But see Gîtâ, p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 71.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. the desire to be honoured or respected, *Arguna Misra*. Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> Who does not care when death comes. <sup>6</sup> Cf. p. 151 supra.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Gîtâ for all this, pp. 101, 103, 125, &c. <sup>8</sup> Cf. *Katha*, p. 101.

<sup>9</sup> *Nilakantha* says this means the constituents of the body. *Arguna Misra* says, 'Prâna or life-wind,' &c. They are seven. See gloss on *Khândogya-upanishad*, p. 441, and p. 343 infra.

<sup>10</sup> Because, says *Arguna Misra*, he has no desire. *Nilakantha* says this means an ascetic, sannyâsin. See p. 257 infra, note 1.



transient, like an Asvattha tree<sup>1</sup>, always full of birth, death, and old age<sup>2</sup>. Having his understanding always (fixed) upon indifference to worldly objects, searching for his own faults<sup>3</sup>, he procures the release of his self from bonds in no long time. Seeing the self void of smell<sup>4</sup>, void of taste, void of touch, void of sound, void of belongings, void of colour, and unknowable, he is released. He who sees the enjoyer of the qualities<sup>5</sup>, devoid of qualities, devoid of the qualities of the five elements<sup>6</sup>, devoid of form, and having no cause, is released. Abandoning by the understanding<sup>7</sup> all fancies bodily and mental<sup>8</sup>, he gradually obtains tranquillity<sup>9</sup>, like fire devoid of fuel. He who is free from all impressions<sup>10</sup>, free from the pairs of opposites, without belongings, and who moves among the collection of organs with penance<sup>11</sup>, he is indeed released. Then freed from all impressions, he attains to the eternal

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 111, where Saṅkara explains the name to mean 'what will not remain even till to-morrow.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 109, and other passages.

<sup>3</sup> Arguna Misra has a different reading, which means 'particularly observing the evils of (the three kinds of) misery.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 119; *Mundaka*, p. 267; and *Māṇḍukya*, p. 371.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 104, 105, and *Kaṭha*, p. 112.

<sup>6</sup> *Nīlakanṭha* says this refers to the gross elements, the next expression to the subtle ones, and being free from these two, he is 'devoid of qualities,' viz. the three qualities. <sup>7</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> I.e. those which cause bodily and mental activity.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Maitrî*, p. 178. The original is the famous word 'Nirvāṇa.'

<sup>10</sup> Scil. derived from false knowledge, says Arguna Misra. *Nīlakanṭha* says all impressions from outside oneself which are destroyed by those produced from concentration of mind, &c. See p. 391 infra.

<sup>11</sup> I.e. all those operations by which the internal man is rendered pure and free from all taints; see below, p. 248, where *Nīlakanṭha* renders it as 'the performance of one's duty which is called penance.' But see, too, pp. 74, 119, 166 supra. The meaning seems to be that the

Supreme Brahman, tranquil, unmoving, constant, indestructible<sup>1</sup>. After this I shall explain the science of concentration of mind, than which there is nothing higher, (and which teaches) how devotees concentrating (their minds) perceive the perfect self<sup>2</sup>. I will impart instruction regarding it accurately. Learn from me the paths<sup>3</sup> by which one directing the self within the self perceives the eternal<sup>4</sup> (principle). Restraining the senses, one should fix the mind on the self; and having first performed rigorous penance<sup>5</sup>, he should practise concentration of mind for final emancipation. Then the talented Brâhmaṇa, who has practised penance, who is constantly practising concentration of mind, should act on (the precepts of) the science of concentration of mind<sup>6</sup>, seeing the self in the self by means of the mind<sup>7</sup>. If such a good man is able to concentrate the self on the self, then he, being habituated to exclusive meditation<sup>8</sup>, perceives the self in the self. Being

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man in question lets his senses work, but does not permit himself to be in any way identified with their operations. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 64.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the expressions at Gîtâ, p. 45. 'Unmoving,' which occurs at Îsa, p. 10, is there explained by Saṅkara to mean 'always the same.' The same sense is given by Mahîdhara. Weber's *Satapatha*, p. 980.

<sup>2</sup> 'Perfect' would seem to mean here free from all bonds or taints, the absolute.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. sources of knowledge, says Arguna Misra.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. as to 'directing the self within the self,' Gîtâ, p. 69. Nilakantha says, 'paths, means of mental restraint, the self, mind; in the self, in the body.'

<sup>5</sup> See p. 247, note 11. Nilakantha's note there referred to occurs on this passage. See also p. 166, note 1 supra.

<sup>6</sup> It is not easy to say what this science is. Is it Patañjali's system that is meant? No details occur to enable one to identify the 'science.' But, probably, no system is alluded to.

<sup>7</sup> See note 4 above.

<sup>8</sup> Nilakantha has a very forced explanation of the original word,

self-restrained and self-possessed<sup>1</sup>, and always concentrating his mind, and having his senses subjugated, he who has achieved proper concentration of mind<sup>2</sup> sees the self in the self. As a person having seen one in a dream, recognises him (afterwards), saying, 'This is he;' so does one who has achieved proper concentration of mind perceive the self<sup>3</sup>. And as one may show the soft fibres, after extracting them from the *Muñga*, so does a devotee see the self extracted from the body. The body is called the *Muñga*; the soft fibres stand<sup>4</sup> for the self. This is the excellent illustration propounded by those who understand concentration of mind. When an embodied (self) properly perceives the self concentrated<sup>5</sup>, then there is no ruler over him, since he is the lord of the triple world<sup>6</sup>. He obtains various bodies as he pleases; and casting aside old age and death, he grieves not and exults not. The man who

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which also occurs further on; he takes the meaning to be, 'he who is habituated to that by which the One is attained, viz. meditation.'

<sup>1</sup> The original is the same as at *Gîtâ*, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, one who has got the power of concentrating his mind as he pleases; and the words 'always concentrating' &c., just before, would mean 'one who always exercises that power.'

<sup>3</sup> I.e. having perceived the self in the state of concentration, he sees the whole universe to be the self in this state when the concentration has ceased, *Nîlakantha*. *Arguna Misra* says, 'having perceived the self at the time of concentration, he recognises it as the same at the time of direct perception,' meaning, apparently, the time of final emancipation.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. the reality, which in this simile forms the substratum of what are called the fibres; the simile is in the *Kaṭha-upanishad*; see, too, *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. on the supreme self, as above explained.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 161; *Svetâsvatara*, p. 290; and *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 218; *Khândogya*, p. 523; *Aitareya*, p. 26; *Kaushîtaki*, p. 126.

has acquired concentration of mind, and who is self-restrained, creates for himself even the divinity of the gods<sup>1</sup>; and abandoning the transient body, he attains to the inexhaustible Brahman. When (all) beings are destroyed, he has no fear; when (all) beings are afflicted, he is not afflicted by anything<sup>2</sup>. He whose self is concentrated, who is free from attachment, and of a tranquil mind, is not shaken by the fearful effects of attachment and affection<sup>3</sup>, which consist in pain and grief<sup>4</sup>. Weapons do not pierce him<sup>5</sup>; there is no death for him; nothing can be seen anywhere in the world happier than he. Properly concentrating his self, he remains steady to the self; and freed from old age and grief, he sleeps at ease. Leaving this human frame, he assumes bodies at pleasure. But one who is practising concentration should never become despondent<sup>6</sup>. When one who has properly achieved concentration perceives the self in the self, then he forthwith ceases to feel any attachment to Indra himself<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> I do not quite understand the original. The other reading, *dchatvam* for *devatvam*, is not more intelligible. But comparing the two, the meaning seems to be, that the divinity of the gods, i.e. their qualities and powers as gods, are within his reach, if he likes to have them.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 107.

<sup>3</sup> Affection is the feeling that a thing is one's own; attachment is the feeling of liking one has for a thing acquired with difficulty, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>4</sup> Pain appears to be the feeling immediately following on hurt or evil suffered; grief is the constant state of mind which is a later result.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Yoga-sûtra Bhâshya*, p. 208.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 70. Despondency is the feeling that one has not acquired 'concentration' after much practice, and that therefore the practice should be abandoned.

<sup>7</sup> The other reading here may be rendered, 'Then forthwith Indra himself esteems him highly.'

Now listen how one habituated to exclusive meditation attains concentration. Thinking<sup>1</sup> of a quarter seen before, he should steady his mind within and not out of the city in which he dwells. Remaining within (that) city, he should place his mind both in its external and internal (operations) in that habitation in which he dwells. When, meditating in that habitation, he perceives the perfect one, his mind should not in any way wander outside. Restraining the group of the senses, in a forest<sup>2</sup> free from noises and unpeopled, he should meditate on the perfect one within his body with a mind fixed on one point. He

<sup>1</sup> This is all rather mystical. *Nilakantha* takes 'city' to mean 'body,' and 'habitation' to mean the *mûlâdhâra*, or other similar mystic centre within the body, where, according to the Yoga philosophy, the soul is sometimes to be kept with the life-winds, &c. 'Thinking of a quarter,' &c., he explains to mean 'meditating on the instruction he has received after studying the Upanishads.' I do not understand the passage well. 'City' for 'body' is a familiar use of the word. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 65. The original word for habitation occurs at *Aitareya-upanishad*, p. 199, where *Saṅkara* explains it to mean 'seat.' Three 'seats' are there mentioned,—the organs of sight, &c.; the mind; and the *Âkâsa* in the heart. There, too, the body is described as a 'city,' and *Anandagiri* explains habitation to mean 'seat of amusement or sport.' Here, however, the meaning seems to be that one should work for concentration in the manner indicated, viz. first fix the mind on the city where one dwells, then on the particular part of it oftenest seen before, then one's own habitation, then the various parts of one's body, and finally one's own heart and the Brahman within it. Thus gradually circumscribed in its operations, the mind is better fitted for the final concentration on the Brahman. As to external and internal operations, cf. note 8, p. 247. The perfect one is the Brahman. Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 171. As to *âvasatha*, which we have rendered by 'habitation,' see also *Mândukya*, p. 340; *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 751; and the alternative sense suggested by *Saṅkara* on the *Aitareya*, loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Maitrî-upanishad*, p. 100.

should meditate on his teeth<sup>1</sup>, palate, tongue, neck, and throat likewise, and also the heart, and likewise the seat of the heart. That talented pupil, O destroyer of Madhu! having been thus instructed by me, proceeded further to interrogate (me) about the piety (required) for final emancipation, which is difficult to explain. 'How does this food eaten from time to time become digested in the stomach? How does it turn to juice and how also to blood? And how, too, do the flesh, and marrow, and muscles, and bones—which all (form) the bodies for embodied (selves)—develop in a woman as that (self) develops? How, too, does the strength develop? (And how is it also) about the removal of non-nutritive (substances)<sup>2</sup>, and of the excretions, distinctly? How, too, does he breathe inwards or outwards? And what place does the self occupy, dwelling in the self<sup>3</sup>? And how does the soul moving about carry the body? And of what colour and of what description (is it when) he leaves it? O sinless venerable sir! be pleased to state this accurately to me.' Thus questioned by that Brâhmana, O Mâdhava! I replied<sup>4</sup>, 'O you of mighty arms! O

<sup>1</sup> Nîlakantha cites numerous passages from works of the Yoga philosophy in illustration of this. He takes 'heart' to mean the Brahman seated in the heart (cf. *Khândogya*, p. 528), and 'the seat of the heart' to mean the one hundred and one passages of the heart. The latter expression Arguna Misra seems to render by 'mind.' See also generally on this passage, *Maitrî-upanishad*, p. 133, and *Yoga-sûtra* III, 1 and 28 seq., and commentary there.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, 'those which are void of strength.' I adopt Arguna Misra's reading. The other reading literally means 'obstructions.'

<sup>3</sup> The self here means the body, I take it. See p. 248 supra.

<sup>4</sup> The reply does not appear here. Nîlakantha says that the succeeding chapters contain it. Arguna Misra seems to say that the answer has been already given. The context here is obscure.

restrainer of (your) foes! according to what (I had) heard. As one placing any property in his store-room should fix his mind on the property<sup>1</sup>, so placing one's mind in one's body, and (keeping) the passages confined, one should there look for the self and avoid heedlessness<sup>2</sup>. Being thus always assiduous and pleased in the self, he attains in a short time to that Brahman, after perceiving which he understands the Pradhâna<sup>3</sup>. He is not to be grasped by the eye, nor by any of the senses. Only by the mind (used) as a lamp is the great self perceived<sup>4</sup>. He has hands and feet on all sides; he has eyes, heads, and faces on all sides; he has ears on all sides; he stands pervading everything in the world<sup>5</sup>. The soul sees the self<sup>6</sup> come out from the body; and abandoning his body, he perceives the self,—holding it to be the immaculate Brahman,—with, as it were, a mental smile<sup>7</sup>. And then depending upon it thus, he attains final emancipation in me<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Nîlakantha says the original means household effects; Arguna Misra says wealth, and adds, the mind is fixed on it from fear of others finding it out.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sanatsugâtîya, p. 152. Here, however, the sense is the ordinary one.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. all nature, that from which the universe is developed.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Katha, pp. 117-130. See Sânti Parvan (Moksha) CCXL, 16.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 103. The stanza occurs often in the Bhârata. This, says Arguna Misra, answers the question 'how the soul carries the body.' • The soul can do that as it is all-pervading.

<sup>6</sup> The individual soul, which has acquired true knowledge, perceives the self to be distinct from the body. See p. 249 supra.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. at the false notions which he entertained. Nîlakantha says, 'smile, i.e. amazement that he should have been deceived by the mirage-like course of worldly life.'

<sup>8</sup> I.e. final emancipation and assimilation with the supreme; 'depending upon it thus' = taking refuge with the Brahman in the way above stated.

This whole mystery I have declared to you, O best of Brâhmanas<sup>1</sup>! I will now take my leave, I will go away; and do you (too) go away, O Brâhmana! according to your pleasure.' Thus addressed by me, O Krishna! that pupil, possessed of great penance,—that Brâhmana of rigid vows,—went away as he pleased.

Vâsudeva said :

Having spoken to me, O son of Prithâ! these good words relating to the piety (required) for final emancipation, that best of Brâhmanas disappeared then and there. Have you listened to this, O son of Prithâ! with a mind (fixed) on (this) one point only<sup>2</sup>? For on that occasion, too, sitting in the chariot you heard this same (instruction). It is my belief, O son of Prithâ! that this is not easily understood by a man who is confused, or who has not acquired knowledge with his inmost soul purified<sup>3</sup>. What I have spoken, O chief of the descendants of Bharata! is a great mystery (even) among the gods. And it has never yet been heard by any man in this world, O son of Prithâ! For, O sinless one! there is no other man than you worthy to hear it. Nor is it easily to be understood by (one whose) internal self (is) confused. The world of the gods<sup>4</sup>, O son of Kuntî! is filled by those who perform

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<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra says, the only questions among those<sup>e</sup> stated above, which are of use for final emancipation, have been here answered. The others should be looked for elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> The original words here are identical with those at Gîtâ, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup> I adopt Nilakantha's reading here. Arguna Misra reads 'vigagdhena,' which he explains to mean 'one who eats kinds of food incompatible with one another.' A third reading is 'krîtaghneṇa,' ungrateful.

<sup>4</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 84.



actions. And the gods are not pleased with a cessation of the mortal form<sup>1</sup>. For as to that eternal Brahman, O son of *Prithâ*! that is the highest goal, where one, forsaking the body, reaches immortality and is ever happy. Adopting this doctrine, even those who are of sinful birth, women, Vaisyas, and *Sûdras* likewise, attain the supreme goal. What then (need be said of) *Brâhmanas*, O son of *Prithâ*<sup>2</sup>! or well-read *Kshatriyas*, who are constantly intent on their own duties, and whose highest goal is the world of the Brahman? This has been stated with reasons; and also the means for its acquisition; and the fruit of its full accomplishment, final emancipation, and determination regarding misery<sup>3</sup>. O chief of the descendants of *Bharata*! there can be no other happiness beyond this. The mortal, O son of *Pându*! who, possessed of talents, full of faith, and energetic<sup>4</sup>, casts aside as unsubstantial the (whole) substance of this world<sup>5</sup>, he forthwith attains the highest goal by these means. This is all that is to be said, there is nothing further than this. Concentration of mind comes to him, O son of *Prithâ*! who practises concentration of mind constantly throughout six months<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 234, where *Śaṅkara* quotes the original stanza, but with a reading which means, 'And the gods are not pleased at mortals rising above (them).' That is a better reading.

<sup>2</sup> See *Ġitâ*, pp. 85, 86, where the words are nearly identical with those in the text.

<sup>3</sup> This is not quite clear. Does 'determination regarding misery,' the original of which is *duḥkhasya ka vinirṇayaḥ*, mean 'conclusion of all misery?' Comp. *Ġitâ*, p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> *Arguna Misra* says this means assiduous.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. wealth and so forth, says *Nīlakaṇṭha*. Cf. 'human wealth' at *Sanatsugâtīya*, p. 161.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Maitrī-upanishad*, p. 154. The copy of *Arguna Misra*'s

## CHAPTER V.

On this<sup>1</sup>, too, O chief of the descendants of Bharata! they relate this ancient story, (in the form of) a dialogue, which occurred, O son of Prithâ! between a husband and wife. A Brâhmana's wife, seeing the Brâhmana her husband, who had gone through all knowledge and experience<sup>2</sup>, seated in seclusion, spoke to him (thus): 'What world, indeed, shall I go to, depending on you as (my) husband, you who live renouncing (all) action, and who are harsh and un-discerning<sup>3</sup>. We have heard that wives attain to the worlds acquired by (their) husbands. What goal, verily, shall I reach, having got you for my husband?' Thus addressed, that man of a tranquil self, spoke to her, with a slight smile: 'O beautiful one! O sinless one! I am not offended at these words of yours. Whatever action there is, that can be caught (by the touch)<sup>4</sup>, or seen, or heard, that only do the men of action engage in as action. Those who are devoid of knowledge only lodge<sup>5</sup> delusion in themselves by means of action. And freedom from action is not to be attained in this world even for an

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commentary which I have used, says that the Anugîtâ ends here. But, as we have shown, there is a verse coming further on, which Saṅkarâkârya cites as from the Anugîtâ. In the printed copies of the Mahâbhârata the next chapter is called the Brâhmanagîtâ.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the questions at p. 252, Nîlakantha; more probably, perhaps, the 'doctrine' mentioned at p. 254 is what is alluded to.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 57 and note.

<sup>3</sup> Nîlakantha says this means 'ignorant that the wife has no other support.' Arguna Misra interprets kînâsa to mean 'indigent' instead of 'harsh.'

<sup>4</sup> So Arguna Misra. Nîlakantha's reading and his interpretation of the passage are different.

<sup>5</sup> I follow Arguna Misra; the original literally means 'restrain.'

instant<sup>1</sup>. From birth to the destruction of the body, action, good or bad, by act, mind or speech<sup>2</sup>, does exist among (all) beings. While the paths<sup>3</sup> (of action), in which the materials are visible, are destroyed by demons<sup>4</sup>, I have perceived by means of the self the seat abiding in the self<sup>5</sup>—(the seat) where dwells the Brahman free from the pairs of opposites, and the moon together with the fire<sup>6</sup>, upholding (all) beings (as) the mover of the intellectual principle<sup>7</sup>; (the seat) for which<sup>8</sup> Brahman and others concentrating (their minds) worship that indestructible (principle), and for which learned men have their senses restrained, and their selves tranquil, and (observe) good vows. It is not to be smelt by the nose, and not to be tasted by the tongue. It is not to be touched by the sense of touch, but is to be apprehended by the mind. It cannot be

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 52, 53; see also, as to freedom from action, *Gîtâ*, p. 127.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. thought, word, and deed. I have in the text kept to a more literal rendering.

<sup>3</sup> This is *Nîlakantha*'s reading and interpretation. Arguna Misra reads 'actions visible and invisible.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. inter alia *Kumâra-sambhava* II, 46.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. says Arguna Misra, the safe place, within the body; and says *Nîlakantha*, the seat called *Avimukta*, between the nose and the brows; as to which cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 67. In the *Kenopanishad* (p. 220) the word *âyatana* is used to signify a means to the attainment of the Brahman.

<sup>6</sup> The moon and fire constitute the universe, says Arguna Misra. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 113. *Nîlakantha* interprets this more mystically as referring to the *Idâ* and *Pîngalâ* arteries.

<sup>7</sup> So *Nîlakantha*, but he takes it to stand for 'vâyu' or wind, as a distinct principle. The sense is by no means clear. But the moon being the deity of the mind also may, perhaps, be described as she is here, on that account.

<sup>8</sup> This is Arguna Misra's interpretation of the original locative.

conquered by the eyes, and is entirely beyond the senses of hearing. It is devoid of smell, devoid of taste and touch, devoid of colour and sound, and imperishable<sup>1</sup>. (It is that) from which (this whole) expanse<sup>2</sup> (of the universe) proceeds, and on which it rests. From this the Prâna, Apâna, Samâna, Vyâna, and Udâna also proceed, and into it they enter<sup>3</sup>. Between the Samâna and the Vyâna, the Prâna and the Apâna moved. When that<sup>4</sup> is asleep, the Samâna and Vyâna also are absorbed<sup>5</sup>; and between the Prâna and the Apâna dwells the Udâna pervading (all). Therefore the Prâna and the Apâna do not forsake a sleeping person. That is called the Udâna, as the life-winds are controlled<sup>6</sup> (by it). And therefore those who study the Brahman engage in penance<sup>7</sup> of which I am the goal<sup>8</sup>. In

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note 4, p. 247 supra, and p. 253.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra says this means the five great elements, the eleven organs (active and perceptive, and the mind), the life-wind, and the individual soul.

<sup>3</sup> The Prâna is at the nose, the Apâna at the arms, the Samâna at the navel, the Vyâna pervades the whole body, and the Udâna is at all the joints; cf. Yoga-sûtra III, 38 seq. Nîlakantha says this explains how the 'expanse' (meaning, he says, the operations of the creation, &c.) 'proceeds' from the Brahman. See on the life-winds, *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 667; *Khândogya*, pp. 42-188; *Sâṅkhyatattvakaumudî*, p. 96; *Vedânta Paribhâṣhâ*, p. 45; p. 271 infra.

<sup>4</sup> The self, Arguna Misra. Nîlakantha says, 'the Prâna accompanied by the Apâna.'

<sup>5</sup> I. e. into the Prâna and Apâna, Arguna Misra.

<sup>6</sup> Nîlakantha derives the word thus, *utkarshena ânayati*.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. the subjugation of the life-winds as indicated at Gîtâ, p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> The meaning of the passage as a whole is not very clear, and the commentators afford but little help. The sense appears to be this: The course of worldly life is due to the operations of the life-winds which are attached to the self and lead to its manifestations as individual souls. Of these, the Samâna and Vyâna are

the interior<sup>1</sup>, in the midst of all these (life-winds) which move about in the body and swallow up one another<sup>2</sup>, blazes the Vaisvâna fire<sup>3</sup> sevenfold. The nose, and the tongue, and the eye, and the skin, and the ear as the fifth, the mind and the understanding, these are the seven tongues<sup>4</sup> of the blaze of Vaisvânara. That which is to be smelt, that which is to be drunk, that which is to be seen, that which is to be touched, and likewise that which is to be heard, and also that which is to be thought of, and that which is to be understood, those are the seven (kinds of) fuel for me<sup>5</sup>. That which smells, that which eats, that which sees, that which touches, and that which hears as the fifth, that which thinks, and that which understands, these are the seven great officiating priests<sup>6</sup>. And mark this always,

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controlled and held under check by the Prâna and Apâna, into which latter the former are absorbed in sleep. The latter two are held in check and controlled by the Udâna, which thus controls all. And the control of this, which is the control of all the five, and which is otherwise called penance, destroys the course of worldly life, and leads to the supreme self.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. within the body.

<sup>2</sup> As explained in note 8, p. 258.

<sup>3</sup> This, says Nîlakantha, explains the word 'I' in the sentence preceding. Vaisvânara is a word often used to denote the self. The Vishamaslokî derives it thus, 'that which saves all beings from hell;' see the Prasna-upanishad, pp. 167-188 (where seven tongues are also referred to); Mundaka, p. 292; Khândogya, p. 364; Mândukya, p. 341.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Taittirîya-âraṇyaka, p. 802.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. the Vaisvânara. Cf. Taittirîya-âraṇyaka, p. 803 and gloss.

<sup>6</sup> These I take to be the powers of hearing, &c., which are presided over by the several deities; or, better, perhaps, they may mean the soul distinguished as so many with reference to these several powers; cf. Brîhadâraṇyaka, p. 169; Maitrî, p. 96; Prasna, pp. 214, 215; Kaushîtaki, p. 96; Aitareya, p. 187; Khândogya, p. 616. The latter sense is accepted by Arguna Misra.

O beautiful one! The learned sacrificers throwing (in) due (form) the seven offerings into the seven fires in seven ways, produce them in their wombs<sup>1</sup>; (namely), that which is to be smelt, that which is to be drunk, that which is to be seen, that which is to be touched, and likewise that which is to be heard, that which is to be thought of, and also that which is to be understood. Earth, air, space, water, and light as the fifth, mind and understanding, these seven, indeed, are named wombs. All the qualities which stand<sup>2</sup> as offerings are absorbed in the mouth of the fire<sup>3</sup>; and having dwelt within that dwelling are born in their respective wombs<sup>4</sup>. And in that very (principle), which is the generator of all entities, they remain absorbed during (the time of) deluge. From that<sup>5</sup> is produced smell; from that is produced taste; from that is produced colour; from that touch is produced; from that is produced sound; from that doubt<sup>6</sup> is produced; from that is produced determination. This (is what) they know as the sevenfold production. In this very way was it<sup>7</sup> comprehended by the ancients. Becoming perfected by the perfect sacrifice<sup>8</sup>, they were perfectly filled with light.'

<sup>1</sup> The next clause explains this; that which is to be smelt is earth, and so on throughout. The men who sacrifice all sensuous objects, get such powers that they can create the objects whenever they like. As to 'in their wombs,' see Yoga Bhâshya, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. are so treated in the above allegory.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. the Brahman.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. when the sacrificer wishes, as stated in note 1.

<sup>5</sup> That principle—viz. the Brahman.

<sup>6</sup> This is the operation of the mind, see Gîtâ, p. 57 note.

<sup>7</sup> The Brahman, *Angana Misra*. Or it may be the 'sevenfold production.'

<sup>8</sup> The wholesale sacrifice of all sensuous perceptions. The

## CHAPTER VI.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

On this, too, they relate this ancient story. Learn now of what description is the institution of the ten sacrificial priests<sup>1</sup>. The ear<sup>2</sup>, the skin, the two eyes, the tongue, the nose, the two feet, the two hands, speech, the genital organ, and the anus, these, verily, are ten sacrificial priests, O beautiful one! Sound, touch, colour, and taste, smell, words, action, motion, and the discharge of semen, urine, and excrement, these are the ten oblations. The quarters, wind, sun, moon, earth and fire, and Vishṇu also, Indra, Praṇâpati, and Mitra, these, O beautiful one! are the ten fires<sup>3</sup>. The ten organs are the makers of the offering; the offerings are ten, O beautiful one! Objects of sense, verily, are the fuel; and they are offered up into the ten fires. The mind is the ladle<sup>4</sup>; and the wealth is the pure, highest knowledge<sup>5</sup>. (Thus) we have heard, was the universe duly divided<sup>6</sup>. And the mind, which is the instru-

root corresponding with perfect occurs three times in the original, hence the repetition of perfect above.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Taittirîya-brâhmaṇa, p. 411, and Âraṇyaka, p. 281.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Brâhadâraṇyaka, p. 459. The reading in the printed edition of Bombay is defective here.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 337 seq., where all this is more fully explained. And cf. the analogous Buddhistic doctrine stated at Lalita Vistara (Translation by Dr. R. Mitra), p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> See Taittirîya-âraṇyaka loc. cit., and cf. Gîtâ, p. 61. 'The wealth' probably means the Dakṣiṇâ to be given to the priests, which is mentioned at Gîtâ, p. 119.

<sup>5</sup> The 'priests' here being the senses, the knowledge would accrue to them, as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 108.

<sup>6</sup> See note 3.

ment of knowledge, requires everything knowable<sup>1</sup> (as its offering). The mind is within the body the upholder of the frame, and the knower is the upholder of the body<sup>2</sup>. That<sup>3</sup> upholder of the body is the Gârhapatya fire; from that another is produced, and the mind which is the Âhavanîya; and into this the offering is thrown. Then the lord of speech was produced<sup>4</sup>; that (lord of speech) looks up to the mind. First, verily, are words produced; and the mind runs after them.

<sup>1</sup> Each sense can only offer up its own perceptions—the mind offers up all knowledge whatever.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra says this is an implied simile, the mind is an upholder of the body as the 'knower' or self is.

<sup>3</sup> Arguna Misra says this means 'the mind.' I think it better to take it here as the self (see p. 238 supra), to which the 'mind' and the 'other,' mentioned further on, would be subordinate; the 'other' Arguna Misra renders by the 'group of the senses.' The senses are compared to fires at Gîtâ, p. 61. The passage at Taittirîya-âraṇyaka above cited refers only to the Gârhapatya and Âhavanîya fires. Nîlakanṭha's text and explanation of this passage are, to my mind, not nearly so satisfactory as Arguna Misra's.

<sup>4</sup> In the Taittirîya-brâhmana and Âraṇyaka loc. cit., the equivalent of the original word for 'lord of speech' here occurs, viz. Vâkpati for Vâkaspati here; but that is there described as the Hotri priest, and speech itself as the Vedî or altar. The commentator there interprets 'lord of speech' to mean the wind which causes vocal activity, and resides in the throat, palate, &c. As to mind and speech, see also Khândogya, pp. 285-441, and comments of Saṅkara there. The meaning of this passage, however, is not by any means clear to my mind. The Darahotri mantras in the Taittirîya are stated to be the mantras of the Ishî, or sacrifice, performed by Pragâpati for creation. It is possible, then, that the meaning here is, that speech which is to be learnt by the pupil, as stated further on—namely, the Vedas—was first produced from that Ishî (cf. Kullûka on Manu I, 21). But to understand that speech, mind is necessary; hence it is said to look up to the mind. The Brâhmana's wife, however, seems to understand speech as ordinary speech, hence her question.



The Brâhmana's wife said :

How did speech come into existence first, and how did the mind come into existence afterwards, seeing that words are uttered (after they have been) thought over by the mind? By means of what experience does intelligence come to the mind, and (though) developed, does not comprehend<sup>1</sup>? What verily obstructs it?

The Brâhmana said :

The Apâna becoming lord changes it into the state of the Apâna in consequence. That is called the movement of the mind, and hence the mind is in need (of it)<sup>2</sup>. But since you ask me a question regarding speech and mind, I will relate to you a dialogue between themselves. Both speech and mind went to the self of all beings<sup>3</sup> and spoke (to him thus), 'Say which of us is superior; destroy our doubts, O lord!' Thereupon the lord positively said to speech, 'Mind (is superior).' But speech thereupon said to him, 'I, verily, yield (you) your desires<sup>4</sup>.'

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<sup>1</sup> This, again, is to my mind very hard to understand. The original word for 'intelligence' is *mati*, which at *Khândogya*, p. 514, Sâṅkara interprets thus: 'intelligence is pondering, application to (literally, respect for) the subject of thought.' The original for 'developed,' Arguna Misra renders by 'mixed or assimilated with;' and 'does not comprehend,' he takes to mean 'does not understand—speech or words.' This question appears to be suggested by the last words of the previous speech.

<sup>2</sup> These two sentences are again very obscure. *Nilakantha*, as usual, deserts his original, giving peculiar meanings to the words without producing any authority. Arguna Misra is very meagre, and besides the MS. is very incorrect. See p. 264, note 5 *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. *Pragâpati*; says Arguna Misra, which seems to be justified by the sequel. *Nilakantha* takes it to mean the individual self, which doubtless is its meaning elsewhere, e. g. *Maitrî*, p. 56.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. speech conveys information on all matters, Arguna Misra;

The Brâhmana<sup>1</sup> said :

Know, that (in) my (view), there are two minds<sup>2</sup>, immovable and also movable. The immovable, verily, is with me ; the movable is in your dominion. Whatever mantra, or letter, or tone goes to your dominion, that indeed is the movable mind<sup>3</sup>. To that you are superior. But inasmuch, O beautiful one! as you came personally to speak to me (in the way you did)<sup>4</sup>, therefore, O Sarasvatî! you shall never speak after (hard) exhalations<sup>5</sup>. The goddess speech, verily, dwelt always between the Prâna and Apâna<sup>6</sup>. But, O noble one! going with the Apâna

as the means of acquiring desired fruit, visible or invisible, is learnt by speech, *Nîlakantha*. Cf. as to all this, *Bṛihadâraṇyaka-upanishad*, pp. 50 seq. and 261.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. *Nîlakantha* says, 'the Brâhmana named mind,' alluding apparently to p. 310 infra. But the reading of some of the MSS., viz. Brahman for the Brâhmana, seems preferable, having regard to what follows. Apparently, the Brâhmana's own speech should begin at 'The goddess speech' further on.

<sup>2</sup> *Nîlakantha* says, immovable=to be understood by the external senses ; movable=not perceptible by senses, such as heaven, &c., which is not quite intelligible. *Arguna Misra* says, the immovable mind is that of the teacher, which is fixed, as it has not to learn or acquire anything, while that of the pupil is movable as acquiring new impressions and knowledge.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. it is the movable mind which takes cognisance of the significations of all mantras (sacred texts), letters, tones, in which, I presume, sacred instruction is conveyed. To this mind, speech is superior, as that mind only works on what speech places before it ; but the mind which is 'with' *Pragâpati*, is superior to speech as it is not dependent on speech like the other.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. proudly, about her being the giver of desires to Brahman.

<sup>5</sup> I.e., says *Arguna Misra*, the words will not come out with the Prâna life-wind and convey any sense to the hearer, but will be absorbed down into the Apâna life-wind, and not be articulated as speech at all. Cf. *Kaushîtaki*, p. 41 ; *Kaṭha*, p. 184 (with glosses) ; and *Khândogya*, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> I.e., I presume, was dependent on the two life-winds named.

wind<sup>1</sup>, though impelled, (in consequence of) being without the *Prâna*, she ran up to *Pragâpati*, saying, 'Be pleased<sup>2</sup>, O venerable sir!' Then<sup>3</sup> the *Prâna* appeared again nourishing speech. And therefore speech never speaks after (hard) exhalation. It is always noisy or noiseless. Of those two, the noiseless is superior to the noisy<sup>4</sup> (speech). This excellent (speech), like a cow, yields milk<sup>5</sup>, and speaking of the Brahman it always produces the eternal (emancipation). This cow-like speech, O you of a bright smile! is divine, with divine<sup>6</sup> power. Observe the difference of (its) two subtle, flowing (forms)<sup>7</sup>.

The *Brâhmaṇa*'s wife said :

What did the goddess of speech say on that occasion in days of old, when, though (she was) impelled with a desire to speak, words could not be uttered?

The *Brâhmaṇa* said :

The (speech) which is produced in the body by

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Cf. p. 353 *infra*. For this sense of the word 'between,' see p. 258 *supra*, and *Khândogya-upanishad*, p. 623.

<sup>1</sup> And not with the *Prâna*, so as to be articulated. Cf. p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. to withdraw the 'curse' pronounced, as above stated.

<sup>3</sup> After the curse was withdrawn, says *Arguna Misra*. Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 317.

<sup>4</sup> Since, says *Arguna Misra*, noiseless speech is the source of all words—*Vânmaya*. Perhaps we may compare *Aitareya-brâhmaṇa* (*Haug*), p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. *Vânmaya* ; milk, as a source of pleasure.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. enlightening, *Arguna Misra*. But, perhaps, the translation should be, 'has powers divine and not divine.' As to this, cf. *Sânkhya Bhâshya* on III, 41, and *Sânkhyatattvakaumudî*, p. 118, and *Wilson's Sâṅkhya Kârikâ*, p. 37 (Sanskrit), and *Svetâsvatara*, p. 284 (gloss).

<sup>7</sup> *Arguna Misra* refers to a 'Satapatha text' in praise of the subtle speech. I cannot trace the text. But see *Nirukta* (*Roth*), pp. 167-187.

means of the Prâna<sup>1</sup>, and which then goes into the Apâna, and then becoming assimilated with the Udâna leaves the body<sup>2</sup>, and with the Vyâna envelopes all the quarters<sup>3</sup>, then (finally) dwells in the Samâna<sup>4</sup>. So speech formerly spoke. Hence the mind is distinguished by reason of its being immovable, and the goddess distinguished by reason of her being movable<sup>5</sup>.

## CHAPTER VII.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

On this, too, O beautiful one ! they relate this ancient story, (which shows) of what description is the institution of the seven sacrificial priests<sup>6</sup>. The

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 285, and the passage there quoted by Sâikara as well as Ânandagiri's gloss. And see, too, p. 353 *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. the part of it which specially appertains to speech—the throat, &c.

<sup>3</sup> All the nâḍīs or passages of the body, Arguna Misra.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. at the navel in the form of sound, as the material cause of all words. There and in that condition speech dwells, after going through the body, as above stated. There, adds Arguna Misra, devotees are to meditate on speech.

<sup>5</sup> This is not quite clear, but the meaning seems to be, that the merit of the immovable mind consists in its unchangeability, and that of speech in being the cause of variations in the movable mind by conveying new knowledge and new impressions. Cf. on this result, *Khândogya-upanishad*, p. 482.

<sup>6</sup> Arguna Misra says, the last chapter explained Prânâyâma, and this explains Pratyâhâra. Prânâyâma is the restraint of the life-winds, Pratyâhâra that of the senses, according to the Yoga philosophy (see the quotation in the commentary at Yoga-sûtra III, 1, and see also pp. 141–145). Cf. also Gîtâ, p. 61. The Saptahotrî-vidhâna as taught in the Taittirîya-brâhmaṇa and Âraṇyaka is to be found a few pages after the pages referred to for the Darahotrî-vidhâna at p. 261 *supra*. And the other Vidhânas also are to be found in the same parts of those books.

nose, and the eye, and the tongue, and the skin, and the ear as the fifth, mind and understanding, these are the seven sacrificial priests separately stationed. Dwelling in a minute space, they do not perceive each other. Do you, verily, O beautiful one! learn about these sacrificial priests, (which are) seven according to (their several) natures.

The Brâhmana's wife said :

How (is it) these do not perceive each other, dwelling (as they do) in a minute space? What are their natures, O venerable sir? Tell me this, O lord!

The Brâhmana said :

Not knowing the qualities (of anything) is ignorance (of it). Knowledge of the qualities is knowledge. And these never know the qualities of each other. The tongue, the eye, the ear likewise, the skin, the mind, and the understanding also, do not apprehend smells, the nose apprehends them. The nose, the eye, the ear likewise, the skin, the mind, and the understanding also, do not apprehend tastes, the tongue apprehends them. The nose, the tongue, the ear likewise, the skin, the mind, and the understanding also, do not apprehend colours, the eye apprehends them. The nose, the tongue, and next the eye, the ear, the understanding, the mind likewise, do not apprehend (objects of) touch, the skin apprehends them. The nose, the tongue, and the eye, the skin, the mind, and the understanding also, do not apprehend sounds, the ear apprehends them. The nose, the tongue, and the eye, the skin, the ear, and the understanding also, do not apprehend doubt, the mind apprehends it. The nose, the tongue, and the eye, the skin, the ear, and the mind

also, do not apprehend final determination, the understanding apprehends it. On this, too, they relate this ancient story,—a dialogue, O beautiful one! between the senses and the mind.

The mind said :

The nose smells not without me, the tongue does not perceive taste, the eye does not take in colour, the skin does not become aware of any (object of) touch. Without me, the ear does not in any way hear sound. I am the eternal chief among all elements<sup>1</sup>. Without me, the senses never shine, like an empty dwelling, or like fires the flames of which are extinct. Without me, all beings, like fuel half dried and half moist, fail to apprehend qualities or objects, even with the senses exerting themselves<sup>2</sup>.

The senses said :

This would be true as you believe, if you, without us, enjoyed the enjoyments (derived from) our objects<sup>3</sup>. If when we are extinct, (there is) pleasure and support of life, and if you enjoy enjoyments, then what you believe is true; or if when we are absorbed<sup>4</sup>, and objects are standing, you enjoy objects according to their natures by the mere operation of the mind.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kaushîtaki-upanishad, p. 93 ; *Khândogya*, p. 297 ; Maitrî, p. 158 ; and *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 284. The passages in the last two works seem to be identical ones.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. in their respective operations.

<sup>3</sup> The implication, of course, is, as Arguna Misra says, that this is not so, as what is not perceived by the senses cannot be the object of the mind's operations,—a proposition which reminds one of the maxim, 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu,' apparently without Leibnitz's limitation of it. Cf. Archbishop Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> As in sleep, &c.

If again you think your power over our objects is constant<sup>1</sup>, then take in colours by the nose, take in tastes by the eye, take in smells by the ear, take in (objects of) touch by the tongue, and take in sounds by the skin, and also (objects of)<sup>2</sup> touch by the understanding. For those who are powerful have no rules (to govern them); rules are for the weak. You should accept enjoyments unenjoyed before; you ought not to enjoy what has been tasted<sup>3</sup> (by others). As a pupil goes to a preceptor for Vedic learning, and having acquired Vedic learning from him, performs the directions of the Vedic texts, so you treat as yours<sup>4</sup> objects shown<sup>5</sup> by us, both past and future<sup>6</sup>, in sleep and likewise wakefulness. Besides, when creatures of little intelligence are distracted in mind, life is seen to be supported, when our objects<sup>7</sup> perform their functions. And even after having carried on numerous mental operations, and indulged in dreams, a creature, when troubled by desire to enjoy, does run to objects of sense only. One entering upon enjoyments, resulting from mental operations (alone), and not connected with objects

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<sup>1</sup> I. e. if you can enjoy objects independently of the senses, whenever you choose to perform your operations. This, says Arguna Misra, meets an objection which might be made, that the mind at the time stated does not desire objects.

<sup>2</sup> Sic in original. It comes twice.

<sup>3</sup> Eating what has been tasted by another is a cause of degradation. Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 81; *Maitrî*, p. 103; and p. 363 *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> You incorrectly attribute to yourself the quality of apprehending them.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. presented before you by us.

<sup>6</sup> This is not quite clear. Arguna Misra has, 'not past, not future;' literally, 'not come, not gone.'

<sup>7</sup> Viz. smell, sound, &c.; not by the mere operations of the mind, but by obtaining the objects, is life supported.

of sense, (which is) like entering a house without a door<sup>1</sup>, always meets death, on the exhaustion of the life-winds<sup>2</sup>, as a fire which is kindled (is extinguished) on the exhaustion of fuel. Granted, that we have connexions with our (respective) qualities, and granted that we have no perception of each other's qualities; still, without us, you have no perception<sup>3</sup>, and so long no happiness can accrue to you.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

On this, too, they relate an ancient story, O beautiful one! (showing) of what description is the institution of the five sacrificial priests. The learned know this to be a great principle, that the Prâṇa and the Apâna, and the Udâna, and also the Samâna and the Vyâna, are the five sacrificial priests.

The Brâhmaṇa's wife said :

My former belief was that the sacrificial priests were seven by (their) nature<sup>4</sup>. State how the great principle is that there are verily five sacrificial priests<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The senses are the doors of the house here, as they are among the doors of the city at Gîtâ, p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> Owing to the want of food, &c. Cf. Maitrî, p. 112, and *Khândogya*, p. 422.

<sup>3</sup> Perception of pleasure, says Arguna Misra; but he takes the subsequent clause to mean this, 'and without you no pleasure accrues to us either.' The text is here in an unsatisfactory state.

<sup>4</sup> As stated in the last chapter; some MSS. read 'your' for 'my' at the beginning of the sentence.

<sup>5</sup> Arguna Misra says that in this *Pañkahotri*-vidhâna the five chief Hot-~~is~~ only are stated for briefly explaining the Prânâyâma.



The Brâhmaṇa said :

The wind prepared by the Prâṇa afterwards becomes the Apâṇa. The wind prepared in the Apâṇa then works as the Vyâṇa. The wind prepared by the Vyâṇa works as the Udâṇa. And the wind prepared in the Udâṇa is produced as Samâṇa<sup>1</sup>. They formerly went to the grandsire, who was born first, and said to him, 'Tell us which is greatest among us. He shall be the greatest among us<sup>2</sup>.'

Brahman said :

He, verily, is the greatest, who being extinct, all the life-winds in the body of living creatures become extinct; and on whose moving about, they again move about. (Now) go where (you) like.

The Prâṇa said :

When I am extinct, all the life-winds in the body

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<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra says, 'The wind going to the Prâṇa, and being obstructed in upward progress by the Prâṇa, goes to the Apâṇa, and then unable to go upwards or downwards, enters the passages or nâḍīs of the body and becomes Vyâṇa. In the same way Udâṇa, by the collision of the two, produces sound in the throat, and depends on Prâṇa and Apâṇa; so, too, the Samâṇa dwelling in the navel and kindling the gastric fire is also dependent on those two.' The meaning seems to be that one life-wind is distributed in the different places, and gets different names, as stated, in the order mentioned. See Maitrî, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> A similar visit on the part of the Prâṇas (who, however, are not there the life-winds only, but the Prâṇa life-wind and the active organs) to Pragâpati is mentioned at *Bṛihadâraṇyaka-upanishad*, p. 1016, and *Khândogya*, p. 297. Cf. also *Prasna*, p. 178; *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 317; and *Kaushîtaki*, p. 63. See also, generally, as to the life-winds and their functions, *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 280, and Sâṅkara's comment there; *Yoga-sûtras* III, 38, and comment; Cowell's note at Maitrî, p. 247; *Sâṅti Parvan* (Moksha Dharma), chap. 184, st. 24-25; chap. 185, st. 1 seq.; and p. 258 supra.

of living creatures become extinct; and on my moving about, they again move about. I am the greatest. See I am extinct!

The Brâhmana said :

Then the Prâna became extinct, and again moved about. Then the Samâna and Udâna also<sup>1</sup>, O beautiful one! spoke these words, 'You do not pervade all this here as we do. You are not the greatest among us, O Prâna, because the Apâna is subject to you<sup>2</sup>.' The Prâna again moved about<sup>3</sup>, and the Apâna<sup>4</sup> said to him.

The Apâna said :

When I am extinct, all the life-winds in the body of living creatures become extinct; and on my moving about, they again move about. I am the greatest. See I am extinct!

The Brâhmana said :

Then the Vyâna and the Udâna addressed him who was speaking (thus): 'You are not the greatest, O Apâna! because the Prâna is subject to you.' Then the Apâna moved about, and the Vyâna spoke to him : 'I am the greatest among (you) all. Hear the reason why. When I am extinct, all the life-winds in the body of living creatures become extinct.

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra says, Vyâna and Apâna also by force of the two 'ands' which occur in the original; and so in other places too.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra says on this, 'The Prâna moves upwards through the help of the Apâna. If it moved downwards, it would be simply absorbed into the Apâna.'

<sup>3</sup> I.e. recommenced its proper operation in its proper place.

<sup>4</sup> And the other life-winds also, Arguna Misra says, the name Prâna being merely 'indicative,' as the phrase is, of the class to which it belongs.

And on my moving about, they again move about.  
I am the greatest. See I am extinct !'

The Brâhmaṇa said :

Then the Vyâna became extinct, and again moved about. And the Prâna and Apâna, and the Udâna, and the Samâna, spoke to him, 'You are not the greatest among us, O Vyâna! because the Samâna<sup>1</sup> is subject to you.' The Vyâna moved about again, and the Samâna spoke again. 'I am the greatest among (you) all. Hear the reason why. When I am extinct, all the life-winds in the body of living creatures become extinct; and on my moving about, they again move about. I am the greatest. See I am extinct !' Then the Samâna moved about, and the Udâna said to him: 'I am the greatest among (you) all. Hear the reason why. When I am extinct, all the life-winds in the body of living creatures become extinct; and on my moving about, they again move about. I am the greatest. See I am extinct !' Then the Udâna became extinct, and again moved about. And the Prâna and Apâna, and the Samâna, and the Vyâna also, spoke to him: 'O Udâna! you are not the greatest. The Vyâna<sup>2</sup> only is subject to you.'

The Brâhmaṇa said :

Then Brahman, the lord of (all) creatures, said to them who were assembled together: 'You are all greatest, and not greatest<sup>3</sup>. You are all possessed

<sup>1</sup> Because the Samâna helps in the digestion of the food which afterwards goes to the Vyâna for distribution through the nâḍīs.

<sup>2</sup> Because the Udâna is able to generate sound after the nâḍīs are filled up by the Vyâna.

<sup>3</sup> 'Not greatest' because none of them is independent of the other. 'Greatest' Arguna Misra renders by 'superior to objects.'

of one another's qualities<sup>1</sup>. All are greatest in their own spheres, and all support one another. There is one unmoving<sup>2</sup> (life-wind). There are others moving about, (which are) five, owing to (their) specific qualities. My own self is one only<sup>3</sup>, (but) accumulated in numerous (forms). Being friendly with one another, and pleasing one another, go away happily. Welfare be to you! Support one another.'

## CHAPTER IX.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

On this, too, they relate this ancient story, a dialogue between Nârada and the sage Devamata.

Devamata said :

When a creature is about to be born, what comes into existence first, his Prâṇa, or Apâna, or Samâna, or Vyâna, or else Udâna ?

Nârada said :

By whichever the creature is produced, that which is other than this first comes to him. And the pairs of the life-winds should be understood, which (move) upwards, or downwards, or transversely.

<sup>1</sup> This is not quite clear. I presume it means that each one has the generic qualities which make the others great in their own spheres; but the specific qualities are different.

<sup>2</sup> The one life-wind is supposed here to be generally unmoving, but its distribution among the different parts of the body as specified, for instance, in the commentary on the Yoga-sûtra III, 38, gives it the different names. The expression does not seem to be quite accurate for this, which nevertheless seems to be the true sense.

<sup>3</sup> Another reading is, 'That one is my own self.' Cf. Maitrî, pp. 28 seq., 105, and Bhagavadgîtâ, p. 169.

Devamata said :

By which (of the life-winds) is a creature produced ? and which (of them) first comes to him ? Explain to me also the pairs of the life-winds, which (move) upwards, or downwards, or transversely.

Nârada said :

Pleasure is produced from a mental operation <sup>1</sup>, and (it) is also produced from a sound, (it) is also produced from taste, and (it) is also produced from colour, and (it) is also produced from touch, and (it) is also produced from smell. This is the effect <sup>2</sup> of the Udâna ; the pleasure is produced from union <sup>3</sup>. From desire the semen is produced ; and from the semen is produced menstrual excretion. The semen and the blood are produced by the Samâna and the Vyâna in common <sup>4</sup>. From the combination of the semen and the blood, the Prâna comes first into operation ; and the semen being developed by the Prâna, the Apâna then comes into operation. The pair Prâna and Apâna go upwards and downwards, and the Samâna and Vyâna are called the pair (moving) transversely. It is the teaching of the

<sup>1</sup> I.e. desire. 'Sound' = recollection of a woman's voice ; 'taste,' scil. of chastity ; 'colour' = the beauty of a woman, Arguna Misra. Cf. Âpastamba I, 2, 7, 8, and Lalita Vistara, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, 'form,' which Arguna Misra interprets to mean effect, and adds, 'The Udâna causes mental activity, and by mental activity sound &c. are apprehended.'

<sup>3</sup> I.e. of Udâna and mind, Arguna Misra ; adding, 'the result is that a creature is produced by the Udâna.'

<sup>4</sup> Or, perhaps, generally, that is to say, the store of them, the specific semen being produced from desire, as before stated. The Samâna's function is the digestion of food, and that of the Vyâna is the distribution of the digested food to the whole body through the nâdîs, hence the proposition in the text.

Veda, that the fire verily is all the deities<sup>1</sup>, and knowledge (of it) arises among Brâhmanas, being accompanied by intelligence<sup>2</sup>. The smoke of that (fire), which is of excellent glory, (appears) in the shape of (the quality of) darkness; (its) ashes, (the quality of) passion; and (the quality of) goodness is that in connexion with it<sup>3</sup>, in which the offering is thrown. Those who understand the sacrifice understand the Samâna and the Vyâna as the principal (offering). The Prâna and Apâna are portions<sup>4</sup> of the offering of clarified butter, and between them is the fire. That is the excellent seat of the Udâna as understood by Brâhmanas<sup>5</sup>. As to that which is distinct from these pairs<sup>6</sup>, hear me speak about

<sup>1</sup> Cf. inter alia, Aitareya-brâhmana (Haug's ed.), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra says intelligence means 'discussion, or argument.' The connexion of this with what has gone before, according to Arguna Misra, is this, that the author having first stated the five Hotris fully, now explains in what the Prâna and Apâna are to be offered up for acquiring the Prânâyama. The fire he takes to mean the self. Cf. what has been said about Vaisvânara above, p. 259.

<sup>3</sup> That is to say, the flame, I take it. He is drawing out here the figure of the fire.

<sup>4</sup> These are only a subordinate part of the offering, called Âgyabhâga. They are called subordinate, I suppose, as the operations of the Samâna and Vyâna are more practically important for vitality. The fire is the self. The place of the principal offering is between the Âgyabhâgas, as stated by Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> The Udâna is here treated as the life-wind into which the others are to be offered up. See p. 258, and note 8 there.

<sup>6</sup> The next three sentences seem to indicate what is to be destroyed in common with the life-winds. One has to get rid of all notions about day and night, good and evil, existence and non-existence, and then final emancipation is reached. The fire, which is common to all the passages, stands for the self; into that apparently all the ideas of time, and good and evil, and so forth, are to be offered as the life-winds are; and that fire stands in the place of the Udâna, for this purpose, as into the last all the other life-winds

that. Day and night are a pair, between them is the fire. That is the excellent seat of the Udâna as understood by Brâhmanas. That which exists and that which does not exist are a pair, between them is the fire. That is the excellent seat of the Udâna as understood by Brâhmanas. The two—good and evil—are a pair, between them is the fire. That is the excellent seat of the Udâna as understood by Brâhmanas. First<sup>1</sup>, the Samâna and Vyâna, their function<sup>2</sup> is performed: then, secondly, the Samâna comes into operation again. Then the Vâmadevya<sup>3</sup> for tranquillity, and tranquillity is the eternal Brahman. This is the excellent seat of the Udâna as understood by Brâhmanas.

## CHAPTER X.

On this, too, they relate an ancient story (showing) of what nature is the institution of the *Kâturhotra*<sup>4</sup>. The due performance of it in its entirety is now taught. Hear me, O good woman! state this won-

have to be offered. As to that which exists, &c., cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 103, and p. 370, note 9 infra. As to good and evil and generally, cf. *Khândogya*, p. 60; *Kaushîtaki*, p. 19. They are nothing to one who knows the Brahman. Day and night Arguna Misra takes to mean the *Idâ* and *Piṅgalâ nâḍis*, between which is the *Sushumṇâ*, as they are connected with the sun and moon. But the sense of the whole passage is far from clear.

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra understands these to be three Savanas.

<sup>2</sup> Of taking into the *nâḍis* the food digested in the night, this is the morning Savana; the afternoon Savana is the kindling of the gastric fire for digesting new food.

<sup>3</sup> The Vâmadevya is a *sûkta* beginning 'Kayâ nas kîtrâ' (*Rv.* IV, 31, 1). The singing of it is the third Savana, Arguna Misra. And see *Taittirîya-âraṇyaka*, p. 889.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Aitareya-brâhmana* (Haug), pp. 132, 133.

derful mystery. The instrument, the action, the agent, and emancipation<sup>1</sup>, these, indeed, O you of a (pure) heart! are the four *Hotris* by whom this universe is enveloped. Hear also the assignment of causes exhaustively<sup>2</sup>. The nose, and the tongue, and the eye, and the skin, and the ear as the fifth, mind and understanding, these seven should be understood to be the causes of (the knowledge of<sup>3</sup>) qualities. Smell, and taste, and colour, sound, and touch as the fifth, the object of the mental operation and the object of the understanding<sup>4</sup>, these seven are causes of action. He who smells, he who eats, he who sees, he who speaks, and he who hears as the fifth, he who thinks, and he who understands, these seven should be understood to be the causes of the agents<sup>5</sup>. These<sup>6</sup>, being possessed of qualities<sup>7</sup>, enjoy their own qualities, agreeable and disagreeable. And I am here devoid of qualities. Thus these seven are the causes of emancipation<sup>8</sup>. And among the learned who understand (everything), the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. as to the three first, *Gîtâ*, p. 123. They are the four categories, to one or other of which everything in the world may be referred.

<sup>2</sup> The texts here differ. Arguna Misra's reading he interprets to mean 'the subjugation of these *Hotris*.' The reading followed in the text seems to some extent to be supported by the sequel. But the passage altogether is not very clear.

<sup>3</sup> So Arguna Misra—through these the knowledge of the qualities of objects of sense is acquired.

<sup>4</sup> The sensations, or perceptions, referred to lead to action.

<sup>5</sup> This seems to mean, that the powers of smelling, &c., when attributed to the self, make him appear as an agent, as an active principle.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. action, agent, and instrument, Arguna Misra.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. the three, goodness, passion, and darkness.

<sup>8</sup> It is these seven from which the self is to be emancipated. 'I' must mean the self, not the *Brâhmaṇa* who speaks.



qualities<sup>1</sup> which are in the position of the deities, each in its own place, always enjoy the offering according to prescribed rules. To him who is not learned, eating various (kinds of) food, the (feeling of this or that being) mine adheres. And cooking food for himself, he, through the (feeling of this or that being) mine, is ruined<sup>2</sup>. The eating of that which should not be eaten, and drinking of intoxicating drinks also destroys him. He destroys the food, and destroying that food he is destroyed in return. The learned man, being (himself) a ruler, destroying this food again produces it<sup>3</sup>. And not even a trifling obstacle<sup>4</sup> arises to him from that food. Whatever is thought by the mind<sup>5</sup>, whatever is spoken by speech, whatever is heard by the ear, whatever is seen by the eye, whatever is touched by the sense of touch, and whatever is smelt by the nose, absorbing all these offerings from all sides, together with those (senses) which with the mind are six<sup>6</sup>, my fire<sup>7</sup> of (high) qualifications<sup>8</sup>, shines dwelling within the body. My sacrifice of concentration of mind is in progress, the performance of which yields the fire<sup>9</sup> of knowledge ;

<sup>1</sup> I. e., I presume, the senses. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 55. The learned do not suppose their self to have aught to do with them. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 53 ; Manu III, 118.

<sup>3</sup> His knowledge gives him this power. He is not 'destroyed' by the food as the other man is. Nîlakantha compares *Bṛihadâra-nyaka*, p. 884. See, too, p. 260, note 1 supra.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. mischief owing to the destruction of life necessary for getting food, says Nîlakantha quoting *Bṛihadâra-nyaka*, p. 913.

<sup>5</sup> This includes the operation of the understanding also. Nîlakantha says this verse explains what the word 'food' means here.

<sup>6</sup> For the phrase cf. Gîtâ, p. 112.

<sup>7</sup> That is to say, my self, Arguna Misra. See p. 259, note 3 supra.

<sup>8</sup> As the objects of sense &c. are all absorbed into it.

<sup>9</sup> It is called 'fire,' as it burns up all action. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 62.

the Stotra in which, is the upward life-wind; the Sastra, the downward life-wind; and which is very beneficial on account of the abandonment of everything<sup>1</sup>; the Brahman priest in which, is the counsellor in all action<sup>2</sup>; the Hotṛi priest, the self; the Adhvaryu priest, (the self) whose hymn of praise<sup>3</sup> is the offering; the Sastra of the Prasâstṛi, truth; and the Dakshinâ, final emancipation. On this, too, *Rik* verses are recited by the men who understand Nârâyana<sup>4</sup>—the god Nârâyana to whom they formerly offered animal<sup>5</sup> (offerings). On that Sâman hymns<sup>6</sup> are sung, of which an illustration is stated<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra's commentary is not intelligible here, so I follow Nîlakantha, but diffidently.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. the mind, say the commentators. 'Mantâ' simply is given among the synonyms of Ahañkâra at Sâñkhya-sâra, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. the actions performed for knowledge of the truth, Arguna Misra.

<sup>4</sup> Nîlakantha refers to a *Rik* 'Tapa âsîd-grîhapatih,' and also the famous allegory at the end of the Taittirîya-âraṇyaka. These are cited, he says, as authorities for this 'sacrifice (consisting of) concentration of mind.'

<sup>5</sup> I. e. the senses, Nîlakantha. Arguna Misra compares the whole passage with the Purusha Sûkta, which are the *Rik* verses alluded to, according to him. He refers for further explanations to his own commentary on that sûkta of the Rig-veda.

<sup>6</sup> They sing these hymns, out of the gratification produced by knowledge of the self, says Nîlakantha, and he cites Taittirîya-âraṇyaka, p. 749. See also Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 138, and Sañkara's commentary there.

<sup>7</sup> The readings of our texts here are not very satisfactory. The illustration is stated, says Nîlakantha, whose reading we follow, by the Taittirîyas in the passage referred to in the last note. Arguna Misra's reading means 'such as Tâhu kâhu,' which would seem to be the words of the Sâman hymn referred to. But his commentary does not show what the words before him were. The whole figure as drawn out in this passage is not quite clear, though the general sense is pretty intelligible. Cf. the allegories at Aitareya-brâhmana, pp. 132, 133, and at the close of the Taittirîya-âraṇyaka.

O modest one! understand that god Nârâyana, who is the self of everything.

### CHAPTER XI.

There is one director<sup>1</sup>; there is no second director. I speak concerning him who abides in the heart. This being, the director, dwells in the heart and directs (all creatures). Impelled by that same (being), I move as I am ordered, like water on a declivity. There is one instructor; there is no second (different) from him. I speak concerning him who abides in the heart. Taught by that instructor, all snakes whatever are ever hated in the world<sup>2</sup>. There is one kinsman; there is no second (different) from him. I speak concerning him who abides in the heart. Taught by him kinsmen are possessed of kinsmen<sup>3</sup>, (and) the seven *Rishis*, O son of *Prithâ*<sup>4</sup>! shine in heaven<sup>5</sup>. There

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the Supreme Being, Arguna Misra. *Nîlakantha* connects this with the preceding chapter by saying that this describes Nârâyana, who is there mentioned. See *Sânti Parvan* (Moksha Dharma), chap. 226, st. 8 (Bombay ed.)

<sup>2</sup> The natural feelings of animosity are caused by the Supreme Being within. Such seems to be the meaning. Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 128, 129. I may remark that Arguna Misra seems to interpret the original words, which we have rendered by 'I speak concerning him,' &c., to mean 'I repeat what has been said by,' &c. This does not seem to me to be satisfactory; and it may be added, too, that Arguna Misra's interpretation appears in his gloss not on the first verse, about the 'director,' but only on the second, about the 'instructor.' Hated = full of animosity, *Nîlakantha*.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. the feeling of kinsmanship arises from his inspiration.

<sup>4</sup> The poet seems to be nodding here, as this expression cannot form part of the *Brâhmana*'s speech to his wife.

<sup>5</sup> The seven sages are always mentioned together, and may well be spoken of as types of the feeling of kinship.

is one hearer<sup>1</sup>; there is no second (different) from him. I speak concerning him who abides in the heart. Living under that instructor, (according to the proper mode of) living with an instructor, Sakra<sup>2</sup> acquired immortality in all worlds. There is one enemy; there is no second (different) from him. I speak concerning him who abides in the heart. Taught by that instructor, all snakes whatever are ever hated in the world<sup>3</sup>.

On this, too, they relate an ancient story, (about the instruction of the snakes, and the gods, and sages, by Pragâpati. The gods, and sages, and the snakes, and the demons, approaching Pragâpati, said (to him): 'Tell us the highest good.' To them who were inquiring about the highest good, the venerable one said, 'Om<sup>4</sup>, the Brahman, in a single syllable.' Hearing that, they ran away in (various) directions<sup>5</sup>. When they were running for instruction regarding the self, the inclination of the snakes to biting had been already formed. The natural inclination of the demons towards ostentatiousness had been formed. The gods had been engaged in gifts, and the great sages in restraint of the senses. Having had one teacher,

<sup>1</sup> Nîlakantha takes this to mean pupil, but it is difficult to reconcile that with the rest of the passage. Arguna Misra renders it by 'the destroyer of every one's doubts.' For that, it will be necessary to take the word as a form of the causative, and not the simple root *sru*, to hear. But see, too, p. 283, 'the instructor . . . the hearer.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sana'si gâtîya, p. 152, note 1.

<sup>3</sup> The words here are nearly the same as before; the commentators give no explanation of the repetition. But see p. 281, note 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 79. The full sense is that from the study of this Om the highest good is attained.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. to their own dwellings, believing that they had learnt what they wanted.

and having been instructed with one word, the snakes, the gods, the sages, and the demons, all engaged in different<sup>1</sup> (pursuits). One hears what is said (to one) and apprehends it duly; (but even) to one who inquires and extols highly, there is no other instructor<sup>2</sup>. And by his counsel does action afterwards take place. The instructor, the learner, the hearer, and the enemy, are always within the heart. Acting sinfully in the world, he becomes (a man of) sinful conduct. Acting virtuously in the world he becomes (a man of) virtuous conduct<sup>3</sup>. And he becomes a man of conduct according to his own desire<sup>4</sup>, who, owing to his desires, is given up to the pleasures of the senses. But he who, casting aside vows<sup>5</sup> and actions, merely adheres to the Brahman, he moving about in the world identifying himself with the Brahman, becomes a Brahma-kârin. To him the Brahman itself is the fuel, the Brahman the fire, the Brahman his origin, the Brahman water, the Brahman the instructor. He is rapt in the

<sup>1</sup> The meaning seems to be that the original inclination was not altered by the new instruction received by them. Nîlakantha seems to understand the passage differently. What has been rendered in the text by 'when they were running for instruction,' he renders by 'when they were practically carrying out the instruction received by them;' but this rendering seems to omit all consideration of the words 'Pûrvameva tu'—already. Though, therefore, there are one or two circumstances in favour of this construction, I have adopted the other. Cf. *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 964.

<sup>2</sup> The meaning is that the real instructor is within oneself. 'abiding in the heart,' as said before, although instruction may in form be received from one outside, of whom one seeks to learn, and whom one respects (or extols highly, as the text has it), and although such instruction may be well apprehended.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, pp. 546–853.

<sup>4</sup> See *Gîtâ*, p. 117.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. fasts and other like observances.

Brahman<sup>1</sup>. Such is this subtle life as a Brahma<sup>kâr</sup>in understood by the wise. Understanding it they practised it, being instructed by the Kshetragnâ<sup>2</sup>.

## CHAPTER XII.

The Brâhmana said :

I have crossed beyond that very impassable place, in which fancies are the gadflies and mosquitoes<sup>3</sup>, in which grief and joy are cold and heat, in which delusion is the blinding darkness, in which avarice is the beasts of prey and reptiles, in which desire and anger are the obstructors, the way to which consists in worldly objects, and is to be crossed by one singly<sup>4</sup>. And I have entered the great forest<sup>5</sup>.

The Brâhmana's wife said :

Where is that forest, O very intelligent person! what are the trees (there), and what the rivers, and the hills and mountains; and at what distance is that forest?

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 61. The water is that required for the sacrifice. The words 'the Brahman is his origin' are not quite clear, as being not connected with the figure employed. Perhaps it might be taken otherwise thus, 'the Brahman (is) the fire produced from the Brahman,' this last standing for the arani.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. one who understands the truth, Nîlakantha ; God, Arguna Misra. The same sentence winds up two of the following chapters ; and at p. 310 Krishna says the Kshetragnâ signifies the supreme self. See Gîtâ, p. 102 seq.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Lalita Vistara, p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. not with the help of son, wealth, &c., says Nîlakantha, as each man's salvation after having got into the course of worldly life depends on himself. Cf. Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma), chap. 193, st. 32. and Manu IV, 240; obstructor, thief, Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. the Brahman. Nîlakantha compares a text from the Sruti, 'Kim svid vanam ka u sa vriksha âsa ;' see Rig-veda X, 31, 7.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

There is nothing else more delightful than that, when there is no distinction from it. There is nothing more afflicting than that, when there is a distinction from it<sup>1</sup>. There is nothing smaller than that, there is nothing larger than that<sup>2</sup>. There is nothing more subtle than that; there is no other happiness equal to that. Entering it, the twice-born do not grieve, and do not exult<sup>3</sup>. They are not afraid of anybody, and nobody is afraid of them. In that forest<sup>4</sup> are seven large trees<sup>5</sup>, seven fruits, and seven guests; seven hermitages, seven (forms of) concentration, and seven (forms of) initiation. This is the description of the forest. That forest is filled with trees producing splendid flowers and fruits of five colours<sup>6</sup>. That forest

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, pp. 516, 517.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 180 and note there.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. as to all this *Gîtâ*, p. 101.

<sup>4</sup> This is not the forest spoken of before, but what has been before called the 'impassable place,' but which also at p. 286 is by implication called a forest, viz. the course of worldly life.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. the eye, ear, tongue, skin, and nose, and the mind, and understanding—these are called trees, as being producers of the fruits, namely, the pleasures and pains derived from their several operations; the guests are the powers of each sense personified—they receive the fruits above described; the hermitages are the trees above mentioned, in which the guests take shelter; the seven forms of concentration are the exclusion from the self of the seven functions of the seven senses &c. already referred to; the seven forms of initiation refer to the initiation into the higher life, by repudiating as not one's own the actions of each member out of the group of seven. Cf. as to this *Khândogya*, p. 219, and commentary there.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. for these different numbers of colours, *Yoga-sûtra* II, 19, and commentary, p. 105, and *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, p. 18. The trees here mean: are the *Tanmâtras*, or subtle elements, and the theory is that the *Gandha-tanmâtra*, or subtle element of smell, has five qualities, its

is filled with trees producing flowers and fruits of four colours. That forest is filled with trees producing flowers and fruits of three colours, and mixed. That forest is filled with trees producing flowers and fruits of two colours, and of beautiful colours. That forest is filled with trees producing flowers and fruits of one colour, and fragrant. That forest is filled with two large trees producing numerous flowers and fruits of undistinguished colours<sup>1</sup>. There is one fire<sup>2</sup> here, connected with the Brahman<sup>3</sup>, and having a good mind<sup>4</sup>. And there is fuel here, (namely) the five senses. The seven (forms of) emancipation from them are the seven (forms of) initiation<sup>5</sup>. The qualities are the fruits, and the guests eat the fruits. There, in various places, the great sages receive hospitality. And when they have been worshipped and have disappeared<sup>6</sup>, another forest shines forth, in which intelligence is the tree, and emancipation the fruit, and which possesses shade (in the form of) tran-

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own special one, so to say, and the four special ones of the others; the next is taste, the next colour, the next touch, and the last sound, each has one quality less than its predecessor. See Yoga-sûtra, p. 106, and gloss; Sâṅkhya-sûtra I, 62; and Vedânta Paribhâṣâ, p. 45.

<sup>1</sup> These are mind and understanding; the fruits and flowers are here of 'undistinguished colours,' as the text expresses it, since they include the colours of all the fruits of all the other five sets of trees; that is to say, the subject-matter of their operations is sound, taste, &c., the subject-matters of all the senses together. 'Undistinguished colours' is, perhaps, more literally 'of colours not clear.' Arguna Misra paraphrases it by 'of variegated colours,' which is no doubt the true ultimate sense.

<sup>2</sup> The self, Nîlakantha. See p. 279, note 7 supra.

<sup>3</sup> I. e., I presume, devoted to the Brahman.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. true knowledge, Arguna Misra. <sup>5</sup> See note 5, p. 285.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. when the senses having worked, as unconnected with the self, are finally absorbed into it. Cf. Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 49 and Katha, p. 151.



quillity, which depends on knowledge, which has contentment for its water, and which has the Kshetragña within for the sun. The good who attain to that, have no fear afterwards. Its end cannot be perceived upwards or downwards or horizontally<sup>1</sup>. There always dwell seven females there<sup>2</sup>, with faces (turned) downwards, full of brilliance, and causes of generation. They absorb<sup>3</sup> all the higher delights of people, as inconstancy (absorbs) everything<sup>4</sup>. In that same<sup>5</sup> (principle) the seven perfect sages, together with their chiefs, the richest<sup>6</sup>, abide, and again emerge from the same. Glory, brilliance, and greatness, enlightenment, victory, perfection, and power<sup>7</sup>—these seven rays follow after this same sun. Hills and mountains also are there collected together, and rivers and streams flowing with water produced from the Brahman<sup>8</sup>. And there is the confluence of the rivers in the secluded place<sup>9</sup> for the

<sup>1</sup> It extends on all sides, its end cannot be perceived on any side.

<sup>2</sup> These are, according to Arguna Misra, the Mahat, Ahankâra, and five Tanmâtras. Their faces are turned downwards, as they are obstacles in the way upwards, viz. the way of final emancipation; they are brilliant, as they light up the course of worldly life; and hence, too, they are 'causes of generation.' They give birth to the universe.

<sup>3</sup> They conceal the higher delight of final emancipation.

<sup>4</sup> I follow Arguna Misra, but the text is doubtful.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. the Brahman.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, pp. 295–300. The word sages here, as before, means the various organs. See *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 415.

<sup>7</sup> Glory=renown; brilliance=Brahmic splendour (Brahmategas); perfection=obtaining what is desired; power=not being conquered by others, Arguna Misra. About the sun, see line 3 of text above.

<sup>8</sup> I. e. contentment. See the second line in the text above.

<sup>9</sup> I. e. the space in the heart, the sacrifice being that of 'concentration of mind,' *yogayagña*,—*Nilakantha*. A confluence of

sacrifice, whence those who are contented in their own self repair to the divine grandsire himself. Those whose wishes are reduced<sup>1</sup>, whose wishes are (fixed) on good vows, whose sins are burnt up by penance, merging the self in the self<sup>2</sup>, devote themselves to Brahman. Those people who understand the forest of knowledge<sup>3</sup>, praise tranquillity. And aspiring to that forest, they are born so as not to lose courage<sup>4</sup>. Such, indeed, is this holy forest, as understood by Brâhmanas. And understanding it, they act (accordingly), being directed by the Kshetragña.

### CHAPTER XIII.

The Brâhmana said :

I do not smell smells, I perceive no tastes, I see no colour, and I do not touch, nor yet do I hear various sounds, nor even do I entertain any fancies<sup>5</sup>. Nature desires objects which are liked ; nature hates all (objects) which are hateful<sup>6</sup>. Desire and hatred are born from nature<sup>7</sup>, as the upward and

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rivers is very sacred—here the meaning intended seems to be the absorption of all desires by contentment into the heart.

<sup>1</sup> Literally, 'lean.'      <sup>2</sup> I. e. the body in the soul, Arguna Misra.

<sup>3</sup> Knowledge is Brahman, which is described as a forest here, Arguna Misra.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 70.

<sup>5</sup> This is the name for the operations of the mind.

<sup>6</sup> The sense is similar to that at Gîtâ, p. 55. The self has nothing to do with these feelings ; the qualities deal with the qualities.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 65. The meaning of nature here, as in the Gîtâ, is in substance the result of all previous action with which the self has been associated, which result, of course, exists connected not with the self, but with the developments of nature, in the form of body,

downward life-winds, after attaining to the bodies of living creatures. Apart from them, and as the constant entity underlying them, I see the individual self in the body. Dwelling in that (self), I am in no wise attached<sup>1</sup> (to anything) through desire or anger, or old age, or death. Not desiring any object of desire, not hating any evil, there is no taint on my natures<sup>2</sup>, as there is no (taint) of a drop of water on lotuses<sup>3</sup>. They are inconstant things appertaining to this constant (principle) which looks on various natures. Although actions are performed, the net of enjoyments does not attach itself to it, as the net of the sun's rays does not attach itself to the sky<sup>4</sup>. On this<sup>5</sup>, too, they relate an ancient story, (in the shape of) a dialogue between an Adhvaryu priest and an ascetic. Understand that, O glorious one! Seeing an animal being sprinkled<sup>6</sup> at a sacrificial ceremony, an ascetic who was sitting (there) spoke to the Adhvaryu, censuring (the act) as destruction of life. The Adhvaryu

senses, &c. The comparison appears to mean that the feelings of desire &c. are, like the life-winds, unconnected with the self, though associated with it, and are both alike manifestations of nature.

<sup>1</sup> Nîlakantha compares *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 770. Arguna Misra has a different reading, meaning 'liable (to be subjugated).'

<sup>2</sup> The plural, which is in the original, is unusual. The various aspects of the 'result' stated in p. 288, note 7, being looked at separately, are described as 'natures,' like the leaves of a lotus, which in their ensemble make one lotus.

<sup>3</sup> Lalita Vistara, p. 2, and p. 64 supra.

<sup>4</sup> The figure seems to be somewhat like that at *Gîtâ*, p. 82, about the atmosphere and space, which latter remains untainted by the former. Looking on various natures, i.e. as distinct from the self.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. the remaining untainted.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. with water, preparatory to its being offered up for the sacrifice.

answered him (saying), this goat will not be destroyed. (This) creature will obtain welfare, since the Vedic text is such. For that part of him which is of the earth will go to the earth; whatever in him is produced from water, that will enter water. His eye (will enter) the sun, (his) ear the quarters, and his life-winds likewise the sky<sup>1</sup>. There is no offence on my part, adhering (as I do) to the scriptures<sup>2</sup>.

The Ascetic said :

If you perceive (that) good (will) result upon his life being severed (from him), then the sacrifice is for the goat, what benefit (is it) to you? Let the brother, father, mother, and friend (of the goat) give you their consent<sup>3</sup>; take him (to them) and consult (them), especially as he is dependent. You ought to inquire of those who can give their consent thus. After hearing their consent, (the matter) will be fit for consideration<sup>4</sup>. The life-winds<sup>5</sup>, too, of this goat have gone to their sources, and I think only his unmoving body remains. To those who wish to derive enjoyment from the slaughter (of a living creature), the unconscious body being comparable to fuel, that which is called an animal becomes

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 542, and p. 337 below.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Khândogya-upanishad*, p. 627, and also *Sârîraka Bhâshya* on Sûtra III, 1, 25, p. 774.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. for his slaughter, which is to bring welfare to the goat. Arguna Misra says that this is a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*, as the sacrifice is in truth not in the interests of the goat at all.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. whether the goat should be killed. Without their consent he ought not to be slaughtered; with their consent, it becomes a matter for consideration, Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> It may also mean the senses, as in the *Khândogya*, p. 297.

the fuel<sup>1</sup>. The teaching of the elders<sup>2</sup> is, that refraining from slaughter (of living creatures) is (the duty) among all duties. We maintain that that action should be performed which involves no slaughter. (Our) proposition is no slaughter (of living creatures). If I spoke further, it would be possible to find fault with your proceedings in many ways<sup>3</sup>. Always refraining from the slaughter of all beings is what we approve. We substantiate (this) from what is actually visible<sup>4</sup>, we do not rely on what is not visible.

The Adhvaryu said :

You enjoy the earth's quality of fragrance, you drink watery juices, you see the colours of shining bodies, you touch the qualities of the air, you hear the sound produced in space, you think by the mind (on the objects of) mental operations. And all these entities, you believe, have life. You have not (then) abstained from taking life. You are (engaged) in the slaughter (of living creatures)<sup>5</sup>. There is no movement<sup>6</sup> without slaughter (of living creatures). Or what do you think, O twice-born one?

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<sup>1</sup> This is not very clear, but the meaning seems to be that the slaughter is committed for the enjoyment of the sacrificer; the sacrificer only requires fuel, and the slaughtered animal is then used for that purpose.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 627, and next note; and *Gîtâ*, inter alia, p. 114, and p. 348 infra. <sup>3</sup> See *Sânkhya-tattva-kaumudî*, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. a rule expressly laid down. What is not visible means what is not expressly stated, but is to be derived by inference, and so forth (cf. *Âpastamba* I, 1, 4, 8). The express text is the famous one, 'Na himsyâtsarvâ bhûtânî.' *Himsâ*, which is rendered slaughter here, may mean also 'giving pain' generally.

<sup>5</sup> This is the *tu quoque* argument. The sustentation of life requires some sort of slaughter.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. the support of the body, says *Arguna Misra*.

The Ascetic said :

The indestructible and the destructible, such is the double manifestation of the self. Of these the indestructible is the existent<sup>1</sup>, the manifestation as an individual<sup>2</sup> (entity) is called the destructible<sup>3</sup>. The life-winds, the tongue, the mind, and (the quality of) goodness, together with (the quality of) passion<sup>4</sup>, (these make up) the manifestations as individual entities. And to one who is free from these manifestations, who is free from the pairs of opposites, who is devoid of expectations, who is alike to all beings, who is free from (the thought that this or that is) mine, who has subdued his self, and who is released on all hands<sup>5</sup>, there is no fear anywhere<sup>6</sup>.

The Adhvaryu said :

O best of talented men ! one should in this (world)

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<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra takes it otherwise, 'the true nature of the Sat, the self.' Nîlakantha renders the original by sadrûpam without further explanation. This indestructible seems to correspond to that mentioned at Gîtâ, p. 113, which should be considered in connection with Gîtâ, pp. 73, 74. The note at the former page is, perhaps, not quite accurately expressed, as the word 'material cause' conveys some inadmissible associations. Perhaps 'underlying principle' might be a nearer approach to the correct idea. The existent will thus be that which really exists, as it is indestructible.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 77. <sup>3</sup> See Sânti Parvan (Moksha), ch. 240, st. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Arguna Misra says, 'The life-winds here are indicative of the operations of the organs of action (as to which see p. 290, note 5 supra), the tongue of the perceptive senses, the mind of the internal activities, the quality of goodness of all sources of pleasure, and passion of all sources of pain,' the last two apparently covering the external world, the previous ones the human activities, internal and external.

<sup>5</sup> Released scil. from piety or impiety, &c.,—Arguna Misra, who says 'self' in the phrase preceding means mind.

<sup>6</sup> Because, says Arguna Misra, according to the very authority which says there is sin in slaughter, all sin is destroyed by knowledge. \* Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84.

dwelt in company of good men only<sup>1</sup>. For having heard your opinion, my mind is enlightened. O venerable sir! I approach you, in the belief (that you are) the Lord; and I say (to you), O twice-born one! there is no fault (attaching) to me, performing (as I have done) the rites performed by others<sup>2</sup>.

The Brâhmana said:

With this explanation, the ascetic thereafter remained silent, and the Adhvaryu also proceeded with the great sacrifice, freed from delusion. Thus Brâhmanas understand the very subtle emancipation to be of this nature, and understanding it, they act (accordingly), being directed by the Kshetragña.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

The Brâhmana said:

On this<sup>3</sup>, too, they relate an old story, (in the shape of) a dialogue, O you of a pure heart! between Kârtavîrya and the ocean. (There lived once) a king named Arguna<sup>4</sup>, a descendant of Kṛitavîrya, possessed of a thousand arms, who with his bow conquered the (whole) earth up to the ocean. Once

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> The readings here in the MSS. are not satisfactory. I adopt as the best that which appears to have been before Arguna Misra. The meaning seems to be this:—I have now understood the truth, but I cannot be blamed for having hitherto done that which I saw every one else do. Now I have had the benefit of conversation with a good man, and have become free from my delusion.

<sup>3</sup> Namely, that final emancipation is not to be obtained by action, and that slaughter is sinful.

<sup>4</sup> He is also called a Yogin at Raghuvamśa VI, 38. See Mallinâth's commentary there.

on a time, as we have heard, he was walking about near the sea, proud of his strength, and showering hundreds of arrows on the sea. The ocean, saluting him, and with joined hands, said, 'O brave man! do not throw arrows (on me). Say, what shall I do for you? The creatures, who take shelter with me, are being destroyed, O tiger-like king! by the great arrows thrown by you. Give them security, O Lord!'

Arguna said :

If there is anywhere any wielder of the bow equal to me in battle, who might stand against me in the field, name him to me.

The ocean said :

If, O king! you have heard of the great sage Gamadagni, his son is (the) proper (person) to show you due hospitality<sup>1</sup>.

Then the king, full of great wrath, went away, and arriving at that hermitage approached Râma only. In company with his kinsmen, he did many (acts) disagreeable to Râma, and caused much trouble to the high-souled Râma. Then the power of Râma, whose power was unbounded, blazed forth, burning the hosts of the enemy, O lotus-eyed one! And then Râma, taking up his axe, hacked away that man of the thousand arms in battle, like a tree of many branches. Seeing him killed and fallen, all (his) kinsmen assembled together, and taking swords and lances, surrounded the descendant of Bhṛigu. Râma also taking up a bow, and hurriedly mounting a chariot, shot away volleys of arrows, and blew away the army of the king. Then some of the

<sup>1</sup> I.e. by giving him what he desired—a 'foeman worthy of his steel' to fight with him.



Kshatriyas, often troubled by fear of the son of Gamadagni, entered mountains and inaccessible places, like antelopes troubled by a lion. And the subjects of those (Kshatriyas) who were not performing their prescribed duties<sup>1</sup> through fear of him, became *Vrishalas*, owing to the disappearance of *Brâhmanas*<sup>2</sup>. Thus the *Dravidas*, *Âbhîras*, *Paundras*, together with the *Sâbaras*, became *Vrishalas*<sup>3</sup>, owing to the abandonment of their duties by Kshatriyas. Then when the heroic (children) of Kshatriya women were destroyed again and again, the Kshatriyas, who were produced by the *Brâhmanas*<sup>4</sup>, were also destroyed by the son of Gamadagni. At the end of the twenty-first slaughter, a bodiless voice from heaven, which was heard by all people, spoke sweetly to Râma, 'O Râma! O Râma! desist (from this slaughter). What good, dear friend, do you perceive, in taking away the lives of these kinsmen of Kshatriyas over and over again?' Then, too, his grandfathers<sup>5</sup>, with *Rîkîka* as their head, likewise said to the high-souled (Râma), 'Desist, O noble one<sup>6</sup>!' But Râma, not forgiving his father's

<sup>1</sup> Viz. the protection of their subjects.

<sup>2</sup> As the kings failed to protect the people, the *Brâhmanas* apparently were nowhere forthcoming.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i, pp. 482 seq., 358, 391; vol. ii, p. 423; *Sânti Parvan*, ch. 65, st. 13; ch. 207, st. 42 (*Râgadharmā*).

<sup>4</sup> As Kshatriyas were required for the protection of the people, the *Brâhmanas* procreated them on Kshatriya women. See Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i, p. 451 seq. And as they were the offspring of these anomalous connexions they are described as 'kinsmen of Kshatriyas.' Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 317; *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 1037 and comments there. As to heroic, see Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iv, p. 302 note.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 40, note 1.

<sup>6</sup> See as to the whole story, Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i, p. 442.

murder, said to those sages, 'You ought not to keep me back from this.'

The *Pitrîs* said :

O best of victors! you ought not to destroy these kinsmen of Kshatriyas. It is not proper for you, being a Brâhmana, to slaughter these kings.

## CHAPTER XV.

The *Pitrîs* said :

On this<sup>1</sup>, too, they relate an ancient story; hearing that (story), O best of the twice-born! you should act accordingly. There was (once) a royal sage, named Alarka, whose penance was very great, who understood duty, who was veracious, high-souled, and very firm in his vows. Having with his bow conquered this world as far as the ocean,—having performed very difficult deeds<sup>2</sup>,—he turned his mind to subtle<sup>3</sup> (subjects). While he was sitting at the foot of a tree, O you of great intelligence! his thoughts, abandoning (those) great deeds, turned to subtle (questions).

Alarka said :

My mind is become (too) strong<sup>4</sup>; that conquest is constant in which the mind is conquered. (Though) surrounded by enemies, I shall direct my arrows elsewhere<sup>5</sup>. As by its unsteadiness, it wishes<sup>6</sup> to

<sup>1</sup> The impropriety or sinfulness of slaughter.

<sup>2</sup> Such as the subjugation of enemies and so forth.

<sup>3</sup> The Brahman, says Nilakantha.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. too strong to be under control.

<sup>5</sup> That is to say, elsewhere than towards the external foes with whom he was waging war.

<sup>6</sup> The text is unsatisfactory here. I adopt Nilakantha's reading.

make all mortals perform action, I will cast very sharp-edged arrows at the mind.

The mind said :

These arrows, O Alarka! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and your vital part being pierced, you will die. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

Hearing that, he then spoke these words after consideration :—

Alarka said :

Smelling very many perfumes, one hankers after them only. Therefore I will cast sharp arrows at the nose.

The nose<sup>1</sup> said :

These arrows, O Alarka! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and your vital part being pierced, you will die. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

Hearing that, he then spoke these words after consideration :—

Alarka said :

Enjoying savory tastes, this (tongue) hankers after

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<sup>1</sup> This and the other corresponding words must be understood to refer not to the physical nose and so forth, but the sense seated there. The nose here, for instance, stands for the sense of smell. Nilakantha understands all these words of Alarka as indicating the so-called *Hatha-yoga*, which, he adds, invariably occasions death. As to the throwing of arrows at the mind, he says, it means, 'I will subdue the mind by the restraint of the excretive organs by means of the *Hatha-yoga*.' And finally he says, 'A man, having restrained all the senses by means of the *Hatha-yoga*, merely droops away ; becoming deficient in those senses, he does not accomplish his end.'

them only. Therefore I will cast sharp arrows at the tongue.

The tongue said :

These arrows, O Alarka ! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and your vital part being pierced, you will die. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

Hearing that, he then spoke these words after consideration :—

Alarka said :

Touching various (objects of) touch, the skin hankers after them only. Therefore I will tear off the skin by various feathered arrows.

The skin said :

These arrows, O Alarka ! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and your vital part being pierced, you will die. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

Hearing that, he then said after consideration :—

Alarka said :

Hearing various sounds, the (ear) hankers after them only. Therefore I (will) cast sharp arrows at the ear.

The ear said :

These arrows, O Alarka ! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and then you will lose (your) life. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

Hearing that, he then said after consideration :—

Alarka said :

Seeing numerous colours, the eye hankers after them only. Therefore I will destroy the eye with sharp arrows.

The eye said :

These arrows, O Alarka! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and your vital part being pierced, you will die. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

Hearing that, he then said after consideration :—

Alarka said :

This (understanding) forms various determinations by its operation. Therefore I will cast sharp arrows at the understanding.

The understanding said :

These arrows, O Alarka! will not penetrate through me at all. They will only pierce your own vital part, and your vital part being pierced, you will die. Look out for other arrows by which you may destroy me.

The Brâhmaṇa<sup>1</sup> said :

Then Alarka even there employed himself in a fearful penance<sup>2</sup> difficult to perform; but he did not obtain any arrows for these seven by his devotions. Then that king deliberated with a mind very intent on one (subject), and after deliberating for a long time, O best of the twice-born! Alarka, the best of talented (men), could not arrive at anything better

<sup>1</sup> Sic in our copies. It should be the *Pitrîs*, seeing that they are relating Alarka's story to Parasurâma.

<sup>2</sup> Meditation, or pondering, according to *Nîlakantha*.

than concentration of mind<sup>1</sup>. Then directing his mind to one point<sup>2</sup>, he became steady, and applied himself to concentration of mind. And (then) the brave man forthwith destroyed the senses with one arrow; and entering the self by means of concentration of mind, he reached the highest perfection. And the royal sage, amazed, then uttered this verse, 'O! Alas! that we should have engaged in all external (matters); that being possessed of a desire for enjoyments, we should have devoted ourselves before now to sovereignty! I have now subsequently learnt that there is no higher happiness than concentration of mind.' Do you understand this too, O Râma! and do not kill Kshatriyas. Perform a fearful<sup>3</sup> penance, thence you will obtain the highest good. Thus spoken to by (his) grandfathers, the noble son of Gamadagni engaged himself in fearful penance, and attained that perfection which is difficult to reach.

## CHAPTER XVI.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

There are, verily, three foes in (this) world, and they are stated to be (divided) ninefold, according to qualities. Exultation, pleasure, joy<sup>4</sup>, these three

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the rāga-yoga, says Nīlakaṇṭha, which consists in mere control of the mind. Cf. Sāṅkhya-sāra, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> See Yoga-sūtra, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> This means difficult, and occasioning many trials to one who performs it.

<sup>4</sup> Nīlakaṇṭha says exultation is when one is sure of obtaining what is desired, pleasure when it is obtained, and joy when the thing obtained is enjoyed. Arguna Misra takes a different distinction; but our copy of his commentary is not quite intelligible in

are qualities appertaining to the quality of goodness. Grief, wrath, persistent hatred, these are stated to be qualities appertaining to the quality of passion. Sleep, sloth, and delusion, these three qualities are qualities appertaining to the quality of darkness. Cutting these off by multitudes of arrows<sup>1</sup>, a courageous man, free from sloth, having a tranquil self, and senses controlled, is energetic about subjugating others<sup>2</sup>. On this, people who know about ancient times celebrate verses which were sung of old by the king Ambarīsha, who had become tranquil (in mind). When vices<sup>3</sup> were in the ascendant, and good (men) were oppressed, Ambarīsha, of great glory, forceably possessed him-

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the beginning. Pleasure he takes to mean 'pride felt in supposing oneself to possess some merit,' and joy that produced when impending danger is averted. As to the next triad, the text is again unsatisfactory. The text printed in the edition which contains *Nilakantha's* commentary, is 'desire, anger,' &c. There is nothing about them in the commentary. *Arguna Misra's* text is the one we have adopted. He says, 'grief, pain caused by loss of what is desired; anger, the pain caused by the counteraction of one's attempts to injure another; persistent hatred, the pain caused by believing another to be doing harm to oneself.' Persistent hatred is *Nilakantha's* interpretation. I think his interpretation is preferable. The two triads seem to be based on one principle of gradation. The distinctive marks of the three qualities are pleasure, pain, and delusion respectively, and those characterise the three triads stated in the text. See *Sānti Parvan (Moksha)*, chap. 194, st. 27 seq.

<sup>1</sup> Tranquillity and so forth, *Nilakantha*; practising yoga or concentration of mind, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. external, says *Arguna Misra*; external foes of one's own emancipation is, I presume, what is meant.

<sup>3</sup> *Arguna Misra* says, 'his own and those of others' *Nilakantha* takes good to mean not men, but tranquillity, &c. The next sentence seems rather to militate against this view, which in itself is not a well-founded one.

self of the kingdom<sup>1</sup>. He (then) restraining his own vices, and honouring good men, attained high perfection, and sang these verses: 'I have conquered most vices; destroyed all foes; but there is one, the greatest, vice which should be destroyed and which I have not destroyed—that (vice), being impelled by which, a creature does not attain freedom from desire, and being troubled by desire, understands (nothing) while running into ditches<sup>2</sup>; (that vice), being impelled by which, a man even does what ought not to be done. That avarice—cut (it) off, cut (it) off with sharp swords. For from avarice<sup>3</sup> is born desire; then anxiety comes into existence; and he who desires, mostly acquires qualities appertaining to the quality of passion. Obtaining those, he mostly acquires qualities appertaining to the quality of darkness<sup>4</sup>. When the bodily frame is destroyed, he, owing to these qualities, is born again and again, and engages in action. And at the expiration of life, again with his body dismembered and scattered about, he meets death, and again birth. Therefore, properly perceiving this, and restraining avarice by courage, one should wish for sovereignty in the self. This is sovereignty<sup>5</sup>; there is no other sovereignty here. The self properly understood is itself the sovereign.' Such were

<sup>1</sup> For the good of the people, says Arguna Misra. •

<sup>2</sup> I.e. base actions, *Nilakantha*.

<sup>3</sup> Avarice, according to Arguna Misra, is the belief that one has not got that which one has, and desire is the wish for more and more. Avarice, seems, however, to be the general frame of mind, always wishing for something, never being contented, and desire is the wish for a specific object.

<sup>4</sup> Which are sources of delusion. Cf. a similar doctrine at *Âpastamba* II, 5, 140. <sup>5</sup> *Nilakantha* compares *Taittirîya*, p. 26.



the verses sung with regard to the great sovereignty, by the glorious Ambarīsha, who destroyed the one (chief vice), avarice.

## CHAPTER XVII.

The Brāhmaṇa said :

On this<sup>1</sup>, too, they relate this ancient story (in the shape of) a dialogue, O you of a pure heart! between a Brāhmaṇa and Ganaka. King Ganaka, by way of punishment, said to a Brāhmaṇa who had fallen into some offence : ' You should not live within my dominions.' Thus spoken to, the Brāhmaṇa then replied to that best of kings : ' Tell me, O king! how far (extend) the dominions which are subject to you. I wish, O Lord! to live in the dominions of another king, and, O master of the earth! I wish to do your bidding according to the Sâstras.' Thus spoken to by that glorious Brāhmaṇa, the king then heaved frequent and warm sighs, and said nothing in reply. While that king of unbounded power was seated, engaged in meditation, a delusion suddenly came upon him, as the planet<sup>2</sup> upon the sun. Then when the delusion had gone off, the king recovered himself, and after a short while spoke these words to the Brāhmaṇa.

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Ganaka said :

Though this country, which is the kingdom of my father and grandfather, is subject (to me), I cannot

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<sup>1</sup> On getting rid of the notion that this, that, and the other thing is one's own,—Arjuna Misra. Nīlakaṇṭha agrees, and adds also on the subject of cutting off avarice.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, Râhu.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

**Ganaka said :**

<sup>1</sup> Meaning, apparently, that over which he and no one else has power. He contracts his vision gradually, and finds nothing at all which he can call his own to the exclusion of others. He explains, further on, how he arrives at the alternative conviction stated towards the close of this speech. In the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* (p. 916) he is said to have offered his kingdom to Yâgñavalkya and himself as his slave, after learning the *Brahma-vidyâ*. See too Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iv, p. 426 seq. <sup>2</sup> See *Sānti Parvan* (*Moksha*) I, 13.

<sup>2</sup> See *Sānti Parvan* (Moksha) I, 13.

\* Conditions of indigence or affluence, *Nīlakantha*. Arguna Mera's reading is different.

\* There is a familiar verse, ascribed to *Ganaka*, which says, 'If

was, (I thought of) the Vedic text about anybody's property, (hence) I could not find by my intelligence anything that should be (called) mine<sup>1</sup>. Resorting to this conviction, I have got rid of (the notion that this or that is) mine. Now hear the conviction, holding which, my domain (appears to me to be) everywhere<sup>2</sup>. I do not desire for myself even smells existing in the nose<sup>3</sup>. Therefore the earth<sup>4</sup> being conquered is always subject to me. I do not desire for myself tastes even dwelling in the mouth. Therefore water being conquered is always subject to me. I do not desire for myself the colour (or) light appertaining to the eye. Therefore light being conquered is always subject to me. I do not desire for myself the (feelings of touch) which exist in the skin. Therefore air being conquered is always

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Mithilâ is on fire, nothing of mine is burnt (in it).' The verse occurs in the Mahâbhârata, Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma), chap. 178, st. 2, and also chap. 276, st. 4. See too Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i. p. 429.

<sup>1</sup> This is not clear. I have followed Nîlakantha's text. Arguna Misra's is in the earlier part more intelligible, 'Whose is this to-day, whose to-morrow?' But I cannot find that there is any Vedic text to this effect. Nîlakantha cites on his text Îsopanishad, p. 5. The meaning here seems to be, 'When I considered as to whom the things I saw in my thoughts belonged to, I remembered the Vedic text that one should not wish to obtain another's property, and so, thinking about the matter with that caution, I could not make out that there was anything which I could call my own.'

<sup>2</sup> This is the alternative conclusion he has come to.

<sup>3</sup> The sense of smell enjoys the smell, my self has nothing to do with it. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 55, also Maitrî, pp. 112, 113.

<sup>4</sup> Whenever there is any smell, it is supposed that particles of earth are there; so the meaning here is 'all things having the quality of smell are subject to me,' and so throughout. The objects of sense are all used for the purposes of the prescribed actions, the benefits of which accrue to gods, &c. Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 53, 54, and see also pp. 84, 85.

subject to me. I do not desire for myself sounds even though existing in the ear. Therefore sounds being conquered are always subject to me. I do not desire for myself the mind always within me. Therefore the mind being conquered is always subject to me. All these actions of mine are, verily, for this purpose, (namely) for the gods, the *Pitris*, the *Bhûtas*, together with guests. Then the *Brâhmaṇa*, smiling, again said to *Ganaka*: 'Know me to be *Dharma*, come here to-day to learn (something) about you<sup>1</sup>. You are the one person to turn this wheel, the nave of which is the *Brahma*<sup>2</sup>, the spoke the understanding, and which does not turn back<sup>3</sup>, and which is checked by the quality of goodness as its circumference<sup>4</sup>.'

## CHAPTER XVIII.

The *Brâhmaṇa* said :

O modest one! I do not move about in this world in the way which, according to your own understanding, you have guessed. I<sup>5</sup> am a *Brâhmaṇa*, I am

<sup>1</sup> I. e. to put him to the test. Such examinations are often referred to in our later literature.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. *Veda*, says *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. says *Arguna Misra*, which leads to the seat from which there is no return. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 112.

<sup>4</sup> The wheel is the *yoga*, says *Arguna Misra*. The expression is noteworthy, as being that used of Buddha's teaching. See on that *David's Buddhism*, p. 45.

<sup>5</sup> The man who has achieved final emancipation has got that, in which the benefits to be derived from the course of life of a *Brâhmaṇa*, &c., are included (see p. 191 *supra*). Hence, says he, the

emancipated, I am a forester, and I likewise perform the duties of a householder, observing vows. I am not such, O beautiful one! as you see me with the eye. I pervade every single thing that is in this world. Whatever creatures there are in the world, movable or not moving, know me to be the destroyer of them as fire is of wood<sup>1</sup>. Sovereignty over the whole world, and even over heaven; that, or else this knowledge; (of these two) knowledge is my only wealth<sup>2</sup>. This<sup>3</sup> is the path of the Brâhmanas, by which those who understand that<sup>4</sup> proceed, to households, or residence in forests, or, dwelling with preceptors, or among mendicants<sup>5</sup>. With numerous unconfused symbols only one knowledge is approached. And those who, adhering to various symbols and Âsramas, have their understanding full of tranquillity<sup>6</sup>, go to the single entity as rivers to the ocean. This path is traversed by the understanding, not by the body<sup>7</sup>. Actions have a beginning and an end, and the body is tied down by action. Hence, O beautiful one! you

doubt, on which your question is based as to what world you will go to by being joined to me, is wrong. See p. 256 supra.

<sup>1</sup> He is speaking here on the footing of the essential identity of everything. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> The expression here is clumsy; the meaning is that he prefers knowledge to sovereignty, if the alternative is offered him.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. knowledge.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. the Brahman.

<sup>5</sup> These are the four orders or Âsramas.

<sup>6</sup> The knowledge to be acquired, by whatever symbols the attempt to acquire it is made, is but this, that all is one; and that is acquired certainly when tranquillity has been achieved.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. by realising the identity of everything, not by the actions performed with the body, which, as he goes on to show, are perishable, and cannot lead to any lasting result.

(need) have no fear occasioned by the other world. With your heart intent upon the real entity, you will certainly come into my self.

## CHAPTER XIX.

The Brâhmaza's wife said :

This is not possible to be understood by one whose self<sup>1</sup> is frivolous, or by one whose self is not refined ; and my intelligence is very frivolous, and narrow, and confused. Tell me the means by which this knowledge is acquired. I (wish to) learn from you the source from which that knowledge proceeds.

The Brâhmaza said :

Know that he who devotes himself to the Brahman is the (lower) *Arazi*, the instructor is the upper *Arazi*. Penance and sacred learning cause the attrition<sup>2</sup>, and from that the fire of knowledge is produced.

The Brâhmaza's wife said :

As to this symbol of the Brahman which is denominated the *Kshetragña*, where, indeed, is (to be found) a description of it, by which it<sup>3</sup> is capable of being comprehended ?

<sup>1</sup> I. e. mind, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>2</sup> Scil. of the *Arazis* (i.e. the wood used for kindling fire) ; the sense is, that the pupil who has penance and Vedic learning goes to a teacher for knowledge. See *Svetâsvatara*, pp. 307, 308.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. the Brahman, says *Arguna Misra*, of which the *Kshetragña* is only a symbol. For a definition of *Kshetragña*, see *Sânti Parvan* (*Moksha*), c. ap. 187, st. 23.

The Brâhmaṇa said :

He is without symbols<sup>1</sup>, and also without qualities ; nothing exists that is a cause of him. I will only state the means by which he can be comprehended or not. A good means is found, namely, action<sup>2</sup> and knowledge, by which that<sup>3</sup> (entity), which has the symbols (useful) for knowledge<sup>4</sup> attributed to it through ignorance, is perceived as by bees<sup>5</sup>. In the (rules for) final emancipation, it is not laid down, that a certain thing should be done, and a certain thing should not<sup>6</sup>. But the knowledge of the things beneficial to the self is produced in one who sees and hears<sup>7</sup>. One should adopt as many of these things, (which are) means of direct perception, as may here be practicable—unperceived, and those whose form is perceived<sup>8</sup>, in hundreds and in thousands, all of various descriptions. Then one comes near to that beyond which nothing exists.

The Deity said :

Then the mind of the Brâhmaṇa's wife, after the

<sup>1</sup> See Sanatsugâtîya, p. 160.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. that which is required as a preliminary to the acquisition of knowledge, and hence is necessary for final emancipation.

<sup>3</sup> The Brahman.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. symbols which are to convey a knowledge of the Brahman.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. in a way not perfect ; as bees hovering above a flower get the fragrance of it without grasping the flower itself, so these means give one an imperfect knowledge of the Brahman to be afterwards perfected by constant meditation upon it (nididhyâsa).

<sup>6</sup> As it is in the prior portion of the Vedas, as to sacrifices, &c.

<sup>7</sup> Sees, i. e. by contemplation ; hears, i. e. from a teacher, Arguna Misra.

<sup>8</sup> This seems to mean such things as hearing, reading, &c., which would be 'perceived' scil. by the senses ; and all intellectual operations which would be 'unperceived.'

destruction of the Kshetragnâ<sup>1</sup>, turned to that which is beyond (all) Kshetragnâs by means of a knowledge of the Kshetra<sup>2</sup>.

Arguna said :

Where, indeed, O *Krishna*! is that Brâhmana's wife, and where is that chief of Brâhmanas, by both of whom this perfection was attained? Tell me about them both, O undegraded one!

The Deity said :

Know my mind to be the Brâhmana, and know my understanding to be the Brâhmana's wife. And he, O *Dhananîgaya*! who has been spoken of as the Kshetragnâ, is I myself<sup>3</sup>.

## CHAPTER XX.

Arguna said :

Be pleased to explain to me the Brahman which is the highest object of knowledge; for by your favour my mind is much interested in (these) subtle<sup>4</sup> (subjects).

Vâsudeva said :

On this, too, they relate an ancient story (in the shape of) a dialogue, connected with final emancipation, between a preceptor and a pupil. A talented

<sup>1</sup> I. e. after the identification of the individual self with the universal self, when the individual ceases to be perceived as such. Cf. *Sânti Parvan* (Moksha), chap. 187, st. 23.

<sup>2</sup> That beyond Kshetragnâs = the absolute supreme self. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 106.

<sup>3</sup> The substance of this speech, says *Arguna Misra*, is that the mind and understanding devoted to the supreme lead to final emancipation.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 296 supra. The last chapter closes what in some of the M<sup>S</sup>s. is called the *Brahma Gîtâ*, or *Brâhmana Gîtâ* contained in the *Anugîtâ Parvan*. See further as to this our Introduction, where the point is further dwelt on.



pupil, O terror of your foes ! asked a Brâhmaṇa preceptor of rigid vows, (when he was) seated, something about the highest good. 'I' (he said), 'whose goal is the highest good, am come to you (who are) venerable; I pray of you with (bowed) head, O Brâhmaṇa ! that you should explain to me what I ask.' The preceptor, O son of Prithâ ! said to the pupil who spoke thus : 'I will explain to you everything, O twice-born one ! on which you verily have any doubt.' Thus addressed by the preceptor, O best of the Kauravas ! he who was devoted to the preceptor, put (his) questions with joined hands. Listen to that, O you of great intelligence !

The pupil said :

Whence am I<sup>1</sup>, and whence are you ? Explain that which is the highest truth. From what were the movable and immovable entities born ? By what do entities live, and what is the limit of their life ? What is truth, what penance, O Brâhmaṇa ? What are called the qualities by the good ? And what paths are happy ? What is pleasure, and what sin ? These questions of mine, O venerable Brâhmaṇa sage ! O you of excellent vows ! do you be pleased to explain<sup>2</sup> correctly, truly, and accurately. There is none else here who can explain these questions. Speak, O best of those who understand piety ! I feel the highest curiosity (in this matter). You are celebrated in the worlds as skilled in topics connected with the piety (required for) final emancipation. And there exists none else but you who can destroy all

<sup>1</sup> Compare the questions at the beginning of the Svetâsvatara-upanishad.

<sup>2</sup> A similar expression to that in the Sanatsugâtîya, p. 149, and elsewhere.

doubts. And we<sup>1</sup>, likewise, are afraid of worldly life, and also desirous of final emancipation.

Vâsudeva said :

That talented preceptor, who preserved (all) vows, O son of Prithâ ! O chief of the family of the Kauravas ! O restrainer of foes ! duly explained all those questions to that pupil, who had approached him (for instruction), who put (his) questions properly, who was possessed of (the necessary) qualifications, who was tranquil, who conducted himself in an agreeable manner, who was like (his) shadow<sup>2</sup>, and who was a self-restrained ascetic and a Brahma-kârin.

The preceptor said :

All this, which is connected with the knowledge of the Vedas<sup>3</sup> and involves a consideration of the real entity, and which is cultivated by the chief sages, was declared by Brahman. We consider knowledge only as the highest thing ; and renunciation<sup>4</sup> as the best penance. And he who understands determinately the true object of knowledge which is impregnable<sup>5</sup>—the self abiding in all entities—and who can move about anywhere<sup>6</sup>, is esteemed highest. The learned man who perceives the abiding together<sup>7</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> It is not easy to account for the change here from the singular to the plural.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. always attended on the preceptor. Cf. generally, *Mundaka*, p. 283.

<sup>3</sup> The question was not quite from his own imagination, says *Nilakantha*. Arguna Misra has a different reading, which he interprets to mean 'that on which the Vedas are all at one.'

<sup>4</sup> Of the fruit of action, Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. not such as to require modification by any other knowledge, as knowledge of the world does.

<sup>6</sup> *Nilakantha* compares *Khândogya*, pp. 523-553.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. of *Kit* and *Gada*, says *Nilakantha*; of Brahman and its manifestations, as alluded to, inter alia, at pp. 105, 106, 191 *supra*.

and the severance also, and likewise unity and variety<sup>1</sup>, is released from misery. He who does not desire anything, and has no egoism about anything, becomes eligible for assimilation with the Brahman, even while dwelling in this world<sup>2</sup>. He who knows the truth about the qualities of nature, who understands the creation of all entities, who is devoid of (the thought that this or that is) mine, and who is devoid of egoism, is emancipated; there is no doubt of that. Accurately understanding the great (tree) of which the unperceived<sup>3</sup> is the sprout from the seed, which consists of the understanding as its trunk, the branches of which are the great egoism, in the holes of which are the sprouts, namely, the senses, of which the great elements are the flower-bunches<sup>4</sup>, the gross elements the smaller boughs, which is always possessed of leaves, always possessed of flowers, and from which pleasant fruits are always produced, on which all entities subsist, which is eternal, and the seed of which is the Brahman; and cutting it with that excellent sword—knowledge—one attains immortality, and casts off birth and death<sup>5</sup>. I will state to you to-day, O highly

<sup>1</sup> I.e. that variety is only in this world, but that the unity of everything is the true proposition. Cf. *inter alia* Gîtâ, p. 104.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Brîhadâraṇyaka*, p. 858, and Gîtâ, p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. the *Prakṛiti* of the Sâṅkhyas.

<sup>4</sup> The great elements are the five *tanmâtras* of earth, water, fire, air, and space, which afterwards produce what we have called the gross elements in the text, namely, the earth &c. which we perceive.

<sup>5</sup> The tree typifies worldly life. Cf. pp. 111–189 *supra*. The leaves and flowers, Arguna Misra says, stand for volition and action; and Nîlakantha seems to agree. The tree is called eternal, as worldly life is supposed to have had no beginning. Cf. *Sârîraka Bhâshya*, p. 494, 'sprout from the seed,' this rendering is necessitated by Brahman being described as the seed. Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 288; *Svetâsvatara*, p. 362; *Kaṭha*, pp. 143, 144.

talented one! the true conclusion<sup>1</sup> about the past, the present, the future, and so forth, and piety, desire, and wealth<sup>2</sup>, which is understood by the multitudes of Siddhas, which belongs to olden times, and is eternal, which ought to be apprehended, and understanding which talented men have here attained perfection. Formerly<sup>3</sup>, the sages, *Bṛihaspati*, *Bhadradvâga*, *Gautama*, and likewise *Bhârgava*, *Vasishtha*, and also *Kâsyapa*, and *Visvâmitra*, and *Atri* also, desiring knowledge, met each other, after having travelled over all paths<sup>4</sup>, and becoming wearied of their own actions. And those twice-born (sages), giving the lead to the old sage *Ângirasa*, saw Brahman, from whom (all) sin has departed, in Brahman's mansion. Having saluted that high-souled one who was sitting at ease, the great sages, full of humility, asked him this momentous (question) concerning the highest good: 'How should one perform good action? how is one released from sin? what paths are happy for us? what is truth and what vice? By what action are the two paths southern and northern obtained<sup>5</sup>? (and what is) destruction<sup>6</sup> and emancipation, the birth and death of entities?' What the grandsire said conformably to the scriptures<sup>7</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the means of arriving at it, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>2</sup> The triad, the acquisition of which worldly men aspire to.

<sup>3</sup> He explains how the doctrine belongs to olden times.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. paths of action, *Nîlakantha*. See *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 165.

<sup>5</sup> Namely, the *Pitriyâna* and *Devayâna* (*Arguna Misra*), as to which see *Khândogya*, p. 341, *Kaushîtaki*, p. 13, and *Bṛihadâra-nyaka*, p. 1034.

<sup>6</sup> *Nîlakantha* seems to interpret this to mean the temporary and final dissolutions of the worlds, on which see, inter alia, *Vedânta Paribhâshâ*, p. 48.

<sup>7</sup> So *Nîlakantha*. May it not be 'according to the received tradition?'

when thus spoken to by the sages, I will state to you. Listen (to that) O pupil!

Brahman said:

From the truth were the entities movable and immovable produced. They live by penance<sup>1</sup>. Understand that, O you of excellent vows! By their own action they remain transcending their own source<sup>2</sup>. For the truth joined with the qualities is invariably of five varieties. The Brahman<sup>3</sup> is the truth; penance is the truth; Pragâpati also is truth; the entities are born from the truth; the universe consisting of (all) creatures is the truth. Therefore Brâhmaṇas whose final goal is always concentration of mind, from whom anger and vexation have departed, and who are invariably devoting themselves to piety, are full of the truth. I will speak about those (Brâhmaṇas) who are restrained by one another<sup>4</sup>, who are possessed of knowledge, who are the establishers of the bridge of piety, and who are the constant creators of the people<sup>5</sup>. I will speak of the four (branches of) knowledge, and likewise of the castes, and of the four orders, distinctly. The wise always speak of piety as one, (but) having

<sup>1</sup> I. e. by action, *Nilakantha*. Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 280, and see p. 166 supra, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. they remain apart from the Brahman, being engaged in action. This answers some of the questions put by the pupil to the preceptor. As to 'the truth,' see p. 162, note 2 supra.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. *Īsvara*, or god; penance=piety; Pragâpati=the individual soul, *Nilakantha*. Brahman='that' (but how is 'that' 'joined with qualities?'); Pragâpati=Brahman, *Arguna Misra*. They agree about penance and entities (which they take to mean the gross elements) and creatures. Brahman and Pragâpati=Virâg and *Hiranyagarbha*(?), p. 186 supra. Cf. *Sânti Parvan* (*Moksha*), chap. 190, st. 1.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. who commit no breach of piety through fear of one another, *Nilakantha*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 86.

four quarters. I will speak to you, O twice-born ones! of the happy path, which is productive of pleasure, and which has been invariably travelled over by talented men in old days for (obtaining) assimilation with the Brahman. Learn, O noble ones! from me, now speaking exhaustively, of that highest path which is difficult to understand, and of the highest seat. The first step is said to be the order of Brahmaçârins; the second is that of householders; next after that is that of foresters; and next after that too, the highest step must be understood to be that relating to the Adhyâtma<sup>1</sup>. Light<sup>2</sup>, space, sun, air, Indra, Pragâpati, one sees not these, while one does not attain to the Adhyâtma<sup>3</sup>. I will subsequently state the means to that, which you should understand. The order of foresters, (the order) of the sages who dwell in forests and live on fruits, roots and air, is prescribed for the three twice-born (castes). The order of householders is prescribed for all castes. The talented ones speak of piety as having faith for its characteristic. Thus have I described to you the paths leading to the gods<sup>4</sup>, which are occupied by good and talented men by means of their actions, and which are bridges of piety. He who, rigid in his vows, takes up any one of these modes of piety separately, always comes in time to perceive the production and dissolution of

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<sup>1</sup> That is to say, that of the ascetic, who specially devotes himself to the acquisition of knowledge about the relation of the supreme and individual self (Adhyâtma).

<sup>2</sup> The deity presiding over the bright fortnight, says Arguna Misra. The words space and sun and air must be similarly interpreted.

<sup>3</sup> Nîlakantha says 'one sees these only while one has not had a perception of the self.' He takes light &c. to mean the 'universe.'

<sup>4</sup> I.e. the means of reaching the Devayâna path (mentioned at p. 314, note 5), Nîlakantha. Cf. also Mundaka, p. 312.

(all) entities<sup>1</sup>. Now I shall state with accuracy and with reasons, all the elements which abide in parts in all objects. The great self<sup>2</sup>, the unperceived<sup>3</sup> likewise, and likewise also egoism, the ten senses and the one<sup>4</sup> (sense), and the five great elements, and the specific characteristics of the five elements<sup>5</sup>, such is the eternal creation. The number of the elements is celebrated as being twenty-four plus one. And the talented man who understands the production and dissolution of (all) elements, he, of all beings, never comes by delusion. He who accurately understands the elements, the whole of the qualities<sup>6</sup>, and also all the deities<sup>7</sup>, casting aside sin, and getting rid of (all) bonds, attains to all the spotless worlds.

## CHAPTER XXI.

Brahman said :

That unperceived (principle), all-pervading, everlasting, and immutable, which is in a state of equilibrium<sup>8</sup>, should be understood (to become) the city of nine portals, consisting of three qualities, and five

<sup>1</sup> Namely, how they are all manifestations of the Brahman, and are all dissolved in it. Cf. *inter alia* Gîtâ, pp. 74, 92.

<sup>2</sup> See the *Ka/hopanishad*, p. 149. See also p. 332 *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 313, note 3 *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. the mind. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 102. <sup>5</sup> Viz. smell, sound, &c.

<sup>6</sup> Tranquillity, self-restraint, &c., *Arguna Misra*. Are they not rather the three qualities? As to 'twenty-four plus one' above, see p. 368.

<sup>7</sup> Does this mean the senses, as at Gîtâ, p. 123? An accurate understanding of the things noted requires a knowledge of their relation to the supreme, which is the means of final emancipation. And see p. 337 *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 107, and *Sânkhya-sâra*, p. 11, and note 2, p. 331 *infra*.

constituent principles<sup>1</sup>, encircled by the eleven<sup>2</sup>, consisting of mind<sup>3</sup> as the distinguishing power, and of the understanding as ruler, this is (an aggregate made up of) eleven<sup>4</sup>. The three currents<sup>5</sup> which are within this (city) support (it)<sup>6</sup> again and again, and those three channels run on, being constituted by the three qualities. Darkness, passion, and goodness, these are called the three qualities, which are all coupled with one another, and likewise serve one another, which depend on one another, and attend on one another, and are joined to one another<sup>7</sup>. And the five constituent principles

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<sup>1</sup> The five gross elements of which the body is composed (cf. Mahâbhârata, Sânti Parvan, Moksha Dharma, chap. 183, st. 1 seq.) are developments of the unperceived principle, the Prakṛti. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 112, where the words 'which remain (absorbed) in nature' have been inadvertently omitted after 'with the mind as the sixth.' As to the nine portals cf. Gîtâ, p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> The five active organs, the five perceptive senses, and the mind.

<sup>3</sup> This Arguna Misra takes to mean 'egoism.' Nîlakantha takes the usual meaning, and adds, objects are produced from mental operations; 'distinguishing,' that is, manifesting as distinct entities.

<sup>4</sup> The eleven are, according to Arguna Misra, the three qualities, the five gross elements, the group of organs and senses as one, egoism, and understanding.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. the nâdîs, Idâ, Piṅgalâ, and Sushumâ, Arguna Misra, who adds that they are respectively of the quality of darkness, passion, and goodness.

<sup>6</sup> The three nâdîs, says Arguna Misra, support the life-winds. Nîlakantha takes the three currents to be the threefold inclination of the mind, viz. towards a pure piety, towards injuring other living creatures, and towards that mixed piety which requires the destruction of life for its performance. Nîlakantha also has a different reading from Arguna Misra, which means 'are replenished' instead of 'support.' And the three channels are, according to Nîlakantha, the Samskâraś, or effects of previous actions of piety or impiety.

<sup>7</sup> Coupled=always existing in association with one another; serving=being necessary to the operations of one another; depending=supporting one another like three staves, says Nîlakantha;



(are made up of) the three qualities. Goodness is the match of darkness, and passion is the match of goodness; and goodness is also the match of passion, and darkness the match of goodness. Where darkness is restrained, passion there prevails. Where passion is restrained, goodness there prevails<sup>1</sup>. Darkness should be understood to consist in obscurity. It has three qualities<sup>2</sup>, and is called delusion. Its characteristic is also impiety, and it is constant in sinful actions. This is the nature of darkness; it also appears combined (with others). Passion is said to consist in activity, and is the cause of successive<sup>3</sup> (acts). When it prevails, its characteristic, among all beings, appears to be production<sup>4</sup>. Light, lightness<sup>5</sup>, faith, such is stated to be the nature of goodness (prevailing) among all beings, as accepted by good men. The true nature of their characteristics, in aggregation and separation, will now be stated together with the reasons; learn those accurately. Delusion, ignorance,

upholding, says Arguna Misra, as the total absence of one would lead to the absence of the others also; attending=becoming subordinate to whichever of them is dominant for the time being; joined=so as to become one organic whole. Cf. as to all this, Yoga-sûtra II, 18, and commentary, p. 101; Sâṅkhya-kârikâ, Kârikâ 12, with Vâkaspati Misra's comments on it.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 108, and the quotation in the Sâṅkhyatattvakau-mudî, p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. characteristics, viz. obscurity (which seems to stand for ignorance), delusion (which is false knowledge), and impiety (doing that which is known to be sinful and wrong).

<sup>3</sup> The original means, according to Nîlakantha, wrong, unlawful conduct. As to all this cf. Sâṅti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 194, st. 29.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. apparently perpetually doing something. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 108.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. as to this, and generally also, Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 13, and commentary of Vâkaspati Misra (p. 64). The blazing upwards of fire is said to illustrate the lightness of the quality of goodness which belongs to fire.

want of liberality, indecision about actions<sup>1</sup>, sleep, haughtiness<sup>2</sup>, fear, avarice, grief, finding fault with good acts, want of memory<sup>3</sup>, immaturity (of intellect), nihilism<sup>4</sup>, violation of (the rules of) conduct, want of discrimination<sup>5</sup>, blindness, behaviour of the lowest<sup>6</sup> quality, pride of performance without (actual) performance, pride of knowledge without (actual) knowledge, unfriendliness, evil disposition, want of faith, deluded convictions, want of straightforwardness, want of knowledge<sup>6</sup>, sinful action, want of knowledge (of the subtle principle), stolidity<sup>7</sup>, lassitude, want of self-restraint, going into inferior ways; all these qualities, O Brâhmaṇas! are celebrated as being dark. And whatever other states of mind, connected with delusion, are found in various places in this world, all these are dark qualities. Constant talk in disparagement of gods, Brâhmaṇas and Vedas, want of liberality, vanity, delusion<sup>8</sup>, anger, want of forgiveness likewise, and also animosity

<sup>1</sup> According to Gîtâ, p. 108, doing nothing—stolid laziness—is a mark of darkness. Cf. generally on this passage Gîtâ, pp. 107, 118, 124 seq.; Maitrî, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> The same word as at Gîtâ, pp. 116, 125 (headstrong in the latter passage should have been haughty). Cf. as to the word, *Khândogya*, p. 383. <sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> The opposite of the belief mentioned at Gîtâ, p. 126.

<sup>5</sup> The same word as at Gîtâ, p. 109. But the commentators render it here by *himsra*, i. e. destructive.

I am not sure about the original word here, and the word next but one after this. The latter Arguna Misra renders by *sûkṣhma-tattvâvedanam*, which I have translated above in the text. The former seems to mean general unintelligence.

<sup>7</sup> Heaviness and dulness, induced by indolence, &c., *Nîlakantha*. Lassitude is drooping from despondency. Going into inferior ways, Arguna Misra says, means falling into the inferior castes; *Nîlakantha* says it means love for base actions.

<sup>8</sup> Not being cognisant of one's own shortcomings, Arguna Misra.

towards people, this is considered to be dark conduct. Whatever vain<sup>1</sup> actions (there are), and whatever vain gifts, and vain eating, that is considered to be dark conduct. Reviling, and want of forgiveness, animosity, vanity, want of faith also, this is considered to be dark conduct. And whatever such people there are in this world, doers of sinful acts, who break through (all) regulations, they are all held to be dark. I will state the wombs appointed for these (men) of sinful actions. They go to the hell, (namely) the brute (species), to be born in the lower hell<sup>2</sup>; (or become) the immovable entities<sup>3</sup>, animals, beasts of burden, demons, and serpents, and worms, insects, birds, and also creatures born from eggs, and all quadrupeds, and idiots, deaf and dumb men, and whatever others are attacked by diseases generated by sin<sup>4</sup>. These dark, evil-conducted men, who are sunk in darkness, who bear the marks of their own actions, the current of whose (thoughts) is downwards<sup>5</sup>, sink into darkness. I will now proceed to state their improvement and ascent; how, becoming men of meritorious actions, they attain to the worlds of those who perform good acts<sup>6</sup>. Resorting to a contrary<sup>7</sup> (course of life), and growing old in (good) actions<sup>8</sup>, they exert

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 83.

Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 116.

Such as trees and so forth, which are also forms of life.

<sup>4</sup> This is alluded to in some *Smritis* too. And cf. *Khândogya*, p. 358, and the quotation in the commentary on *Sâṅkhya-sûtra* V, 122.

<sup>5</sup> Such, says *Nîlakantha*, as to fit them for the nether world. See *Tattvakaumudî*, p. 113. As to marks, cf. p. 239 *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 130.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. contrary to that already described as dark.

<sup>8</sup> *Nîlakantha* renders this to mean 'destroyed for Agnihotra and such ceremonies,' like the goat referred to above at p. 290.

themselves, and through the ceremonies (performed for them) by benevolent Brâhmanas devoted to their own duties, they go upwards to the same world (as the Brâhmanas)—the heaven of the gods. Such is the Vedic text. Resorting to a contrary<sup>1</sup> (course of life), and growing old in their own duties, they become men in this world whose nature is to return<sup>2</sup>. Coming to a sinful womb, as *Kândâlas*<sup>3</sup>, or deaf, or lisping men, they attain to higher and higher castes in order; going beyond the *Sûdra* womb, and (beyond) whatever other dark qualities there are which abide in the quality of darkness<sup>4</sup> in the current (of this world). Attachment to objects of desire is laid down to be the great delusion. There, sages and saints and gods become deluded, wishing for pleasure. Darkness<sup>5</sup>, delusion, the great delusion, the great obscurity called anger, and death the blinding obscurity; anger is called the great obscurity. I have now duly described to you, O Brâhmanas! this quality of darkness, in full and accurately with reference to

<sup>1</sup> See note 7 on last page. The sequence of ideas seems not to be properly brought out here. In the course of transmigration after their course of conduct is altered they become men, and then proceed to heaven. This seems the real sense here.

<sup>2</sup> To return to life and death, and so on, until they fit themselves for final emancipation. Cf. *Âpastamba* II, 5, 11, 10-11.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 359.

<sup>4</sup> This is not very clear, and the commentators give but little help. The meaning probably is, that they gradually, in course of improvement, cross beyond the *Sûdra* caste, and all those qualities or tempers of mind, and so forth, which have been stated to appertain to the quality of darkness.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Sâṅkhya-kârikâ*, pp. 47, 48, and *Vâkaspati's* comment. There these are identified with the 'afflictions' of the *Yoga-sâstra*—ignorance, self-consciousness, affection, aversion, persistent attachment, and they are five divisions of false knowledge, or the quality of darkness, as it is here called. See, too, *Svetâsvatara* (comm.), p. 284.

its nature, and also its qualities, and also its source. Who, indeed, understands this properly; who, indeed, perceives this properly? The definition of the essence of darkness is, that one sees the real in what is unreal. The qualities of darkness have been described to you in many ways. And darkness in its higher and lower<sup>1</sup> (forms) has been accurately stated. The man who always understands these qualities gets rid of all dark qualities.

## CHAPTER XXII.

Brahman said :

O best (of men)! I will explain to you accurately the quality of passion. Learn, O noble ones! the action of the quality of passion. Injuring (others), beauty<sup>2</sup>, toil, pleasure and pain, cold and heat, power<sup>2</sup>, war, peace, argument, repining<sup>3</sup>, endurance, strength, valour, frenzy, wrath, exercise and quarrel too, vindictiveness, desire, backbiting, battle, the thought (that this or that is) mine, preservation<sup>4</sup>, slaughter, bonds, affliction, buying and selling, touching<sup>5</sup> other people's weak points, by cutting, breaking, piercing; fierceness and cruelty, vilifying, pointing out others' weaknesses, thinking of (this) world, harbouring evil thoughts, animosity, abuse,

<sup>1</sup> Generally and specifically, says Arguna Misra.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra says these mean pride of beauty and pride of power respectively. Cf. as to this list generally, Maitrî, pp. 50, 51.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Sanatsugâtîya, p. 168.

<sup>4</sup> I presume this means solicitude for preserving what one has got. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Literally, piercing. 'Cutting, breaking piercing,' further on, seems to indicate the greater or less offensiveness of the operation of 'touching others' weak points.'

uttering falsehoods, bad<sup>1</sup> gifts, doubt, boasting, censure, praise, laudation<sup>2</sup>, prowess, defiance, attendance (on another), obedience<sup>3</sup>, service, harbouring desire, management<sup>4</sup>, policy, heedlessness, contumely, belongings<sup>5</sup>, and the various decorations which prevail in this world, for men, for women, for living creatures, for articles, and for houses, vexation, and also want of faith, vows and regulations<sup>6</sup>, and actions with expectations, and the various acts of public charity<sup>7</sup>, the ceremony of Svâhâ, the ceremony of Svadhâ, the ceremony of Vashat<sup>8</sup>, salutation, both officiating at sacrifices and imparting instruction, and also sacrificing and study, gifts and acceptance of gifts, expiations, auspicious rites, the wish 'this may be mine and that may be mine,' affection generated by the qualities<sup>9</sup>, treachery and likewise deception, disrespect and respect, theft, slaughter, disgust, vexing (oneself), wakefulness, ostentation, haughtiness, and attachment also, devotion, pleasure and delight, gambling, common scandal, association with women,

<sup>1</sup> I.e. to undeserving persons, Arguna Misra. Probably it includes the other defects also pointed out at Gîtâ, p. 120. As to doubt, see Gîtâ, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> The one is attributing merits which do not exist, the other is merely parading merits which do exist.

<sup>3</sup> Arguna Misra takes this literally to mean 'wish to hear.'

<sup>4</sup> Cleverness in worldly affairs, Nîlakantha.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, passim, and see also Yoga-sûtras II, 30, and commentary (pp. 127-129, Calc. ed.)

<sup>6</sup> Fasts and other observances for special benefits.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. digging tanks and wells, &c.

<sup>8</sup> Vashat and Svâhâ indicate offerings to gods, Svadhâ to the manes. See *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 982, and *Māṇḍūkya* (*Gauḍapâda Kârîkâ*), p. 443, and commentaries there.

<sup>9</sup> I presume this means attachment to the operations of the qualities. Cf. Gîtâ p. 48. As to the wish just before, see Gîtâ, pp. 115, 116.

devotion to dancing, and instrumental or vocal music, all these qualities, O Brâhmanas! are described as passionate. The men who meditate on past, present, and future entities in this world<sup>1</sup>, who are always devoted to the triad—piety, wealth, and lust also<sup>2</sup>—who acting under (the impulse of) desires exult on the success of all their desires, these men, who are enveloped by passion, have (their) currents downwards<sup>3</sup>. Born again and again in this world, they rejoice<sup>4</sup>, and wish for the fruit appertaining to the life after death<sup>5</sup> and that appertaining to this world also. They give and receive, and make Tarpana<sup>6</sup>, and also sacrifice. The qualities of passion have been described to you in many ways, and the action of the quality has also been stated accurately. The man who always understands these qualities, gets rid of all passionate qualities.

### CHAPTER XXIII.

Brahman said :

Now I shall proceed to describe the third—the best—quality, beneficial to all creatures, and unblamable, the duty of the good. Joy<sup>7</sup>, pleasure, nobility, enlightenment and happiness also, absence of stinginess, absence of fear, contentment, faith, forgiveness, courage, harmlessness, equability, truth, straightforwardness, absence of wrath, absence of calumnia-

<sup>1</sup> I. e. who are always thinking of what they have done and what they have to do, and so forth. Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 115, 116.

<sup>2</sup> And not that which is higher than these, viz. final emancipation.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 321 and note 5 there. <sup>4</sup> Cf. inter alia, Gîtâ, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. heaven. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48. <sup>6</sup> I. e. offerings to the manes.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. p. 300 supra, and Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 194, st. 34; chap. 219, st. 36. For nobility, Arguna Misra has manifestation of joy.

tion, purity, dexterity, valour. He who possesses the piety of concentration of mind, (holding) knowledge to be vain<sup>1</sup>, (good) conduct vain, service vain, and labour vain, he attains the highest in the next world. Devoid of (the notion that this or that is) mine, devoid of egoism, devoid of expectations, equable everywhere, not full of desires, (to be) such is the eternal duty of the good. Confidence, modesty<sup>2</sup>, forgiveness, liberality, purity, freedom from laziness, absence of cruelty, freedom from delusion, compassion to (all) creatures, absence of backbiting, joy, contentment, joviality, humility, good behaviour, purity in all action for (acquiring) tranquillity<sup>3</sup>, righteous feelings, emancipation<sup>4</sup>, indifference<sup>5</sup>, life as a Brahma<sup>k</sup>ârin, abandonment on all hands, freedom from (the notion that this or that is) mine, freedom from expectations<sup>6</sup>, unbroken piety<sup>7</sup>, (holding that) gifts (are) vain, sacrifices vain, learning vain, vows vain, receipt of gifts vain, piety vain, penance vain. Those talented Brâhmanas in this world, whose conduct is of this description, who adhere to the quality of goodness, abiding in the seat of the Brahman<sup>8</sup>, perceive (everything) aright. Getting rid of all

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<sup>1</sup> Such is Nîlakantha's reading, and he takes knowledge to mean mere knowledge derived from books, &c. Arguna Misra has a different reading for vain, which he interprets to mean 'wish for fruit.'

<sup>2</sup> See Sanatsugâtîya, p. 162.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. pure and straightforward conduct in the performance of whatever is done for attaining final emancipation.

<sup>4</sup> Of other people from sorrow, Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> The state of being unconcerned, udâsîna, Nîlakantha.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 60, inter alia.

<sup>7</sup> Arguna Misra understands the original here to mean 'not being under the control of another.'

<sup>8</sup> I.e. the source of the Vedas, according to Nîlakantha. The supreme is called Brahmayoni, the original word here, at Svetâ-



sins, and free from grief, those talented men reach heaven, and create (various) bodies<sup>1</sup>. The power of governing, self-restraint, minuteness<sup>2</sup>, these those high-souled ones make (for themselves) by (the operations of their own) minds like the gods dwelling in heaven. They are said to have their currents upwards<sup>3</sup>, and to be gods, and of the quality of goodness<sup>4</sup>; and having gone to heaven they verily change in various ways, by means of nature<sup>5</sup>. They obtain and divide<sup>6</sup> whatever they desire. Thus, O chiefs of the twice-born! have I described to you the conduct of the quality of goodness. Understanding this according to rule, one obtains whatever one desires. The qualities

svatara, p. 354, where Brahman is rendered to mean Prakṛti by Śaṅkara. See Sanatsugâtīya, p. 186, note 6, and Taittirīya-âraṇyaka, p. 894. As to the probable sense here, see p. 339, note 2 infra.

<sup>1</sup> I. e. for themselves. Cf. p. 345 infra; Yoga-sûtras, p. 227; and Brhadâraṇyaka, p. 849.

<sup>2</sup> These include, according to Nîlakantha, the other qualities of the same class unnamed here, for which see Yoga-sûtra III, 44 (p. 207). The power of governing, i. e. producing, destroying, or combining worldly objects as one pleases; self-restraint, i. e. in the presence of tempting objects; minuteness=power of becoming as minute as one pleases. The other qualities are lightness, largeness, and heaviness; power of attracting everything so as to be near oneself (e. g. touching the moon with the finger), power of obtaining one's wish.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 321 supra and note 5. Arguna Misra, and Nîlakantha also, here render it by 'those who go upwards.' As to which, see Gîtâ, p. 109.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. for this sense, which is given by Arguna Misra, Sâṅkhya-sâra, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Nîlakantha says this means that they change their minds for purposes of enjoyment by means of the impression of previous enjoyments. The changes, however, seem to be those above referred to—minuteness, &c., and the acquisition of other bodies. As to nature, cf. Gîtâ, pp. 58 and 112, with the correction made at p. 318 supra.

<sup>6</sup> This is not quite clear. Does it mean distribute among themselves or others?

of goodness have been specifically described, and the operation of the qualities has been accurately stated. The man who always understands these qualities, enjoys the qualities<sup>1</sup>, but is not attached to the qualities.

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#### CHAPTER XXIV.

Brahman said :

The qualities cannot be explained altogether distinctly (from one another). Passion, goodness, and darkness likewise are seen mixed up (with one another). They are attached to one another, they feed on one another. They all depend on one another, and likewise follow one another<sup>2</sup>. There is no doubt of this, that as long<sup>3</sup> as there is goodness so long darkness exists. And as long as goodness and darkness, so long is passion said (to exist) here. They perform their journey together, in union, and moving about collectively. For they act with cause or without cause<sup>4</sup>, moving in a body. Of all these acting with one another, but differing in development, the increase and diminution will now be stated. Where darkness is increased, abiding<sup>5</sup> in the lower entities, there passion should be understood to be little, and goodness likewise to be less. Where

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ inter alia, p. 104.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 318 supra.

<sup>3</sup> So Arguna Misra. Nîlakantha says on this, 'However much goodness may be increased, it is still held in check by darkness, and thus there is the continual relation of that which checks and that which is checked between the three qualities; hence they are alike. So also passion being increased, holds goodness and darkness in check. The sense seems to be that the qualities dominate all in this world and exist together though varying in strength' (Gîtâ, p. 73).

<sup>4</sup> I. e. spontaneously, Arguna Misra. Cf. Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 194, st. 35.

<sup>5</sup> It is in the lower species that darkness is predominant.

passion is developed, abiding in those of the middle current<sup>1</sup>, there darkness should be understood to be little, and goodness likewise to be less. And where goodness is developed, abiding in those of the upward current<sup>2</sup>, there darkness should be understood to be little, and passion likewise to be less<sup>3</sup>. Goodness is the cause of the modifications in the senses, and the enlightener<sup>4</sup>. For there is no other higher duty laid down than goodness. Those who adhere to (the ways of) goodness go up; the passionate remain in the middle; the men of the quality of darkness, being connected with the lowest quality, go down<sup>5</sup>. The three qualities abide in the three castes thus: darkness in the *Sûdra*, passion in the *Kshatriya*, and the highest, goodness, in the *Brâhmaṇa*<sup>6</sup>. Even from afar<sup>7</sup>, darkness, goodness, and passion also, are seen to have been together and moving about collectively. We have never heard of them (as existing) separately. Seeing the sun rising, evil-doers are alarmed, and travellers, suffering trouble from the heat, feel the warmth. The sun is goodness developed, evil-doers likewise are darkness, and the heat to the travellers is said to be a property of

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the human species, Arguna Misra. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 109.

<sup>2</sup> See *Gîtâ*, p. 109, also p. 327 supra. In his *Sânkhya-tattva-kaumudî*, Vâṭaspati Misra applies the epithet to Yogins (see p. 13 of Târânâth's edition, and the editor's note there).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 108.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 108. The modifications of the senses constituting perception by them is an operation of the quality of goodness. This seems to be the meaning of the text; as to this, cf. *Tattva-kaumudî*, p. 14 (Târânâth's edition).

<sup>5</sup> See *Gîtâ*, p. 109; the words are nearly identical.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Sânti Parvan* (Moksha), chap. 188, st. 15. The *Vaisya* is omitted here.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. Arguna Misra says, even after much observation.

passion<sup>1</sup>. The light in the sun is goodness ; the heat is the quality of passion ; and its eclipse on the Parvan<sup>2</sup> days must be understood to be of the quality of darkness. So in all shining bodies, there exist three qualities. And they act by turns in the several places in several ways. Among immovable entities, darkness is in the form of their belonging to the lower species ; the qualities of passion are variable ; and the oleaginous property is of the quality of goodness<sup>3</sup>. The day should be understood to be threefold, the night is stated to be threefold, and likewise months, half-months, years, seasons, and the conjunctions<sup>4</sup>. Threefold are the gifts given<sup>5</sup>, threefold the sacrifices performed, threefold are the

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<sup>1</sup> This illustrates the existence of the qualities as one body. Even the enlightening sun, which embodies the quality of goodness, produces effects which belong to the other qualities. The fear and sorrow which evil-doers, that is thieves, feel, is an effect of the rising of the sun, which appertains to the quality of darkness, and the heat as being the cause of vexation and consequent delusion to travellers, appertains to the quality of passion.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. the days of the moon's conjunction or opposition.

<sup>3</sup> I understand this to mean that in the 'immovable entities' the three qualities co-exist ; the birth in the lower species is an effect of darkness ; the variable qualities, viz. the heat, &c., as Arguna Misra says, are the properties of passion ; and the oleaginous properties among them appertain to goodness, as, says Arguna Misra, they are sources of pleasure (cf. Gîtâ, p. 118). Nîlakantha says, 'Immovable entities being very unintelligent, darkness is very much developed among them,' but this last, as an interpretation of *tiryagbhâvagata*, appears to me to be alike unwarranted and inappropriate here.

<sup>4</sup> Does this mean the period about the close of one and beginning of another yuga or age ? That is the only sense ejusdem generis with the words preceding it that I can think of ; yet the jump from years to yuga-sandhis is a long one.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 120. With reference to some, at least, of the things enumerated here, the division would be rather fanciful.

worlds, threefold the gods, threefold the (departments of) knowledge, and threefold the path<sup>1</sup>. The past, the present, and the future ; piety, wealth, and lust ; the *Prâna*, the *Apâna*, and the *Udâna* ; these are the three qualities. And whatever there is in this world, all that is (made of) these three qualities<sup>2</sup>. The three qualities—goodness, passion, and darkness also—are always acting unperceived. The creation of the qualities is eternal. Darkness, unperceived, holy<sup>3</sup>, constant, unborn, womb, eternal, nature, change<sup>4</sup>, destruction, *Pradhâna*, production and absorption, not developed, not small, unshaking, immovable, immutable, existent and also non-existent<sup>5</sup>—all these, the unperceived, (consisting) of the three qualities, is said to be. These names should be learnt by men who ponder on matters relating to the self. He who understands correctly all the names of the unperceived, and the qualities, and its pure operations, he, freed from the body, understanding the truth about (all) distinctions, and being free from all misery, is released from all qualities.

<sup>1</sup> See these three mentioned at *Khândogya*, pp. 340–359. As to departments of knowledge, cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 84 ; *Arguna Misra* reads, ‘threefold the Vedas.’

<sup>2</sup> The universe is all developed from the *Prakṛti*, which is merely the three ‘qualities in equilibrium.’ Cf. *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* I, 61.

<sup>3</sup> Because it gives final emancipation to one who discriminates it from *Purusha*, *Arguna Misra*. Cf. *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* II, 1 seq., and *Sāṅkhya-kārikâ*, p. 56 seq., and commentary. For another list of names of *Prakṛti*, see *Svetâsvatara* (comm.), p. 283.

<sup>4</sup> Nature is not a development from anything, and hence is called *avikṛti* in *Sāṅkhya-kārikâ* 3 ; but ‘change’ here probably means the whole aggregate of *Vikṛtis*, ‘changes’ or developments, which make up *Prakṛti* ; or by a different derivation it may, perhaps, also mean that from which all development or change takes place.

<sup>5</sup> See *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* V, 52–56 ; and also I, 26, and commentary here. The *Vedântins* speak of *Mâyâ*—which answers to what the

## CHAPTER XXV.

Brahman said :

From the unperceived was first produced the great self<sup>1</sup>, of great intelligence, the source of all qualities<sup>2</sup>; it is said to be the first creation. That great self is signified by these synonymous terms—the great self, intelligence, Vishnu<sup>3</sup>, Gishnu, Sambhu, the valiant, the understanding, means of knowledge, means of perception, and likewise cognition, courage, memory. Knowing that (great self), a learned Brâhmana comes not by delusion. It has hands and feet on all sides<sup>4</sup>, it has eyes, heads, and faces on all sides; it stands pervading everything in the world<sup>5</sup>. The being of great power is stationed in the heart of all. Minuteness<sup>6</sup>, lightness, (the power of) obtaining (everything) (are his); he is the governor, the light, inexhaustible. Now people who comprehend the understanding, and who are always possessed of a good heart, who practise meditation, who are constant at concentration of mind, who are true to their promises, and whose senses are subdued, who are possessed of knowledge, who are not avaricious, who have subdued wrath, whose minds are clear, who are talented, who are devoid of (the thought that this or that is) mine, who are devoid of egoism,

Sânkhyaas call Prakṛti (see Svetâsvatara, p. 340, and Sâṅkhya-sûtra I, 69, and commentary there)—as ‘sattvâsattvâbhyâmanirvâkya.’

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the understanding, on which see Sâṅkhya-sûtra I, 61–64. It is called being (Purusha) further on, as it dwells in the body (Puri).

<sup>2</sup> I. e. of the effects of all qualities (namely, the universe; cf. Gîtâ, p. 48), Nîlakantha.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. all-pervading, Arguna Misra. On the whole passage, see Sâṅkhya-sâra, pp. 15, 16, and note 3 on page 333 infra.

As. says Arguna Misra, it is the source of all activity.

<sup>5</sup> The words are identical with those at Gîtâ, p. 103.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 327 supra.

these being emancipated, attain greatness<sup>1</sup>. And the talented man who understands that high and holy goal, the great self<sup>2</sup>, he among all people comes not by delusion. The self-existent Vishṇu is the Lord in the primary creations<sup>3</sup>. And he who thus knows the lord lying in the cave<sup>4</sup>, the transcendent, ancient being, of universal form, and golden<sup>5</sup>, the highest goal of those possessed of understanding, that talented man, abides transcending the understanding<sup>6</sup>.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Brahman said :

That Mahat which was first produced, is (afterwards) called egoism ; when it is born as (the feeling itself) 'I', that is said to be the second creation. That egoism is stated to be the source of all entities<sup>8</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> I. e., says Arguna Misra, the world of the understanding. Does this mean the world of Hiranyagarbha? The understanding is said to be the 'subtle body' of Hiranyagarbha (Vedānta Paribhāṣhā, p. 46). Probably the reference spiritually interpreted is to the state in which egoism and all its products are non-existent.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, 'the high and holy passage to the great self.'

<sup>3</sup> The Mahat first manifests itself as Vishṇu before it manifests itself as Brahman or Śiva (Sāṅkhya-sāra, p. 16), hence he is said to be the Lord in the primary creation. It may be added, that in the Sāṅkhya-sāra where this passage is quoted the original word rendered 'cognition' above (khyāti) does not occur, but in lieu of it occurs Brahman. The sentence 'And the talented man' &c. is also wanting there.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. the understanding. See Saṅkara on Svetāsvatara, p. 329 ; Kāṭha, p. 100.

<sup>5</sup> Source of enlightenment, Arguna Misra. Cf. Mundaka, pp. 303-308 (gloss).

<sup>6</sup> I. e. attaching himself to the Purusha, as the never-changing reality, and rising above Prakṛiti and its manifestations.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. when the Mahat develops into the feeling of self-consciousness—I—then it assumes the name of egoism.

<sup>8</sup> See on this Sāṅkhya-sāra, Hall's Introd. p. 31, note.

that from which the changes take place<sup>1</sup>; it is full of light, the supporter of consciousness; it is that from which the people are produced, the Pragâpati. It is a deity, the producer of the deities, and of the mind; it is the creator of the three worlds. That which feels<sup>2</sup> thus—‘I am all this’—is called (by) that (name). That eternal world is for those sages who are contented with knowledge relating to the self, who have pondered on the self, and who are perfected by sacred study and sacrifice. By<sup>3</sup> consciousness of self one enjoys the qualities; and thus that source of all entities, the producer of the entities, creates (them); and as that from which the changes take place, it causes all this to move; and by its own light, it likewise charms the world.

<sup>1</sup> So Arguna Misra. *Nîlakantha* says it means ‘born from the change, or development, viz. Mahat.’ The *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, p. 17, however, shows it means ‘appertaining to the quality of goodness.’ See also *Sâṅkhya-kârikâ* 25, and commentary there, which is of great help here. The sense is this: Egoism is of three descriptions; it appertains to the quality of goodness, and as such is the creator of the deities and mind, the deities being those presiding over the ten senses (cf. *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, p. 17); it is full of light, or appertains to the quality of passion (cf. *ibid.*), and as such imparts to the other two qualities their virtue of activity (cf. *Sâṅkhya-kârikâ* commentary, p. 91, Târânâthi’s ed.); it is also of the quality of darkness, and as such the producer of the triple world (see *ibid.*). See *Sâṅkhya-sûtra* II, 17, 18, and comment, where a view somewhat different in one or two details is stated.

<sup>2</sup> *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, p. 16; *Sâṅkhya-kârikâ* 24, p. 89 (Târânâthi’s ed.).

<sup>3</sup> Arguna Misra says that the words *Ahaṅkāra* &c. are here explained; qualities here means objects, as at *Gîtâ*, p. 55. The meaning of the first clause is, that the feeling that the objects are for oneself, and therefore enjoying them, gives the name of *Ahaṅkāra* to the principle in question; its creation of all the elements gives it the name of *Bhûtâdi*. It is called *Vaikârîka*, as the cause of the various activities and developments going on. The last clause seems to be an explanation of the epithet *Taigasa*, also applied to egoism.



## CHAPTER XXVII.

Brahman said :

From egoism, verily, were the five great elements born—earth, air, space, water, and light as the fifth. In these five great elements, in the operations of (perceiving) sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, creatures are deluded<sup>1</sup>. When, at the termination of the destruction of the great elements, the final dissolution approaches, O talented one! a great danger for all living beings arises<sup>2</sup>. Every entity is dissolved into that from which it is produced. They are born one from the other, and are dissolved in the reverse order<sup>3</sup>. Then when every entity, movable or immovable, has been dissolved, the talented men who possess a (good) memory<sup>4</sup> are not dissolved at all. Sound, touch, and likewise colour, taste, and smell as the fifth; the operations (connected with these) have causes<sup>5</sup>, and are inconstant, and their name is delusion. Caused by the production of avarice<sup>6</sup>, not different from one another<sup>7</sup>, and insignificant<sup>8</sup>, connected with flesh and blood, and depending upon one another,

<sup>1</sup> The contact of the objects of sense with the senses is the source of delusion.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 107, and note 1 there.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Sânkhya-sûtra* I, 121, and p. 387 *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. knowledge of the truth, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>5</sup> Hence, as they have a beginning, they also must have an end, and hence they are inconstant.

<sup>6</sup> This and following epithets expand the idea of inconstancy.

<sup>7</sup> Being all in substance connected with the *Prakṛti*, the material world, so to say.

<sup>8</sup> Containing no reality, *Nilakantha*.

excluded from the self<sup>1</sup>, these are helpless and powerless. The Prâna and the Apâna, the Udâna, the Samâna, and the Vyâna, these five winds also are joined to the inner self<sup>2</sup>, and together with speech, mind, and understanding make the eight constituents of the universe<sup>3</sup>. He whose skin, nose, ear, eye, tongue, and speech are restrained, and whose mind is pure, and understanding unswerving<sup>4</sup>, and whose mind is never burnt by these eight fires<sup>5</sup>, he attains to that holy Brahman than which nothing greater exists. And the eleven organs, which are stated as having been produced from egoism—these, O twice-born ones! I will describe specifically. The ear, the skin, the two eyes, the tongue, the nose also as the fifth, the two feet, the organ of excretion, and the organ of generation, the two hands, and speech as the tenth; such is the group of organs, the mind is the eleventh. This group one should subdue first, then the Brahman shines (before him). Five (of these) are called the organs of perception, and five the

<sup>1</sup> Nîlakantha apparently takes the original here to mean of gross nature, not subtle, such as anything connected with the self would be. They are helpless and powerless without support from other principles, and mainly the self.

<sup>2</sup> He here states what is more closely connected with the self, and, as Nîlakantha puts it, accompanies the self till final emancipation. The inner self Nîlakantha takes to mean the self associated with egoism or self-consciousness.

<sup>3</sup> Nîlakantha cites certain texts to show that the perceptive senses work only through the mind, and that the objects of the senses are produced from the senses, and hence the universe, he says, is constituted of the eight enumerated above.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. from the truth.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. vexed by the operations of any of these.

organs of action. The five beginning with the ear are truly said to be connected with knowledge. And all the rest are without distinction connected with action. The mind should be understood to be among both<sup>1</sup>, and the understanding is the twelfth. Thus have been stated the eleven organs in order. Understanding these<sup>2</sup>, learned men think they have accomplished (everything). I will now proceed to state all the various organs. Space<sup>3</sup> is the first entity; as connected with the self it is called the ear; likewise as connected with objects (it is) sound; and the presiding deity there is the quarters. The second entity is air; it is known as the skin as connected with the self; as connected with objects (it is) the object of touch; and the presiding deity there is lightning. The third (entity) is said to be light; as connected with the self it is called the eye; next as connected with objects (it is) colour; and the presiding deity there is the sun. The fourth (entity) should be understood to be water; as connected with the self it is called the tongue; as connected with objects it is taste; and the presiding deity there is Soma. The fifth entity is earth; as connected with the self it is the nose; as connected with objects likewise it is smell; and the presiding deity there is the wind. Thus are the five entities stated to be divided among the three<sup>4</sup>. I will now proceed to state all the various organs.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sāṅkhya-kārikā 27; Sāṅkhya-sāra, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kaṭha, p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Lalita Vistara (translated by Dr. R. Mitra), p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> The above sentences show the entities in the three different aspects mentioned, which correspond to each other; the ear is the sense, that which is connected with the self; sound is the object of that sense, as connected with the external world; and the

As connected with the self, the feet are mentioned by Brâhmanas, who perceive the truth; as connected with objects it is motion; the presiding deity there is Vishnu. The Apâna wind, the motion of which is downward, as connected with the self, is called the organ of excretion; as connected with objects it is excretion<sup>1</sup>; and the presiding deity there is Mitra. As connected with the self the generative organ is mentioned, the producer of all beings; as connected with objects it is the semen; and the presiding deity there is Pragâpati. Men who understand the Adhyâtma speak of the two hands as connected with the self; as connected with objects it is actions; and the presiding deity there is Indra. Then first, as connected with the self, is speech which relates to all the gods; as connected with objects it is what is spoken; and the presiding deity there is fire. As connected with the self they mention the mind, which follows after the five entities<sup>2</sup>; as connected with objects it is the mental operation; the presiding deity there is the moon. Likewise (there is) egoism, the cause of the whole course of worldly life, as connected with the self; as connected with objects, self-consciousness; the presiding deity there is Rudra. As connected with the self, they mention the understanding impelling the six senses<sup>3</sup>;

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quarters, Dik, are the deities presiding over the senses; as to this cf. Sâṅkhyā-sāra, p. 17, and Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 45, which show some discrepancies. The distinctions of Adhyâtma &c. are to be found in the Upanishads; cf. inter alia, Khândogya, p. 227, and cf. Gîtâ, p. 77.

<sup>1</sup> As to the original word, cf. inter alia, Svetâsvatara, pp. 197-202.

<sup>2</sup> This probably means the five senses which can perceive only when associated with the mind. See p. 268 supra.

<sup>3</sup> The understanding is called the charioteer at Kaṭha, p. 111.

as connected with objects that which is to be understood; and the presiding deity there is Brahman. There are three seats for all entities—a fourth is not possible—land, water, and space. And the (mode of) birth is fourfold. Those born from eggs, those born from germs, those born from perspiration, and those born from wombs—such is the fourfold (mode of) birth of the group of living beings<sup>1</sup>. Now there are the inferior beings and likewise those moving in the air. Those should be understood to be born from eggs, as also all reptiles. Insects are said to be born from perspiration; and worms of the like description. This is said to be the second (mode of) birth, and inferior. Those beings, however, which are born after the lapse of some time, bursting through the earth, are said to be born from germs, O best of the twice-born! Beings of two feet or more than two feet, and those which move crookedly, are the beings born from wombs. Understand about them also, O best of men! The eternal seat (where) the Brahman<sup>2</sup> (is to be attained) should be understood to be twofold—penance<sup>3</sup> and meritorious action. Such is the doctrine of the learned. Action should be understood to be of various<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, pp. 404–406, and glosses; *Aitareya*, p. 243; *Vedânta Paribhâshâ*, p. 47; *Sâṅkhya-sûtra* V, 111; *Manu* I, 43; Max Müller's note at p. 94 of his *Khândogya* in this series.

<sup>2</sup> So *Nilakanṭha*, but he also adds that this means birth as a *Brâhmana*, which seems to be quite wrong. Arguna Misra's 'means of acquiring Brahman' is right. See p. 369 *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> I. e., I presume, 'knowledge.' Saṅkara has so interpreted the word at *Mundaka*, p. 270, and *Kaṭha*, p. 127, and elsewhere; and see *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 166 *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Another reading is 'of two kinds.' But I prefer this, as three kinds are mentioned further on.

descriptions, (namely) sacrifice, gift at a sacrifice, and sacred study<sup>1</sup>, for (every one) who is born<sup>2</sup>. Such is the teaching of the ancients. He who duly understands this, becomes possessed of concentration of mind, O chief of the twice-born! and know, too, that he is released from all sins. Space<sup>3</sup> is the first entity; as connected with the (individual) self it is called the ear; as connected with objects likewise it is called sound; and the presiding deity there is the quarters. The second entity is air; as connected with the (individual) self it is called the skin; as connected with objects it is the object of touch; and the presiding deity there is the lightning. The third is called light; as connected with the (individual) self it is laid down to be the eye; next as connected with objects it is colour; the presiding deity there is the sun. The fourth should be understood to be water; as connected with the (individual) self it is stated to be the tongue; as connected with objects it should be understood to be taste; the presiding deity there is Soma. The fifth element is earth; as connected with the (individual) self it is called the nose; as connected with objects likewise it is called smell; the presiding deity there is Vâyu. Thus have I

<sup>1</sup> Cf. as to this *Khândogya*, p. 136, which justifies our rendering, though the commentator Arguna Misra seems to understand the passage differently.

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra seems to understand this to mean 'twice-born.'

<sup>3</sup> This is a repetition of what occurs at p. 337, and apparently is spurious. But two of the MSS., both those containing commentaries, contain the passage twice. One of the other MSS. omits the passage where it occurs before, and has it here. I think that the passage is in its place before, and probably interpolated here.

accurately described to you the creation<sup>1</sup> as connected with the (individual) self. A knowledge of this, O ye who understand piety! is here obtained by those who possess knowledge. One should place all these together, (viz.) the senses, the objects of the senses, and the five great elements, and hold them by the mind<sup>2</sup>. When everything is absorbed into the mind, the pleasures of (worldly) life<sup>3</sup> are not esteemed. The learned (men) whose understandings are possessed of knowledge esteem the pleasure derived from that<sup>4</sup>. Now<sup>5</sup> I shall proceed to describe that discarding of all entities by (means) gentle and hard<sup>6</sup>, which produces attachment to subtle<sup>7</sup> (topics), and is sanctifying. The (mode of) conduct in which qualities are not (treated as) qualities<sup>8</sup>, which is free from attachment, in which one lives alone<sup>9</sup>, which is uninterrupted<sup>10</sup>, and which is full of the Brahman<sup>11</sup>, is called happiness (dwelling) in one aggregate<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> I am not quite sure that this is a correct rendering. But I can think of none better, and the commentators afford no help.

<sup>2</sup> *Nilakantha* says, 'Thinking that the great elements are not distinct from the senses, one should hold them absorbed in the mind.' Arguna Misra says, 'In the mind as their seat they should be placed,' as being not distinct from the mind, I presume. Cf. *Katha*, p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, 'birth.'

<sup>4</sup> From knowledge, I presume. The commentators afford no help.

<sup>5</sup> Arguna Misra's text appears to commence a new chapter here.

<sup>6</sup> Such as meditation or upâsana, and prâṇâyama or restraint of life-winds respectively, Arguna Misra.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. p. 310 supra.

<sup>8</sup> I. e. bravery, learning, &c. are treated as not being merits, as they cause pride, &c., *Nilakantha*.

<sup>9</sup> I. e. in solitude, *Nilakantha*; devoting oneself to the self only. Arguna Misra. Cf. also p. 284 supra, note 4. •

<sup>10</sup> Or, says *Nilakantha*, free from any belief in distinctions.

<sup>11</sup> Another reading would mean 'which exists among Brâhmanas.'

<sup>12</sup> I. e. all collected together, I presume.

The learned man who absorbs objects of desire from all sides, as a tortoise (draws in) his limbs<sup>1</sup>, and who is devoid of passion, and released from everything<sup>2</sup>, is ever happy. Restraining objects of desire within the self<sup>3</sup>, he becomes fit for assimilation with the Brahman<sup>4</sup>, having his cravings destroyed, and being concentrated in mind, and friendly and affectionate<sup>5</sup> to all beings. The fire of the Adhyâtma<sup>6</sup> is kindled in a sage by his abandoning the country<sup>7</sup>, and by the restraint of all the senses which hanker after objects of sense. As fire kindled with fuel shines forth with a great blaze, so the great self<sup>8</sup> shines forth through the restraint of the senses. When one with a tranquil self perceives all entities in one's own heart, then being self-illuminated<sup>9</sup>, one attains to that which is subtler than (the most) subtle (thing)<sup>10</sup>, and than which there is nothing higher. It is settled, that the body in which the colour<sup>11</sup> is fire, the flowing<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 50, 51, and Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma) I, 51, where the phrase is precisely the same as here.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. from all bonds, I suppose. See p. 292 supra.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 51. <sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 110. <sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 68.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. experience, *Nîlakantha*. It means direct perception of the relations between the supreme and individual self. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 111.

<sup>7</sup> As opposed to forests. See Sanatsugâtîya, p. 159, note 9.

<sup>8</sup> This must mean here the supreme self, apparently.

<sup>9</sup> I. e. being devoted to the self only, *Arguna Misra*. The ordinary meaning of the word, however, is one who has direct experience or perception without the aid of senses, &c. Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 765, and *Sârîraka Bhâshya*, pp. 648, 784, &c.

<sup>10</sup> *Nîlakantha* says, 'The supreme Brahman which is subtler than the Brahman within the lotus-like heart.'

<sup>11</sup> I. e. that which perceives colour, viz. the sense, *Arguna Misra*. This applies to the analogous words coming further on.

<sup>12</sup> I. e. taste, says *Arguna Misra*, which seems to be more correct than *Nîlakantha's* blood and such other liquid elements of the body.



(element) water, and the feeling of touch is air, the hideous holder of the mud<sup>1</sup> is earth, and likewise the sound is space; which is pervaded by disease and sorrow; which is surrounded by the five currents<sup>2</sup>; which is made up of the five elements; which has nine passages<sup>3</sup> and two deities<sup>4</sup>; which is full of passion; unfit to be seen<sup>5</sup>; made up of three qualities and of three constituent elements<sup>6</sup>; pleased with contacts<sup>7</sup>; and full of delusion<sup>8</sup>;—this same (body), which is difficult to move in this mortal world, and which rests on the real (entity)<sup>9</sup>, is the very wheel of time which rotates in this world<sup>10</sup>. It is a great ocean, fearful and unfathomable, and is named<sup>11</sup> delusion. The world, together with the immortals, should cast it aside, curtail it,

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the flesh, bone, and so forth, *Nīlakantha*; the mucus in the nose, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. the senses. Cf. p. 238 supra, note 7.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Gītā*, p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> See *Sanatsugâtīya*, p. 187 supra.

<sup>5</sup> As being unholy, *Nīlakantha*; as the bodies of *Kândālas* &c. when seen are productive of sin, *Arguna Misra*. See p. 155 supra.

<sup>6</sup> Viz. *vāta*, *pitta*, *sleshma*, or wind, bile, and phlegm. The *dhātus* are sometimes spoken of as seven. See *Yoga-sūtras*, p. 192; *Taitt. Âr.* p. 874, commentary, and p. 246 supra. See, too, however, *Svetâsvatara*, commentary, p. 287.

<sup>7</sup> Which is delighted only by contact with food and so forth, not otherwise, *Nīlakantha*.

<sup>8</sup> I. e. cause of delusion. The original word for 'it is settled' at the beginning of this sentence is otherwise rendered by *Arguna Misra*. He takes it to mean 'in this light (namely, as above stated) should one contemplate the body.' The other rendering is *Nīlakantha's*.

<sup>9</sup> I. e. the self, *Arguna Misra*; the understanding, *Nīlakantha*; difficult to move = difficult to adjust if attacked by disease, &c., *Nīlakantha*.

<sup>10</sup> It is owing to this body that the self becomes limited by time, *Arguna Misra*. *Nīlakantha's* gloss I do not follow. Cf. p. 187 supra, and p. 355 infra.

<sup>11</sup> I. e. characterised by delusion, *Arguna Misra*.

and restrain it<sup>1</sup>. Desire, wrath, fear, avarice, treachery, and falsehood also, (all these), which are difficult to get rid of, the good do get rid of by restraint of the senses<sup>2</sup>. And he who in this world has vanquished the three qualities and the five constituent elements<sup>3</sup>, obtains the highest<sup>4</sup>—the infinite—seat in heaven. Crossing the river of which the five senses are the lofty banks, the agitation of mind<sup>5</sup> the mighty waters, and delusion the reservoir<sup>6</sup>, one should vanquish both desire and wrath. Freed from all sins, he then perceives that highest (principle), concentrating the mind within the mind<sup>7</sup>, and seeing the self within the self<sup>8</sup>. Understanding everything, he sees the self with the self in all entities as one<sup>9</sup>, and also as various,

<sup>1</sup> I am not sure about the meaning here. Arguna Misra says, (reading visriget, 'send forth,' for vikshipet, 'cast aside,') 'send forth at the creation, curtail at the dissolution, and restrain at the final emancipation.' The commentary reads rodhayet, which we have adopted above. The text in the same copy, however, is bodhayet. Arguna Misra adds, as far as I can make out from an incorrect copy: 'as in this life everything is accomplished by these actions' (namely, I suppose, the casting aside, &c.). Nîlakantha says, 'This same thing is the cause of creation, destruction, and knowledge,' reading bodhayet.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. the five great elements, as stated in Williams' Dictionary, citing Yâgñavalkya III, 145. See Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 182, st. 16; chap. 184, st. 1.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. the seat of the Brahman, Nîlakantha.

<sup>5</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 66, where the word is the same, viz. vega.

<sup>6</sup> From which, namely, the river issues. Cf. for the whole figure, Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 251, st. 12.

<sup>7</sup> The mind = the lotus-like heart, Nîlakantha. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 79. Concentrating = withdrawing from external objects, &c.

<sup>8</sup> I. e. in the body, Nîlakantha. See p. 248.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 83, and note 4 there. Nîlakantha says, 'as one, i. e.

changing from time to time<sup>1</sup>. He can always perceive (numerous) bodies like a hundred lights from one light. He verily is Vishnu, and Mitra, and Varuna, Agni, and Pragâpati. He is the supporter, and the creator. He is the lord whose faces are in all directions<sup>2</sup>. (In him) the great self—the heart of all beings—is resplendent. Him, all companies of Brâhmanas, and also gods, and demons, and Yakshas, and Pisâkas, and Pitris, and birds, and the bands of Rakshases, and the bands of Bhûtas<sup>3</sup>, and also all the great sages, ever extol.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Brahman said :

Among men the royal Kshatriya is the middle<sup>4</sup> quality; among vehicles the elephant<sup>5</sup>, and among denizens of the forest the lion; among all sacrificial animals the sheep, and among the dwellers in holes the snake; among cattle also the bull, and among

by direct perception of the unity of the individual and supreme, and as various, i. e. in the all-comprehending form.'

<sup>1</sup> I. e. creating or acting, Arguna Misra. I think it probable that it was meant to go with the preceding words. See Gîtâ, p. 83 note; but, for this, 'changing' must be in the accusative. It is in the nominative. As the original stands, and on Arguna Misra's interpretation, the sense seems to be that when he is about to engage in the work of creation, he can obtain as many bodies as he likes. Nîlakantha compares *Khândogya*, p. 526. And see pp. 249, 327 supra. Can always perceive = invariably obtains when he wishes.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 83, 93, and note 1 there.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 85, 118.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. passion—that quality is dominant in the Kshatriya, Nîlakantha. See p. 329 supra.

<sup>5</sup> Commenting on Gîtâ V, 18 (p. 65) Saṅkara calls the elephant *atyantatâmasa*, belonging entirely to the quality of darkness.

females a male<sup>1</sup>. The Nyagrodha, the Gambu, the Pippala, and likewise the Sâlmali, the Sinsapâ, and the Meshasringa, and likewise the bamboo and willow<sup>2</sup>; these are the princes among trees in this world, there is no doubt of that. The Himavat, the Pâriyâtra, the Sahya, the Vindhya, the Trikûtavat, the Sveta, the Nîla, the Bhâsa, and the Koshthavat mountain, the Mahendra, the Guruskandha, and likewise the Mâlyavat mountain, these are the princes among mountains<sup>3</sup>. Likewise the Maruts are (the princes) among the Ganas; the sun is the prince among the planets, and the moon<sup>4</sup> among the Nakshatras; Yama is the prince among the Pitris, and the ocean among rivers; Varuna is the king of the waters, and Indra is said to be (the king) of the Maruts. Arka is the king of hot (bodies), and Indu is said to be (the king) of shining bodies. Fire is ever the lord of the elements<sup>5</sup>, and Brihaspati of Brâhmanas; Soma is the lord of herbs, Vishnu is the chief among the strong; Tvashtri is the prince

<sup>1</sup> As to the constructions here, cf. generally Gîtâ, p. 88, and see the remarks of Râmânuga and Sridhara on Gîtâ X, 21. The meaning here is, of course, the male is ruler over females.

<sup>2</sup> I do not know what distinction is intended between these two. Generally kîka is used for the hollow bamboo, which whistles when the wind blows through it.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these mountains are mentioned in Patañjali. See Introduction.

<sup>4</sup> This list may be compared with that at Gîtâ, chapter X. Sometimes the same object occurs more than once with reference to more than one class; thus the moon occurs as lord of Nakshatras, of shining bodies, and of herbs—unless Soma there stands for the Soma plant. See Gîtâ, p. 113. Arguna Misra says expressly that the moon occurs more than once as the correlatives, the classes with reference to which she is mentioned, are different. In such cases I have kept the original names untranslated; Arka=sun; Indu=moon.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Katha, p. 83.

of the Rudras, and Śiva is the ruler of (all) creatures; likewise, sacrifice of (all) initiatory ceremonies<sup>1</sup>, and Maghavat<sup>2</sup> likewise of the gods; the north among the quarters, and among all vipras the powerful king Soma<sup>3</sup>; Kubera (is lord) of all jewels, Purandara of (all) deities. Such is the highest creation among all entities. Pragâpati (is lord) of all peoples; and of all entities whatever I, who am full of the Brahman, and great, (am lord). There is no higher being than myself or Vishṇu. The great Vishṇu full of the Brahman is the king of kings over all. Understand him to be the ruler, the creator, the uncreated Hari. For he is the ruler of men, Kinnaras, and Yakshas; of Gandharvas, snakes, and Rakshases; of gods, demons, and Nâgas. Among all those who are followed by (men) full of desires, (the chief) is<sup>4</sup> the great goddess Mâhesvarî, who has beautiful eyes. She is called Pârvatî. Know the goddess Umâ<sup>5</sup> to be the best and (most) holy of (all) females. Among women who are (a source<sup>6</sup> of) happiness, likewise, the brilliant<sup>7</sup> Apsarases (are chief). Kings desire

<sup>1</sup> This must mean, I presume, that the sacrifice is higher than the initiation, as male than female, see p. 346, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> This is another repetition. Indra has been mentioned before, and Purandara is mentioned further on.

<sup>3</sup> As to king Soma, see inter alia *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 237; *Khândogya*, p. 342, where Saṅkara explains 'king' by adding 'of Brâhmanas.' Vipras=Brâhmanas.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. Mâhesvarî is the most beautiful of womankind.

<sup>5</sup> It is well known that Umâ, Pârvatî, Mâhesvarî are names of the consort of the third member of the Hindu Trinity; see Kena, p. 13, and Saṅkara's comment there. See, too, Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iv, p. 421, and *Taittirîya-âraṇyaka*, p. 839.

<sup>6</sup> The idea of 'source' is supplied by Arguna Misra.

<sup>7</sup> Literally, 'rich.' Arguna Misra paraphrases it by 'Gyotishmatî.' Nîlakantha's explanation here is not quite clear.

piety; and Brâhmanas are the bridges<sup>1</sup> of piety. Therefore a king should always endeavour to protect the twice-born<sup>2</sup>. Those kings in whose dominions good men lie low, lose all their qualifications<sup>3</sup>, and go into wrong paths after death. But those high-souled kings in whose dominions good men are protected, rejoice in this world, and attain the infinite (seat) after death. Understand this, O chiefs of the twice-born! I shall now proceed to state the invariable characteristics of piety. Non-destruction is the highest piety<sup>4</sup>, and destruction is of the nature of impiety. Enlightenment<sup>5</sup> is the characteristic of gods; action<sup>6</sup> the characteristic of men; sound is the characteristic of space; (the sensation of) touch is the characteristic of air; colour is the characteristic of light; taste is the characteristic of water; the characteristic of earth, the supporter of all beings, is smell; words are the characteristic of speech<sup>7</sup> refined into vowels and consonants; the characteristic of mind is thought. Likewise as to what is described here as understanding, a deter-

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<sup>1</sup> I. e. instrumental in piety, or guides to piety. Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 370; Mundaka, p. 297.

<sup>2</sup> So literally, doubtless Brâhmanas only are intended here.

<sup>3</sup> I. e., I presume, they lose all their merits, their good points are destroyed by this dereliction of duty.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. p. 291 supra. Arguna Misra begins a fresh chapter with 'I shall now,' &c. <sup>5</sup> Knowledge of the truth, Arguna Misra.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. action performed for the purpose of obtaining the fruit of it. The next five items refer to the five elements and their characteristic properties. Nîlakantha's explanation, that all these are merely parallels not stated for their own relevancy here, but as illustrations, seems to be the only available one.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. the learning of other people, Nîlakantha. The meaning seems to be that we know speech only in its manifestation in the form of words.

mination is here formed by (that) understanding about objects which have been thought over by the mind<sup>1</sup>. And there is no doubt of this that determination is the characteristic of the understanding. The characteristic of mind is meditation<sup>2</sup>; and the characteristic of a good man is (living) unperceived<sup>3</sup>. The characteristic of devotion is action<sup>4</sup>; and knowledge the characteristic of renunciation. Therefore a man of understanding should practise renunciation, giving prominence to knowledge<sup>5</sup>. The renouncer possessed of knowledge attains the highest goal. And crossing beyond darkness, and transcending death and old age, he repairs to that which has no second<sup>6</sup>. Thus have I duly spoken to you concerning the characteristic of piety. I will now proceed to explain properly the comprehension<sup>7</sup> of the qualities. As to the smell of the earth, verily, that is comprehended by the nose; and the wind<sup>8</sup> likewise residing in the nose is appointed<sup>9</sup> to the knowledge of smell. Taste<sup>10</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> The text here is rather unsatisfactory; I have adopted that which I find in the copy containing Arguna Misra's commentary.

<sup>2</sup> Frequent pondering on matters learnt from Sâstras or common life, *Nîlakantha*. Why mind comes twice the commentators do not explain.

<sup>3</sup> Does this refer to what is said at Sanatsugâtîya, p. 159?

<sup>4</sup> Devotion means here, as in the Gîtâ, action without desire of fruits. For action the word here is the same as at Gîtâ, p. 115, note 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 52, note 7.

<sup>6</sup> This is Arguna Misra's interpretation, and appears to me to be correct. *Nîlakantha*'s is different, but seems to omit all account of *abhyeti*, 'repairs.'

<sup>7</sup> Arguna Misra's interpretation seems to be different, but our copy is not quite intelligible.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 337 supra. The wind is the presiding deity of the nasal organ.

<sup>9</sup> I.e. that is its function. Arguna Misra says, 'it is pondered on,' which is not clear. <sup>10</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 74, as to taste and water.

the essence of water, is always comprehended by the tongue. And the moon likewise, who resides in the tongue, is appointed to the knowledge of taste. The quality of light is colour, and that is comprehended by the eye; and the sun residing in the eye is appointed always to the knowledge of colour. The (sensation of) touch, belonging to the air, is perceived by the skin, and the wind<sup>1</sup> residing in the skin is always appointed to the knowledge of (the objects) of touch. The quality of space is sound, and that is comprehended by the ear. And all the quarters residing in the ear are celebrated as (being appointed) to the knowledge of sound. Thought is the quality of mind, and that is comprehended by the understanding. The supporter of consciousness<sup>2</sup> residing in the heart is appointed to the knowledge of mind<sup>3</sup>. The understanding (is comprehended in the form of) determination, and the Mahat<sup>4</sup> of knowledge. To (this) positive comprehension, the unperceived<sup>5</sup> (is appointed), there is no doubt of that. The Kshe-tragña, which is in its essence devoid of qualities and eternal, is not to be comprehended by any

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<sup>1</sup> This cannot be the presiding deity here, though one expects such deity to be mentioned; see p. 337 supra.

<sup>2</sup> The text of more than one of the lines here is rather doubtful; we follow *Nilakantha*, who takes this to mean the *gîva*, the individual soul. Cf. p. 239, note 2 supra.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. thought, as *Nilakantha* points out. •

<sup>4</sup> Mahat is properly the same as buddhi, understanding, but as it is here mentioned separately, I suppose, it signifies Ahaṅkāra. *Nilakantha* takes its operation, here called knowledge, to mean 'the feeling I am,' which agrees with our interpretation, for which some support is also to be derived from p. 333 supra.

<sup>5</sup> I here follow Arguna Misra, though somewhat diffidently. The knowledge 'this is I,' and the knowledge 'this is so and so and nothing else' is presided over by the unperceived—the *Prakṛiti*.



symbols. Therefore the characteristic of the Kshetragña, which is void of symbols<sup>1</sup>, is purely knowledge. The unperceived is stated to be the Kshetra<sup>2</sup> in which the qualities are produced and absorbed. And I always see, know, and hear it, (though) concealed. The Purusha knows it, therefore is he called Kshetragña<sup>3</sup>. And the Kshetragña likewise perceives all the operations of the qualities<sup>4</sup>. The qualities created again and again, do not know themselves<sup>5</sup>, being non-intelligent, to be created and tied down to a beginning, middle, and end<sup>6</sup>. Only the Kshetragña attains, no one (else) attains, to the truth, which is great, transcendent, and beyond the qualities and the entities (produced)<sup>7</sup> from the qualities. Hence a man who understands piety, abandoning qualities, and the creation<sup>8</sup>, in this world, and transcending the qualities, and having his sins destroyed, then enters into the Kshetragña. One who is free from the pairs of opposites, free from the ceremony of salutations, and

<sup>1</sup> See Sanatsugâtîya, p. 146. See also p. 309 supra.

<sup>2</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 102 seq.

<sup>3</sup> I. e. he who knows the Kshetra.

<sup>4</sup> Enlightenment, activity, and delusion, *Nîlakantha*.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. do not know the self, *Nîlakantha*; better, I think, 'the qualities do not know themselves, only the Kshetragña knows them.' Cf. Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma), chap. 194, st. 41.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. production, existence, and destruction, *Nîlakantha*. This must, however, mean their manifestation, continuance, and dissolution in any particular form. For the prakṛiti, which is made up of the three qualities, is beginningless. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 104.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. the actual physical manifestations, as we may say, of the qualities.

<sup>8</sup> The original, *sattva*, *Nîlakantha* renders by *buddhi*, and qualities by visible objects. In the familiar Sâṅkhya phrase *sattvapuruṣāṇyatâpratyaṣṭi* *sattva* means creation, or what 'is other than purusha' (cf. Sâṅkhyatattvakaumudî, pp. 9-144). That is the meaning here. See too p. 371 infra, and Sânti Parvan (Moksha Dharma), chap. 194, st. 38 seq. and comments there.

from the svâhâ ceremony<sup>1</sup>, who is unmoving, and homeless<sup>2</sup>, is the Kshetragña, he is the Supreme Lord.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

Brahman said :

I will state truly all about that which has a beginning, middle, and end<sup>3</sup>, and about the means for its comprehension, together with names and characteristics<sup>4</sup>. It is stated that day was first and then night; that months have the bright<sup>5</sup> first, the Nakshatras Sravana<sup>6</sup> as the first (among them), and the seasons the winter as the first (among them). The earth is the source<sup>7</sup> of smells, water of tastes, the light (of) the sun is the source of colours, the wind is stated to be the source of (the feelings of) touch; likewise space is the source of sound. These are the qualities of the elements. Now I shall proceed to state the highest and first of all entities. The sun is

<sup>1</sup> See p. 324 supra.

<sup>2</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 101. Unmoving probably means 'not perturbed by the qualities' (Gîtâ, p. 110), or perhaps the same thing as 'of steady mind' at Gîtâ, p. 101. The sense is pretty much the same in both places.

<sup>3</sup> Which has birth &c., *Nîlakantha*, i. e. all the creation, I presume.

<sup>4</sup> The names, that is to say, of the various elements, and their qualities.

<sup>5</sup> This must mean fortnights.

<sup>6</sup> This is specified, says Arguna Misra, as the six months of the northern solstice are caused by the sun being at this Nakshatra. As to those six months, cf. Gîtâ, p. 81. For the same reason, Arguna Misra adds, the winter season is mentioned as the best.

<sup>7</sup> The word âdi, literally beginning, is used in the whole of this passage in different senses; it means the source, it means the best, and it means the first in order.

the first among shining bodies<sup>1</sup>; fire is said to be the first of the elements<sup>2</sup>; Sâvitṛī<sup>3</sup> of all branches of learning; Pragâpati of deities; the syllable Om of all the Vedas; and the Prâṇa life-wind, of all words<sup>4</sup>; whatever is prescribed in this world, all that is called Sâvitṛī<sup>5</sup>. The Gâyatrī is the first among metres; among (sacrificial) animals, the goat<sup>6</sup> is mentioned (as the first). Cows are the first among quadrupeds, and the twice-born among men<sup>7</sup>. The Syena is first among birds; among sacrifices, the offering (into the fire) is the best; and among all reptiles, O best of the twice-born! the snake<sup>8</sup> is the highest. Of all ages the Krīta is the first, there is no doubt of that. Among all precious things, gold (is the first), and among vegetable (products) likewise the barley seed<sup>9</sup>. Among all things to be eaten or swallowed food is the highest; and of

<sup>1</sup> This should be compared with the enumeration at p. 345 supra, and that in the Gîtâ there referred to.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 346 supra. Nīlakantha takes fire to mean the gastric fire, and bhūta, rendered by us elements, to mean the species of beings born from eggs and wombs.

<sup>3</sup> The famous verse 'Tat savitur,' &c. See inter alia Brīhadâraṇyaka, p. 999; Âpastamba I, 1, 1, 9; Manu II, 77 seq., 104-170.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 264, 265 supra.

<sup>5</sup> Here he turns back to the Sâvitṛī, 'looking back in the manner of the lion,' says Nīlakantha, and for purposes of upâsanâ. He does not give up the thread of his discourse entirely, but simply interjects this little clause. Nīlakantha adds, Sâvitṛī here includes every mode of worship prescribed for Brāhmanas, &c., and even for Mlekkhas. Cf. note 3, and Gautama (Bühler's ed.), p. 174 note.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Khândogya, p. 109, and Saṅkara's commentary. Arguna Misra compares this text, Tasmâdesha eteshâm paśunâm śreṣṭhātamaḥ. Where it occurs I know not.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Sânti Parvan (Râgadharmā), chap. 11, st. 11.

<sup>8</sup> I.e. Vāsuki, Nīlakantha. More probably it refers to the species.

<sup>9</sup> As it is used in various ceremonies.

all liquid substances which are to be drunk, water is the best. And among all immovable entities, without distinction, the Plaksha, the ever holy field of Brahman<sup>1</sup>, is stated to be the first. I, too, (am the first) among all the patriarchs<sup>2</sup>, there is no doubt of that. And the unthinkable, self-existent Vishṇu is stated to be my own self. Of all mountains, the great Meru is stated to be the first-born. And among all quarters and sub-quarters, likewise, the eastern quarter<sup>3</sup> is the first. Likewise the Gaṅgā going in three paths is stated to be the first-born among rivers. And likewise of all wells and reservoirs of water, the ocean is the first-born. And of all gods, Dānavas, Bhūtas, Pisākas, snakes, and Rakshases, and of men, Kinnaras, and Yakshas, Īsvara<sup>4</sup> is the lord. The great Vishṇu, who is full of the Brahman, and than whom there is no higher being in these three worlds, is the source of all the universe. Of all orders<sup>5</sup>, that of householders (is the first), there is no doubt of that. The unperceived is the source of the worlds; and the same is also the end of everything. Days end with (the sun's) setting<sup>6</sup>; the night ends with (the sun's) rising; the end of pleasure is ever grief;

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the Creator; his field means, I presume, his special seat.

<sup>2</sup> Beings from whom all creatures were born. See inter alia *Sānti Parvan* (Moksha Dharma), chap. 208, st. 5; *Manu* I, 34.

<sup>3</sup> At p. 347 the north is mentioned. *Arguna Misra* has 'ūrdhva,' or upward here, and yet 'north' before. Is the north the best as the seat of the higher world mentioned at *Sānti Parvan* (Moksha Dharma), chap. 192, st. 8 seq.?

• I.e. Rudra, says *Nilakantha*.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. Brahma-kārin, householder, forester, and Samnyāsin. Cf. *Sānti Parvan* (Moksha), ch. 191, st. 10; *Manu* VI, 89; *Gautama*, p. 190.

<sup>5</sup> These stanzas also occur in the *Sānti Parvan*, chap. 27, st. 31 seq. (*Rāgadharma*). A part of them appears to be quoted in *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* V, 80. And the commentator *Vigñāna Bhikshu* introduces it with the expression 'iti srūyate.' But it is not a Vedic text.

the end of grief ever pleasure. All accumulations end in exhaustion ; all ascents end in falls ; all associations end in dissociations ; and life ends in death. All action ends in destruction ; death is certain for whatever is born<sup>1</sup> ; (everything) movable or immovable in this world is ever transient. Sacrifice, gift, penance, study, observances, and regulations, all this ends in destruction<sup>2</sup>. There is no end for knowledge. Therefore one whose self is tranquil, whose senses are subjugated, who is devoid of (the idea that this or that is) mine, who is devoid of egoism, is released from all sins by pure knowledge.

## CHAPTER XXX.

Brahman said :

The wheel of life<sup>3</sup> moves on ; a wheel of which the spoke is the understanding, of which the pole<sup>4</sup> is the mind, of which the bonds are the group of the senses, of which the outer rim<sup>5</sup> is the five great elements, of which the environment is home<sup>6</sup> ; which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> All this is action, the fruit of which is perishable ; the fruit of knowledge, on the other hand, is everlasting.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, time ; it seems, however, to stand for the vicissitudes of worldly life. Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 283. The body is called 'wheel of time' at p. 53 supra, but Arguna Misra there says 'it is the wheel which causes the rotation of the wheel of time.'

<sup>4</sup> The cause of its being large in dimensions, Arguna Misra ; the supporting pillar, *Nîlakantha*. I prefer the former, and take the sense to be that worldly life is co-extensive with the operations or 'fancies' of the mind.

<sup>5</sup> What is outside the elements, the physical manifestations of *Prakṛiti*, is beyond the domain of worldly life.

<sup>6</sup> The possession of 'home' is equivalent to a dwelling in the midst of worldly life. Hence the idea of homelessness at inter alia Gîtâ, pp. 101-103.

abounds in old age and grief, which moves in the midst of disease and misfortune, which rotates in <sup>1</sup> space and time; the noise of which is trouble and toil, the rotations <sup>2</sup> of which (constitute) day and night; which is encircled with cold and heat; of which pleasure and pain are the joints, and hunger and thirst the nails fixed into it, of which sunshine and shade are the ruts; which staggers in the opening or closing of an eyelid, which is enveloped in the fearful waters of delusion, which is ever revolving and void of consciousness <sup>3</sup>, which is measured by months and half months, is ever-changing <sup>4</sup>, which moves through (all) the worlds <sup>5</sup>; the mud <sup>6</sup> for which is penance and regulations, the mover of which is the force of the quality of passion <sup>7</sup>; which is lit up <sup>8</sup> by the great egoism, which is sustained by the qualities; the fastenings in which are vexations <sup>9</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> This means, I presume, that worldly life is conditioned, so to say, by space and time. See p. 343 supra.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. the cause of the rotation, *Nîlakantha*.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. unintelligent.

<sup>4</sup> Now takes the form of a man, now of an animal, and then of some other thing, *Nîlakantha*. I think, however, that the meaning is, that it is not alike to all; different persons are in different states in this world.

<sup>5</sup> *Arguna Misra* says this means that it is the cause of the movements in all the worlds. That is the sense I extract from his words, which are not quite clear, *lokânâm samkaraṇe hetus*. The rendering in the text follows *Nîlakantha*.

<sup>6</sup> I.e., I presume, that which retards the revolutions of the 'wheel.' Instead of 'penance,' *Nîlakantha*'s reading is 'the quality of darkness.'

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, p. 13, and *Vâkaspati*'s commentary thereon.

<sup>8</sup> 'Animated,' *Nîlakantha*. Egoism is the cause of the world, and of all knowledge of it. Cf. *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> The text here is unsatisfactory. I follow *Nîlakantha*, who says 'vexations=those arising from not obtaining what is desired.'

which revolves in the midst of grief and destruction <sup>1</sup>, which is full of actions and instruments of action <sup>2</sup>, which is large, and which is extended by means of attachments <sup>3</sup>, which is rendered unsteady by avarice and desire <sup>4</sup>, which is produced by ignorance of various (matters) <sup>5</sup>, which is attended upon by fear and delusion, and which is the cause of the delusion of all beings, which moves towards joy and pleasure <sup>6</sup>, which has desire and wrath as its appurtenances, which is made up of (the entities) beginning with the Mahat and ending with the gross elements <sup>7</sup>, which is unchecked, the imperishable source (of all) <sup>8</sup>, the speed of which is like that of the mind, and which is (never) fatigued. This wheel of life, which is associated with the pairs of opposites, and which is devoid of consciousness, all the world, together with the immortals, should cast away, abridge, and check <sup>9</sup>. That man, among all creatures, who always

<sup>1</sup> Revolves in the midst of, = lives upon, is fed by, *Nīlakantha*.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. the organs of action, I presume.

<sup>3</sup> The more attachments one has, the more one is tied down to worldly life, and the more comprehensive such life becomes.

<sup>4</sup> Avarice is coveting another's wealth when one has one's own; desire is the wish for that which one has not.

<sup>5</sup> *Nīlakantha* reads 'vikitra,' which he renders to mean diversified, as being made up of the three qualities, ignorance there being the same thing as *Prakṛiti*, which is probably a better sense altogether than that obtainable from Arguna Misra's reading.

<sup>6</sup> Which moves by attachment to external pleasures, &c., *Nīlakantha*. See p. 300 supra.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. all the world developed from *Prakṛiti*—a common phrase.

<sup>8</sup> This is *Nīlakantha*'s forced meaning. But the text here is doubtful. Perhaps the sense is 'in which production and dissolution are going on unchecked.'

<sup>9</sup> See p. 344 note. For the last word, the variant here is *sthāpayet*, make steady or stop.

accurately understands the movement and stoppage<sup>1</sup> of the wheel of life is never deluded. (That) sage, released from all impressions<sup>2</sup>, transcending all pairs of opposites, and released from all sins, attains the highest goal. The householder, and the Brahma-kârin, the forester, and also the beggar<sup>3</sup>, all these four orders are stated to have the order of householder for their basis. Whatever system of rules<sup>4</sup> is prescribed in this world, to follow it is good; this has been celebrated from ancient times<sup>5</sup>. He who has been first refined by ceremonies<sup>6</sup>, and who has duly observed vows, being (born) in a caste of (high) qualifications<sup>7</sup>, and who understands the Vedas, should return<sup>8</sup> (from his preceptor's house). Always devoted to his own wife, behaving like<sup>9</sup> good men, with his senses restrained, and full of faith, one should perform the five sacrifices<sup>10</sup> in this world. The sage who eats what remains after (offerings) to deities<sup>11</sup> and guests, who is devoted to Vedic rites, who duly performs sacrifices and

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the causes of the revolution and stoppage, *Nîlakantha*.

<sup>2</sup> Impressions of previous actions, delusions, &c. And see p. 247 *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. the Samnyâsin.

<sup>4</sup> Sâstra. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 117.

<sup>5</sup> 'Such is the eternal fame,' literally.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. on whom the Vedic rites or *Samskâras* are duly performed. And see *Gîtâ*, p. 122.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. one of the three higher castes.

<sup>8</sup> The original is the technical word for the return of a Brahma-kârin after finishing his studies. He is describing the 'householder.'

<sup>9</sup> I.e. following the rule of conduct sanctioned by the good.

<sup>10</sup> Vide Williams' Dictionary, s.v. *mahâyagña*; *Ârvalâyana Grîhya* III, 1, 3; *Manu* II, 69; IV, 21.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 62; a guest must always be fed, and unless he is satisfied the host must not eat. Cf. *Sânti Parvan* (*Moksha*), chap. 192, st. 15; *Manu* III, 106; *Âpastamba* II, 3, 7, 3.



gifts according to his means, who is not thoughtlessly active<sup>1</sup> with the hand or foot, who is not thoughtlessly active with the eye, and who is not thoughtlessly active with his speech or any of his limbs, to such a one the (word) good applies. One should always have the sacred thread and a clean cloth, and be of pure vows, and self-restrained, and should always associate with good men, making gifts, and with one's external organs restrained; one should restrain one's lust and hunger<sup>2</sup>, should be kind, should behave like the good, and keep a bamboo stick and a water-pot filled with water<sup>3</sup>. One should learn and teach, should likewise perform sacrifices and officiate at others' sacrifices, and should give and receive gifts,—(thus) one should adopt the sixfold mode of life<sup>4</sup>. Know that three (of these) duties are the means of livelihood for Brâhmaṇas, the two teaching and officiating at sacrifices, and also receiving untainted gifts<sup>5</sup>. And as to the other remaining three duties, gift, study, and sacrifice, they are pious<sup>6</sup> duties. With regard to those three duties, the sage who understands piety, who is self-restrained, kind, possessed of forgiveness, and equable to all creatures, should avoid heedlessness<sup>7</sup>. The

<sup>1</sup> The same word as at Gîtâ, p. 114, there rendered 'vain activity.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Âpastamba II, 1, 1, 2 seq.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Manu IV, 36; Âpastamba II, 1, 1, 15.

<sup>4</sup> These are the well-known six duties of Brâhmaṇas as specified by Manu and others. See the discussion of this point in the Introduction.

<sup>5</sup> Another reading is 'gifts from an untainted (source).'

<sup>6</sup> What is the exact meaning of this here? I suppose the meaning is that the performance of them is a pure performance of duty; the others are duties the performance of which supplies one's own wants, and is therefore interested. Cf. Gautama X, 1 and 2.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. omission or mistake in performance.

Brâhmaṇa householder, who is of rigid vows, who is thus devoted, discharging all these duties as much as is in his power, conquers heaven.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Brahman said :

Thus<sup>1</sup> duly studying to the best of his power, in the way above<sup>2</sup> stated, and likewise living as a Brahmaçârin, one who is devoted to his own duty and learned, who is a sage with all his senses restrained, who applies himself to what is agreeable and beneficial to the preceptor, who is pure<sup>3</sup>, and constant in veracity and piety, should, with the permission of the preceptor, take food without decrying it<sup>4</sup>, should eat (the leavings) of sacrificial offerings, and alms, and should stand, sit, and take exercise<sup>5</sup> (duly), should sacrifice twice to the fire after becoming clean and with a concentrated (mind), and should always bear a staff of the Bilva or Palâsa<sup>6</sup> (wood). The clothing of the twice-born (man) should be of linen, or of cotton, or also a deerskin, or a cloth entirely (dyed with) reddish colour. There should also be a girdle of muñga; he should have matted hair, and likewise always (carry) water (with him), and have his sacred thread, be engaged in sacred

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra says, 'Having described first the order of householder, as that is the chief, he now describes that of Brahmaçârin.' Cf. Âpastamba II, 9, 21, 1, and note.

<sup>2</sup> Where? This is obscure.

<sup>3</sup> Both internally and externally, I presume.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Taittirîya, p. 129; Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 192, st. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 69. Arguna Misra says, 'Having exercise by means of standing and sitting; the meaning is not sleeping except at the proper time.'

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Manu II, 41 seq.

study, and free from avarice, and of rigid observances. (Such) a Brahma-kârin, always making offerings likewise of pure water to satisfy the deities, being restrained in mind<sup>1</sup>, is esteemed. One who is thus devoted<sup>2</sup>, who is concentrated in mind, and continent<sup>3</sup>, conquers heaven, and reaching the highest seat, does not return to birth. Refined by means of all ceremonies, and likewise living as a Brahma-kârin<sup>4</sup>, a sage who has renounced<sup>5</sup> (all) should go out of towns and dwell in forests<sup>6</sup>. Wearing a skin or the bark of a tree, he should bathe (every) morning and evening, and always living within the forest, should not enter a town again. He should honour guests, and should also give them shelter at (the proper) time, living on fruits and leaves, and roots and Syâmâka grain. He should without sloth feed on water, air, and all forest-products down to grass as they come, in order<sup>7</sup>, in accordance with the (regulations<sup>8</sup> at his) initiation. He should honour a guest who comes, by (giving him) water accompanied with roots, fruits, and leaves. And he should always without sloth give alms out of whatever he has for food. He should also eat always after the deities and guests<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Or it may be, 'being self-restrained and with (all his) heart.' The constructions in the original vary greatly, and so they do in the translation.

<sup>2</sup> Applying himself to his duties.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Maitrî, p. 18, and comment there.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Manu VI, 1 seq.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. who is a mendicant ascetic.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. p. 173 supra, note 9. Here he gives a description of the third order of forester, as to which compare generally Manu VI.

<sup>7</sup> First the jungle-products, then air, &c., Arguna Misra. The sense seems to be that the restrictions should become gradually harder. Cf. Manu VI, 24-31; Âpastamba II, 9, 22, 2 seq.; II, 9, 23, 2.

<sup>8</sup> I.e. whatever restriction he put on himself when entering upon the particular mode of life.

<sup>9</sup> Supra, p. 358, and cf. Taittirîya, p. 38.

(are satisfied) and with his speech restrained, having a mind free from envy<sup>1</sup>, eating little, and depending on the deities. Restraining the external senses, kind, full of forgiveness, preserving his hair and moustache, performing sacrifices, addicted to sacred study, and devoted to veracity and piety, pure in body<sup>2</sup>, always dexterous<sup>3</sup>, always in forests, and concentrated in mind,—a forester whose senses are subdued and who is thus devoted<sup>4</sup> conquers the worlds.

A householder, or a Brahma $\hat{a}$ rin, or again a forester, who wishes to apply himself to final emancipation should adopt the best (line of) conduct<sup>5</sup>. Offering safety to all beings, the sage should become free from all action<sup>6</sup>, and be agreeable to all beings, kind, and restrained in all his senses. He should make a fire<sup>7</sup> and feed on the alms (obtained) without asking<sup>8</sup> and without trouble<sup>9</sup>, and which have come spontaneously<sup>10</sup>, in a place free from smoke and where people have already<sup>11</sup> eaten. One who

<sup>1</sup> I.e. of others for obtaining more, and so forth. Arguna Misra's reading is different, and he renders it to mean, 'one by whom the rule of life as a Brahma $\hat{a}$ rin has not been violated.'

<sup>2</sup> Arguna Misra's reading, 'one who has cast away (all attachment to) the body.' Compare as to hair and moustache, Manu VI, 6 seq.

<sup>3</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 127. Here the meaning is probably assiduous in the performance of duties, vows, and so forth.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. applies himself to his duties.

<sup>5</sup> Arguna Misra says this means ânandâsramam, but there must be some bad copying here. I take the word as it stands to mean something like the 'godlike endowments' at Gîtâ, p. 114.

<sup>6</sup> See Gîtâ, pp. 54, 127. The meaning here is probably that of action without egoism. See Gîtâ, p. 55.

<sup>7</sup> I.e. Arguna<sup>a</sup> Misra says, 'not at night.' The readings are unsatisfactory. I read *krîtvâ vahninî*, but diffidently. Is the allusion to the rule at Âpastamba II, 9, 21, 10? Cf. Gautama III, 27.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Kaushîtaki, p. 32.

<sup>9</sup> I.e. to the giver. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 120.

<sup>10</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 10. <sup>11</sup> Cf. Manu VI, 56; Gautama III, 15.

understands final emancipation should seek to obtain alms after the cleaning<sup>1</sup> of the vessels (used for cooking), and should not rejoice if he obtains, and should not be dejected if he does not obtain (alms). Nor should he beg for too much alms<sup>2</sup>, seeking merely to sustain life. Eating only a little, he should go about for alms with a concentrated mind, looking out for the (proper) time. He should not wish for earnings in common with another, nor should he eat when honoured; for an ascetic should be averse from all earnings (accompanied) with honour<sup>3</sup>. When eating, he should not taste any articles of food which have been eaten by others<sup>4</sup>, or which are pungent, astringent, or bitter, and likewise no sweet juices. He should eat just enough for his livelihood—for the support of life. One who understands final emancipation should seek for a livelihood without obstructing (other) creatures; and when he goes about for alms, he should not go following after another<sup>5</sup>. He should not parade (his) piety, he should move about in a secluded place, free from passion. He should resort for shelter to an empty house, or a forest, or the foot of a tree, or a river likewise, or the cavern of a mountain. In summer, (he should pass) but a single night<sup>6</sup> in a town; and in the rains, he may dwell in one place. He should move about the

<sup>1</sup> I.e., I presume, in order to avoid interfering with others' comforts. And see last note.

<sup>2</sup> See *Manu* VI, 55. As to proper time further on, see last note.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Sanatsugâtîya*, pp. 145-147; 'without respect' at *Gîtâ*, p. 120, means probably with disrespect, otherwise that passage and this would be somewhat inconsistent. See too *Manu* II, 162.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Manu* II, 56; *Gîtâ*, p. 118; and p. 269 *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> As that other may get nothing if they go together, *Arguna Misra*. Cf. *Manu* VI, 51.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Gautama* III, 21.

world like a worm<sup>1</sup>, his path being pointed out by the sun, and he should walk with circumspection over the earth out of compassion to all beings<sup>2</sup>. He should not make any accumulations; and should eschew dwelling with friends<sup>3</sup>. And the man who understands final emancipation should verily do all acts which he has to do, always with clean water. A man should always bathe in clean water. And with his senses restrained, he should devote himself to these eight observances<sup>4</sup>,—harmlessness, life as a *Brahmakârin*, veracity, and also straightforwardness, freedom from anger, freedom from (the habit of) carping, restraint of the external organs, and habitual freedom from (the habit of) backbiting. He should always practise a sinless (mode of) conduct, not deceptive and not crooked; and free from attachment should always make one who comes (as a guest) take a morsel of food. He should eat just enough for livelihood—for the support of life. And he should eat (only) what has been obtained with piety<sup>5</sup>, and should not follow his own (mere) desire<sup>6</sup>. He should not accept anything at all other than food and clothing. And he should accept as much as he eats and no more. He should not receive from others, nor should he ever give to others<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. not very fast, Arguna Misra; 'the path being pointed out by the sun' = not at night, for fear of destroying worms, &c.

<sup>2</sup> This seems to be very like the practice of the *Gainas* of the present day. And cf. *Manu* VI, 69. <sup>3</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 68–103.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 114, and cf. also *Sanatsugâtîya*, p. 153.

<sup>5</sup> That is to say, obtained without violation of any binding obligation, or rule of the *Sâstras*. <sup>6</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 117.

<sup>7</sup> This is not very clear, and Arguna Misra's comments are not intelligible. The sense seems to be this, 'He should not take more than is wanted, nor should he keep any accumulations from which to give to others, but should at once share with others all that is earned.'

But owing to the helplessness of people, a wise man should always share (with others). He should not appropriate another's riches, and should not take (anything) unasked. Nor, verily, after enjoying any object should one become afterwards attached to it. One who has anything to do<sup>1</sup> should take earth, water, pebbles likewise, and leaves, flowers, and fruits which are not secured<sup>2</sup> (by anybody), as they come<sup>3</sup>. One should not live by the occupation of an artisan<sup>4</sup>, nor should one wish for gold. One should not hate, should not teach<sup>5</sup>, and should be void of (all) belongings<sup>6</sup>. One should eat what is consecrated by faith<sup>7</sup>, and should avoid (all) controversies, should act without a purpose<sup>8</sup>, should be free from attachment, and without fixed appointments with people<sup>9</sup>. One should not perform, or cause to be performed, any action involving expectation of fruit, or involving any destruction of life, or the assemblage of people<sup>10</sup>. Rejecting all things,

<sup>1</sup> Arguna Misra says that this means if he wants them for any particular purpose he should take the earth, &c.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. apparently, taken possession of and preserved as one's own by anybody.

<sup>3</sup> Arguna Misra renders this by 'which lead to action.' Is it not rather the 'spontaneous earnings' at Gîtâ, p. 60?

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Manu III, 64; Âpastamba I, 6, 18, 18; Gautama XVII, 7.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. teach one who does not ask to be instructed. Cf. Manu II, 110.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 60; the original word, however, is not the same.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 360, note 3 *supra*; Manu II, 54-55; Gautama IX, 59. 'Controversies;' the original is *nimitta*, and the interpretation is what appears to be Arguna Misra's. It may also mean 'omens.' That this is the true sense appears from Manu VI, 50.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48.

<sup>9</sup> Arguna Misra says, 'e.g. I shall come to you to-morrow for alms,' &c. Cf. Âpastamba I, 6, 19, 12.

<sup>10</sup> The words are the same as at Gîtâ, p. 54, 'keeping people (to

and being equable to all beings, moving and unmoving, one should become an ascetic with small belongings. One should not perturb any other (person), nor should one be perturbed by any other (person<sup>1</sup>). He who is trusted by all beings is said to be the foremost among those who understand final emancipation. One should not think of what is not come<sup>2</sup>, nor reflect on that which is past; one should disregard the present, being concentrated (in mind) and indifferent to time<sup>3</sup>. He should not defile<sup>4</sup> anything by the eye, or the mind, or by speech, nor should he do anything wrong openly or in secret. One who draws in the senses from all sides as a tortoise (draws in) his limbs<sup>5</sup>, and in whom the senses, mind, and understanding are absorbed<sup>6</sup>, who is free from desires, who understands all truth, who is free from the pairs of opposites, and from the ceremony of svâhâ, and who is free from salutations<sup>7</sup>, and who is free from (the thought that this or that is) mine, who is free from egoism, who is free from anxiety for new acquisitions or protection of old acquisitions, and self-controlled<sup>8</sup>, who is free from

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their duties),’ but the sense seems to be different. The commentators say nothing on this.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. one should not look to the future with any aspirations or expectations, and should not look back on the past with grief, Arguna Misra. See too p. 170, note 9 supra.

<sup>3</sup> I am not sure if this is a correct interpretation. But it does not seem likely that the other possible sense—literally ‘expecting time’—can be intended here.

<sup>4</sup> This is obscure. Is the sense this, that one should not observe, or think, or speak badly or of the bad side of things?

<sup>5</sup> Cf. p. 342 supra, note 1.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Ka/ha, p. 151.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 352 supra, note 1.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48, where the original words are the same.



expectations, who is free from attachments to any entity, and who is dependent on none<sup>1</sup>, who is attached to the self, and who understands the truth, is emancipated, there is no doubt of that. Those who perceive the self, which is without hands, foot, or back, without a head, without a stomach, which is free from the operations of the qualities<sup>2</sup>, absolute, untainted, and stable, devoid of smell, devoid of taste or touch, devoid of colour, and also devoid of sound, which is to be understood<sup>3</sup>, which is unattached, and which is also devoid of flesh, which is free from anxiety<sup>4</sup>, imperishable, divine, and though dwelling in a house<sup>5</sup>, always dwelling in all entities, they never die<sup>6</sup>. There the understanding reaches not, nor the senses, nor the deities, nor Vedas, sacrifices, nor worlds<sup>7</sup>, nor penance, nor valour<sup>8</sup>; the attainment to it of those who are possessed of knowledge is stated to be without comprehension of symbols<sup>9</sup>. Therefore the learned man who knows (the) property of being void of symbols<sup>10</sup>, being devoted to pious conduct, and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 60.

<sup>2</sup> These are effects of Prakṛiti by which the Purusha is unaffected.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, 'pursued.'

<sup>4</sup> This is obscure. Arguna Misra's text is *niskityam*. Does that mean 'which should be accurately understood?' The rendering in the text of Nīlakantha's reading may mean that the Brahman has no such thoughts (*kintâ*) as are referred to at Gîtâ, p. 115.

<sup>5</sup> Does this mean the body?

<sup>6</sup> I.e. are free from birth and death. Cf. Âpastamba I, 8, 22, 4.

<sup>7</sup> This, again, is not quite clear. Probably the explanation is to be found in the passage at Gîtâ, p. 79.

<sup>8</sup> Nīlakantha's reading is 'observances or vows.'

<sup>9</sup> I.e. 'not to be acquired by inference,' Arguna Misra, p. 351 supra.

<sup>10</sup> See p. 309 supra; 'who is without symbols, and knows piety,' according to Arguna Misra's reading.

resorting to concealed<sup>1</sup> piety should adopt the mode of life (necessary) for experience<sup>2</sup>. Though undeluded, he should act in the manner of the deluded<sup>3</sup>, not finding fault with piety<sup>4</sup>. He should perform piety, behaving so that others would always disrespect him<sup>5</sup>, and should not find fault with the ways of the good<sup>6</sup>. That sage is said to be the best who has adopted this (line of) conduct. The senses, and the objects of the senses, and the five great elements, and mind, understanding, egoism, the unperceived, and the Purusha likewise<sup>7</sup>, by an accurate determination about the truth, after understanding all these, one attains heaven<sup>8</sup>, being released from all bonds. One who knows the truth, understanding these same (entities) at the time of the termination (of his life), should meditate, exclusively pondering on one point<sup>9</sup>; and then, depending on none<sup>10</sup>, he gets emancipation. Freed from all attachments, like the atmosphere dwelling in space<sup>11</sup>, with his accumulations<sup>12</sup> exhausted, and free from distress<sup>13</sup>, he attains to the highest seat.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 159 supra, note 7, and cf. *Manu* III, 109, which is the text referred to in note 5 there.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. direct perception of the Brahman. See *Gîtâ*, p. 57, note 5.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 160 supra, note 8, and cf. also *Manu* II, 110.

<sup>4</sup> *Arguna Misra* compares *Gîtâ*, p. 55, about 'shaking convictions.'

<sup>5</sup> Cf. pp. 159-161 supra.

<sup>6</sup> This means, I presume, the good devoted to action and not to knowledge only.

<sup>7</sup> These are the famous elements of the *Sânkhya*s; see *Sûtra* I, 61.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. p. 159 and note 2.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. p. 300 supra.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 60.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 82, note 3.

<sup>12</sup> Of actions previously performed. See p. 246 supra.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 101, where, however, the original word is different.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

Brahman said :

The ancients who perceived the established (truth) call renunciation<sup>1</sup> penance; and the Brâhmanas dwelling in the seat of the Brahman<sup>2</sup> understand knowledge to be concerned with the Brahman<sup>3</sup>. The highest Brahman is very far off<sup>3</sup>, and (the attainment of it) depends on Vedic knowledge<sup>4</sup>; it is free from the pairs of opposites, devoid of qualities<sup>5</sup>, everlasting, of unthinkable qualities, and supreme. The men of talent, who are pure<sup>6</sup>, and whose minds are refined, transcending passion, and being untainted, perceive that supreme (principle) by means of knowledge and penance. Those who are constantly devoted to renunciation<sup>7</sup>, and understand the Brahman and wish for the supreme, go to the happy path by penance. Penance<sup>8</sup> is said to be a light; (correct) conduct is the means to piety; knowledge verily should be understood to be the highest, and renunciation the best penance. He who understands determinately the self which is unperturbed, which abides in all entities, and which is the essential

<sup>1</sup> Abandoning of fruit, Arguna Misra. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 339 supra, note 4, dwelling in=adhering to.

<sup>3</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 104.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sanatsugâtîya, p. 158 seq. <sup>5</sup> Viz. the three famous ones.

<sup>6</sup> Pure, refined, and untainted are not easily distinguished. Probably 'pure' refers to external cleanliness; 'untainted' to freedom from sin and such taints; and 'refined' to freedom from error.

<sup>7</sup> I. e. who have no 'belongings,' Arguna Misra. •

<sup>8</sup> Action without desire, Arguna Misra, who adds that it is called a light, as it leads to knowledge. See too p. 166, and p. 247, note 11, and p. 340 supra.

element in knowledge, he is laid down<sup>1</sup> (as being able) to move everywhere. The learned man who perceives, association and dissociation, and likewise unity and diversity<sup>2</sup>, is released from misery. He who desires nothing, and despises nothing<sup>3</sup>, becomes eligible, even dwelling in this world, for assimilation with the Brahman<sup>4</sup>. He who knows the truth about the qualities of Pradhâna<sup>5</sup>, and understands the Pradhâna of all entities<sup>6</sup>, who is free from (the thought that this or that is) mine, and free from egoism<sup>7</sup>, is emancipated, there is no doubt of that. One who is free from the pairs of opposites, free from the (ceremonies of) salutation, free from (the ceremony of) svadhâ<sup>8</sup>, attains to that everlasting (principle) which is free from the pairs of opposites, and devoid of qualities, by tranquillity only. Abandoning all action, whether agreeable or disagreeable, developed from the qualities<sup>9</sup>, and abandoning both truth and falsehood<sup>10</sup>, a creature is emancipated, there is no doubt of that. The great tree of Brahman<sup>11</sup> is

<sup>1</sup> 'Laid down' is literally 'wished.'

<sup>2</sup> I presume this means the real fact underlying the appearances of association and so forth, namely, that there is but one reality, and all appearances of difference &c. are unreal. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 124. See also p. 313 supra, note 1, and p. 374 infra.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 65, and see *Kaṭha*, p. 155. <sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> The qualities, viz. the three, of Pradhâna, i.e. constituting Prakṛti, or nature. <sup>6</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 106, and note 3 there.

<sup>7</sup> For this whole expression, which occurs so frequently, cf. *Maitrî*, p. 44, and comment there.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 324 supra, note 8. <sup>9</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48; *Svetâsvatara*, p. 360.

<sup>10</sup> I.e., I presume, what is real and unreal in a worldly view,—the great truth is not to be 'abandoned.' Cf. *Taittirîya*, pp. 97-99; p. 191 supra; *Śānti Parvan (Moksha)*, chap. 174, st. 53; *Āpastamba* 11, 9, 21, 13.

<sup>11</sup> I.e., says *Arguna Misra*, the tree of worldly life produced from the Brahman. Compare chapter XII supra.

eternal; a tree which is produced from the unperceived as the seed, which consists of the understanding as its trunk, whose collection of boughs is the great egoism, the sprouts within which are the senses, the great branches of which are the great elements, and the side branches the objects of sense, which is always possessed of leaves, always possessed of flowers, in which agreeable and disagreeable fruits are always produced, and which is fed upon by all creatures. Cutting and piercing this (tree)<sup>1</sup> with the sword of knowledge of the truth, and abandoning the bonds in the shape of attachment, which cause birth, death, and old age<sup>2</sup>, a wise man who is free from (the thought that this or that is) mine, and who is devoid of egoism, is emancipated, there is no doubt of that. There are these two birds<sup>3</sup>, (which are) unchanging, and which should also be known to be unintelligent<sup>4</sup>. But as to that other who is above them, he is called intelligent. (When) the inner self, devoid of knowledge of nature<sup>5</sup>, and (as it were) non-intelligent<sup>6</sup>, understands that which is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 111; and *Mundaka*, p. 307, and commentary there.

<sup>2</sup> So I render the original, though the sense at first sight appears to be 'which are caused by birth,' &c.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. the understanding and egoism, which dwell in the 'tree,' Arguna Misra. *Nîlakantha* says, 'the great and the individual self.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Sânkhya-kârikâ* 11, and comment of Vâkaspati Misra. The self is not unintelligent; and as the birds are so described, they must stand for some manifestation of *Prakṛiti*, which understanding and egoism are. Otherwise 'bird' does stand for 'self.' See p. 189 *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> The original word here is *sattva*, on which see p. 351 *supra*. Arguna Misra renders it here by *Prakṛiti*.

<sup>6</sup> So *Nîlakantha*; 'the only intelligent principle,'—Arguna Misra. On *Nîlakantha*'s interpretation 'inner self' must be the same thing as *Bhûtâtman* at *Maitrî*, p. 41.

beyond nature, then understanding the Kshetra<sup>1</sup>, and with an understanding comprehending all, and transcending the qualities<sup>2</sup> he is released from all sins.

### CHAPTER XXXIII.

Brahman said :

Some (think of) the Brahman as a tree ; some (think of) the Brahman as a great forest ; and some (think of) the Brahman as unperceived ; and some as transcendent and without misery<sup>3</sup> ; and they<sup>4</sup> think all this to be produced from and absorbed into the unperceived. He who even for (the space of) a (single) exhalation, at the time of the termination (of life<sup>5</sup>) becomes equable<sup>6</sup>, attaining to the self, becomes fit for immortality. Restraining the self in the self<sup>7</sup>, even for (the space of) a wink, he repairs to the inexhaustible acquisition<sup>8</sup> of those who have knowledge, through the tranquillity of the self<sup>9</sup>. And restraining the life-winds again and

<sup>1</sup> See p. 351 supra.

<sup>2</sup> See Gîtâ, p. 109.

<sup>3</sup> As to the first two clauses comp. pp. 284-371 supra ; the last two are said by Arguna Misra to represent the Sâṅkhya and Yoga doctrines respectively.

<sup>4</sup> I presume this means all teachers. But Nîlakanṭha takes it to mean the Sâṅkhyas, and he takes the preceding words as indicating two views based on Śruti texts, viz. the first, that the world is a development of the Brahman, and the other that the Brahman does not undergo any development or change. Anāmaya he takes to mean changeless, and Brahmamaya he takes to mean developed from the Brahman.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 77, 78.

<sup>6</sup> One who sees the supreme as the only real entity, Arguna Misra. Nîlakanṭha takes it to mean one who identifies himself with everything. See Gîtâ, p. 65, and note 4 there.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 344 supra.

<sup>8</sup> I. e. the goal to be acquired.

<sup>9</sup> 'Tranquillity' - the original may also be rendered by 'favour,'

again by control of the life-winds <sup>1</sup>, of ten or twelve <sup>2</sup> (modes), (he repairs to) that which is beyond the twenty-four <sup>3</sup>. Thus having first a tranquil self, he obtains whatever he desires. When the quality of goodness predominates in the unperceived <sup>4</sup>, that fits one for immortality. The men of knowledge extol nothing else beyond goodness. By inference <sup>5</sup> we understand the (attainment of the) being to depend on goodness. It is not possible otherwise <sup>6</sup> to attain that being, O best of the twice-born! Forgiveness, courage, harmlessness, equability, truth, straightforwardness, knowledge, abandonment <sup>7</sup>, and also renunciation are laid down as (constituting) con-

as to which cf. p. 234 supra, but further on the phrase 'having a tranquil self' occurs, where the latter sense is not quite suitable. See *Gîtâ*, p. 51, and *Yoga-sûtra* I, 33.

<sup>1</sup> I. e. the specific modes which are mentioned of control of life-winds, e. g. at *Gîtâ*, p. 61, or *Yoga-sûtra* II, 49 seq.

<sup>2</sup> *Nîlakantha* proposes two interpretations of this. He says the ten are the eight mentioned in *Yoga-sûtra* II, 29, and in addition *tarka* and *vairâgya* (as to which see *Yoga-sûtra* I, 15 and 17). To make up the twelve he substitutes for the last two the four named at *Yoga-sûtra* I, 33. He also suggests that 'ten or twelve' may mean twenty-two, which he makes up thus. The five modes of *yama* (*Yoga-sûtra* II, 30), five of *niyama* (*ibid.* 32), the remaining six in *Yoga-sûtra* II, 29, the four in *Yoga-sûtra* I, 33, and *tarka* and *vairâgya* as before.

<sup>3</sup> The twenty-four are the elements according to the *Sânkhya* system. See *Sânkhya-sâra*, p. 11, and p. 368 supra. That which is beyond them is *Purusha*.

<sup>4</sup> The unperceived, it should be noted, is made up of the three qualities; the predominance of goodness indicates enlightenment or knowledge. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 108.

<sup>5</sup> The middle term in the inference being, says *Arguna Misra*, the enlightening effect of the quality in question.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. p. 167 supra.

<sup>7</sup> The original is *tyâga*, which *Arguna Misra* renders by 'abandonment of all belongings;' renunciation, scil. of fruit. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 121, and p. 114.

duct of the quality of goodness. By this very inference the wise verily believe in the Being and nature as one, there is no doubt of that. Some learned men, who are devoted to knowledge, assert the unity of the Kshetragña and nature<sup>1</sup>. But that is not correct. That they are always distinct (from one another) is also (said) without (due) consideration<sup>2</sup>. Distinction and also association<sup>3</sup> should be accurately understood. Unity and diversity<sup>4</sup> are likewise laid down. Such is the doctrine of the learned. Between the gnat and the udumbara<sup>5</sup> there is observed unity and diversity also. As a fish is in water distinct (from it), such is their relation; (such is) the relation of the drops of water with the leaf of the lotus.

The preceptor said :

Then those Brâhmanas, who were the best of sages, having again felt doubts, interrogated the grandsire of the people who spoke to them thus.

<sup>1</sup> Here, says Nîlakantha, the author indicates an objection to the proposition stated just before. But the passage is not clear.

<sup>2</sup> This, says Nîlakantha, is a reply to the Sâmkhyas, who hold the two to be distinct. Nîlakantha adds, that if the two are distinct, nature will, conceivably, adhere even to an emancipated creature; and if they are one, then the being or self would be really engaging in action and so forth, and that activity being really a property of the self, could not be destroyed save by the destruction of the self. Hence that view is also wrong.

<sup>3</sup> Like that of sea and wave, Nîlakantha.

<sup>4</sup> Unity of Brahman and diversity of manifestation of nature, Arguna Misra, who adds—by reason of the association they are spoken of as one, by reason of the unity and diversity they are distinct. The next sentence contains three parallel cases.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. as to all this, Sânti Parvan, chap. 194, st. 38 seq. (Moksha Dharma); chap. 249, st. 20 seq.; chap. 285, st. 33 seq.



## CHAPTER XXXIV.

The sages said :

Which (form of) piety is deemed to be the most worthy of being performed ? We observe the various modes of piety to be as it were contradictory. Some say (it<sup>1</sup> remains) after the body (is destroyed) ; some say that is not so. Some (say) everything<sup>2</sup> is doubtful ; and others that there is no doubt. Some say the permanent (principle) is impermanent, and others, too, that it exists, and (others) that it exists not<sup>3</sup>. Some (say it<sup>4</sup> is) of one form or twofold, and others (that it is) mixed<sup>4</sup>. Some Brâhmanas, too, who know the Brahman and perceive the truth, believe it to be one ; others distinct ; and others again (that it is) manifold<sup>5</sup>. Some say both time and space (exist)<sup>6</sup>, and others that that is not so. Some have matted hair and skins ; and some (are) clean-shaven and without covering. Some people are for bathing ; some for the omission<sup>7</sup> of bathing. Some are for taking food ; others are intent on fasting. Some people extol action, and

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the piety, Arguna Misra ; the self, Nîlakantha.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. such as piety, &c., Arguna Misra.

<sup>3</sup> I follow Arguna Misra, who says 'permanent' means soul, &c. The correct expression would seem to be 'that which is called permanent by others is impermanent.'

<sup>4</sup> This is the view of those who hold the theory of Parinâma, or development, says Arguna Misra.

<sup>5</sup> 'To be one' = knowledge to be all of one description, 'distinct' = knowledge having various entities for its distinct objects (this is the view of the holders of the Vigñânavâda, says Arguna Misra) ; manifold = that the selfs are numberless. The words here are nearly identical with those at Gîtâ, p. 83, see note 4 there.

<sup>6</sup> I.e. help in action, Arguna Misra.

<sup>7</sup> See Âpastamba I, 1, 1, 2 (comment).

others tranquillity. Some extol final emancipation; some various kinds of enjoyments; some wish for riches, and others indigence. Some (say) means<sup>1</sup> should be resorted to; others that that is not so. Some are devoted to harmlessness, and some given up to destruction; some are for merit and glory; and others say that is not so. Some are devoted to goodness; some are in the midst of doubts; some are for pleasure, and some for pain<sup>2</sup>. Some people (say) meditation<sup>3</sup>, other Brâhmanas (say) sacrifice, and others, gifts; but others extol penance, and other persons sacred study; some knowledge, and renunciation<sup>4</sup>; and those who ponder on the elements<sup>5</sup>, nature<sup>6</sup>. Some extol everything, and others nothing<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. for the acquisition of anything desirable, Arguna Misra, who adds, 'by those who wish for piety.' Nîlakantha says means = 'meditation and so forth;' as to 'that is not so' he cites what he calls a Sruti, which is however one of the Kârikâs of Gauḍapâda on the Mândûkya; see p. 432.

<sup>2</sup> This, too, is not quite clear, but Nîlakantha says, 'meditation should be practised for release from pain, and for acquisition of pleasure;' 'and others say not so, it should be done without desire.'

<sup>3</sup> That is to say, they hold that meditation should be practised.

<sup>4</sup> Arguna Misra seems to take this to mean 'renunciation of knowledge,' i.e. a blank, and says this was the view of the Mâdhya-mikas,—I suppose the Mâdhya-mika Bauddhas.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. the Kârvâkas, Arguna Misra.

<sup>6</sup> Svetâsvatara, p. 276, and Saṅkara's commentary there.

<sup>7</sup> Were there optimists and pessimists at the time of the Anu-gîtâ in India? This verse, however, does not occur in some MSS. Nîlakantha's note on this passage may be of some interest. He says, 'Some hold that the self exists after the body is lost; others, that is the Lokâyatas or Kârvâkas, hold the contrary. Everything doubtful is the view of the Syâdvâdins; nothing doubtful that of the Tairthikas, the great teachers (I presume, about their own respective doctrines). Everything impermanent, Târkikas; permanent, Mîmâmsakas; nothing exists, the Sûnyavâdins; something exists, but only momentarily,

And, O best of the gods! piety being thus confused and abounding in contradictions, we are deluded, and come to no determination. People are acting, (saying) this is good, this is good. And he who is attached to a certain (form of) piety, always esteems that. Here (therefore) our understanding breaks down, and our mind is distracted. We wish, O best (of beings)! to be informed of what is good. Be pleased now to proceed to state what is (so) mysterious, and what is the cause of the connexion between the Kshetragña and nature. Thus addressed by those Brâhmanas, the venerable, holy, and talented creator of worlds told them accurately (what they asked).

Saugatas; knowledge is one, but the ego and non-ego are two different principles, the Yogâkâras; mixed, Uḍulomas; one, is the view of the worshippers of the Brahman as possessed of qualities; distinct, other Mîmâṃsakas, who hold that the special actions are the cause (of everything, is meant, I presume); manifold=the atomists; time and space=astrologers. Those who "say that is not so," that is to say, that what we see has no real existence at all, are the Vṛiddhas, ancient philosophers; omission to bathe=the condition of Naishṭhika Brahma-kârins; bathing=householder's condition; "means should be resorted to, that is not so," those who are against all meditation, &c., according to the Sruti text, which Nîlakantha quotes; "merit and glory, that is not so," some say there is no merit as the Lokâyatas or Kârṇvâkas; "knowledge, renunciation," the former is to be gained only by means of the latter; "ponder on elements"=who are intent on the investigation of the true nature of things; nature=abundance of resources, by which alone knowledge is produced, not by mere renunciation.' It will be understood, that this commentary assumes a different syntactical construction of the original in some places from that adopted in our translation.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

Brahman said :

Well then, I will declare to you what you ask of me, O best (of men)! Learn what a preceptor told a pupil who went to him. Hearing it all, deliberate on it properly. Non-destruction of all creatures, that is deemed to be the greatest duty<sup>1</sup>. This is the highest seat<sup>2</sup>, free from vexation and holy in character. The ancients who perceived the established (truth) call knowledge the highest happiness. Therefore by pure knowledge one is released from all sins. And those who are constantly engaged in destruction, and who are infidels<sup>3</sup> in their conduct, and who entertain avarice and delusion, go verily to hell. Those who without sloth perform actions with expectations, rejoice in this world, being born again and again. But those wise and talented men, who perform actions with faith, free from any connexion with expectations, perceive correctly<sup>4</sup>. Now I will proceed to state how the association and dissociation of Kshetragña and nature (take place). Learn that, O best (of men)! The relation here is said to be that between the object and subject<sup>5</sup>. The subject

<sup>1</sup> See p. 291 supra, and note 3 there.

<sup>2</sup> So literally; the sense is—that which one is to aim at.

<sup>3</sup> The original is nâstika, the contrary of that 'âstikya,' which at Gîtâ, p. 126, we have rendered by 'belief (in a future world),' following Śrīdhara. Râmânuga, whose commentary came to hand too late for any other than a very occasional use in the translation of the Gîtâ, renders it by 'belief in the truth of the teaching of the Vedas.'

<sup>4</sup> I. e. learn the truth.

<sup>5</sup> I use the terms subject and object here in the philosophical sense explained by Sir W. Hamilton, viz. the thinking agent and the object of thought respectively. And cf. also the passage referred to in note 3 on p. 379 infra.

is always the being, and nature is stated to be the object. It has been explained in the above mode, as (having the relation) of the gnat and the udumbara<sup>1</sup>. Nature which is non-intelligent knows nothing, though it is the object of enjoyment<sup>2</sup>. Who enjoys and what is enjoyed<sup>3</sup> is learnt from the Sâstras. Nature is said always to abound in the pairs of opposites, and to be constituted of the qualities; the Kshetragña is free from the pairs of opposites, devoid of parts, and in essence free from the qualities. He abides in everything alike<sup>4</sup>, and is connected with (all) knowledge<sup>5</sup>; and he always enjoys nature as a lotus-leaf (enjoys) water. Even brought into contact with all qualities, a learned man remains untainted<sup>6</sup>. There is no doubt that the being is unattached just like the unsteady drop of water placed upon a lotus-leaf<sup>7</sup>. It is established that nature is the property<sup>8</sup> of the being. And the relation of the two is like that of matter and the maker<sup>9</sup>. As one goes into (a) dark (place) taking a light (with him), so those who wish for the supreme go with the light of nature<sup>10</sup>. While there is oil

<sup>1</sup> P. 374 supra. The relation is one of close connexion, coupled with some identity of nature (because, says Nîlakantha, an entirely extraneous thing could not get into the inside of the fruit, and the gnat's body therefore must have come from the fruit itself), but still the elements are distinct.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 371 supra, note 4.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Maitrî, p. 108.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 105, 106.

<sup>5</sup> Knowledge of the Kshetragña forms part of all real knowledge. Arguna Misra's reading and interpretation are different. He says, 'As he is seen coming to light everywhere alike, so,' &c.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 55-110.

<sup>7</sup> Again the common simile.

<sup>8</sup> The original is dravya, rendered 'matter' in the next sentence. Arguna Misra paraphrases it by 'upakarana,' paraphernalia.

<sup>9</sup> So the original, the sense is not clear. But see Svetâsvatara, p. 368.

<sup>10</sup> Knowledge, which, says Nîlakantha, is a manifestation of nature. Arguna Misra says the knowledge of the truth which the

and wick<sup>1</sup>, the light shines; but the flame is extinguished when the oil and wick are exhausted. Thus nature is perceived<sup>2</sup>; the being is laid down (as being) unperceived. Understand this, O Brâhmanas! Well now, I will tell you something more. One who has a bad understanding does not acquire knowledge even with a thousand (admonitions). And one who is possessed of knowledge enhances (his) happiness even with a fourth share<sup>3</sup>. Thus should one understand the accomplishment of piety by (apt) means. For the talented man who knows (these) means, attains supreme happiness<sup>4</sup>. As a man travelling along some way without provisions for the journey, travels with great discomfort, and may even be destroyed on the way, so should one understand, that by action<sup>5</sup> the fruit is or is not produced. For a man to see within (his) self<sup>6</sup> what is agreeable and what is disagreeable to him is good. And as one who is devoid of a perception of the truth rashly travels on foot by a long way unseen before<sup>7</sup>, while (another) goes by the same self acquires is by means of nature. Cf. Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 56, and comment.

<sup>1</sup> So Nîlakantha. Arguna Misra does not take *guna* here to mean 'wick.'

<sup>2</sup> I. e., I presume, in its manifestations; it is perceived for some time and then vanishes. Cf. Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 59-61; the Purusha is not 'perceived' in this sense. <sup>3</sup> Viz. of admonition, Arguna Misra.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 70, where the same phrase occurs.

<sup>5</sup> The fruit of this is uncertain; knowledge which is in one's self is the thing to be worked for.

<sup>6</sup> I. e. the mind, Nîlakantha. The meaning is, he should not care for external pleasure and pain. Cf. Gîtâ, *inter alia*, p. 50.

<sup>7</sup> This seems to be so left imperfect in the original. The construction seems to be this: the progress of the latter is as great as that of one who drives in a chariot as compared with that of one who goes on foot with much suffering. Cf. the construction on next page.

way in a carriage<sup>1</sup> drawn by horses, and going swiftly, such is the progress of the men of understanding. Having climbed up a mountain one should not look at the surface of the earth<sup>2</sup>. One sees a man travelling in a chariot, and void of intelligence, afflicted by reason of the chariot. As far as there is a carriage-path, he goes in the carriage; where the carriage-path stops, a learned man goes on abandoning the carriage. So travels the talented man, who understands the procedure respecting (knowledge of the) truth and devotion<sup>3</sup>, and who knows about the qualities, comprehending the gradations<sup>4</sup> one above the other. As one who without a boat dives into the ocean with his arms only, through delusion, undoubtedly wishes for destruction; while a wise man likewise knowing distinctions<sup>5</sup>, and having a boat with good oars, goes in the water without fatigue, and soon crosses the reservoir, and having crossed (it) goes to the other shore, throwing

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the *Sâstras*, says *Nîlakantha*. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> When one has arrived at knowledge,—the highest seat, says *Nîlakantha*,—one need not perform the dictates of the *Sâstras*, which are only preliminary to the acquisition of knowledge. Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 48, 73. Cf. as to this figure of the chariot and the next one about the boat, *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 695.

<sup>3</sup> I adopt *Arguna's* rendering of the original here, viz. *Yoga*. The meaning, on that rendering, is the same as it is in the *Gîtâ*.

<sup>4</sup> According to *Arguna Misra*, action with desire, action without desire, and lastly, knowledge. According to *Nîlakantha*, action laid down in the *Sâstras*, then *Yoga*, and then the condition of *Hamsa*, *Paramahamsa*, &c.

<sup>5</sup> Literally, one knowing divisions. I presume the meaning is distinctions between various things as to which suits which, and so forth. The boat, says *Nîlakantha*, is a preceptor, and even a preceptor is not to be sought for after a man has achieved *Yoga*; hence the text proceeds to speak further on of casting aside the boat. Wishes for destruction= is sure to meet destruction.

aside the boat, and devoid of (the thought that this or that is) mine. This has been already explained by the parallel of the carriage and pedestrian. One who has come by delusion through affection, adheres to that like a fisherman to his boat, being overcome by (the thought that this or that is) mine. It is not possible to move on land after embarking in a boat. And likewise one cannot move in water after entering a carriage. Thus there are various actions in regard to different objects<sup>1</sup>. And as action is performed in this world, so does it result to them<sup>2</sup>. That which sages by their understanding meditate upon, which is void of any smell whatever, void of taste, and void of colour, touch, or sound, that is called the Pradhâna<sup>3</sup>. Now that Pradhâna is unperceived; a development of the unperceived is the Mahat; and a development of the Pradhâna (when it is) become Mahat is egoism. From egoism is produced the development, namely, the great elements; and of the elements respectively, objects of sense are verily stated to be the development<sup>4</sup>. The unperceived is of the nature of seed<sup>5</sup>, and also productive in its essence. And we have heard

<sup>1</sup> I. e. appertaining to the various orders of householders, &c.. *Nîlakantha*. But I am not aware of any authority for this sense of vishaya.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. those who perform them. •

<sup>3</sup> *Nîlakantha* says, 'Having stated above the means of knowledge, he now states the proper object of knowledge.'

<sup>4</sup> See p. 332 supra. The original for development is *guna*, literally quality.

<sup>5</sup> The meaning of this passage seems to be identical with that of *Sânkhya-kârikâ* 3. Productive (*Prasavâtmakam*) is probably to be explained as *Prasavadharmi* is at *Sânkhya-kârikâ* 11 (see commentary of *Vâkaspati*, pp. 59, 60), viz. always undergoing development. The great elements are of course the *tanmâtras*.



that the great self is of the nature of seed and a product. Egoism is of the nature of seed and a product also again and again. And the five great elements are verily of the nature of seed and products. The objects of the five elements are of the nature of seed<sup>1</sup>, but they do not yield products. Learn about their properties. Now space has one quality, air is said to have two qualities; it is said that light has three qualities; and water, too, is of four qualities; and earth, abounding with movables and immovables, the divine source of all entities, full of examples of agreeable and disagreeable (things), should be understood to be of five qualities<sup>2</sup>. Sound, touch, colour likewise, taste, and smell as the fifth—these, O best of the twice-born! should be understood to be the five qualities of earth. Smell always belongs to the earth<sup>3</sup>; and smell is stated to be (of) numerous descriptions. I will state at length the numerous qualities of smell<sup>4</sup>. Smell is agreeable or disagreeable, sweet, sour, and bitter likewise, diffusive and compact also, soft, and rough, and clear also<sup>5</sup>—thus should

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<sup>1</sup> This is not clear, unless 'product' above means productive, and seed means a product, it being a product of the *aṅkura* or sprout. *Nīlakaṇṭha* says, 'seed=cause; product=effect. The unperceived is an effect, and so the contrary doctrine of the Sāṅkhya is here shown to be wrong. The objects are causes, as their enjoyment causes an impression.'

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 285, 286 *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> That is to say, smell is the special property of the earth only, the other qualities are common to it with the other elements. The word in the original is *guṇa* or quality everywhere.

<sup>4</sup> See *Sānti Parvan* (*Moksha Dharma*), chap. 184, st. 27.

<sup>5</sup> Bitter, *Nīlakaṇṭha* exemplifies by the smell of the chili, apparently interpreting *ka/vi*, as it may be interpreted, to mean sharp; diffusive=overcoming all other smells, like *Asafoetida*; compact=made up of many smells. *Nīlakaṇṭha* adds, that soft is like that of

smell, which belongs to the earth, be understood to be of ten descriptions. Sound, touch, and colour likewise, and taste, are stated to be the qualities of water. I will now give (some) information about taste. Taste is stated to be of numerous descriptions. Sweet<sup>1</sup>, sour, bitter, sharp, astringent, and saltish likewise—thus are the forms of taste, which is a development of water, said to be of six descriptions. Sound, touch, and likewise colour; thus is light said to have three qualities. The quality of light is colour, and colour is stated to be of numerous descriptions. White, black, red likewise, green, yellow, and grey likewise, short, long, narrow<sup>2</sup>, broad, square, and circular—thus is the colour of light said to be of twelve forms. It should be understood<sup>3</sup> by aged Brâhmaṇas, who speak the truth, and are conversant with piety. Sound and touch also should be understood; air is said to have (these) two qualities. And touch is the quality of air, and touch is stated to be of numerous descriptions. Rough, cold and hot likewise, tender and clear also, hard, glutinous, smooth, slippery, hurtful, and soft<sup>4</sup>—thus the quality of air is properly said by Brâhmaṇas who have reached perfection, who are conversant with piety and perceive the truth, to be of twelve descriptions. Now space has one quality,

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liquid ghee, rough of the oil of mustard, and clear as of cooked rice. The Sânti Parvan passage omits 'sour.' <sup>1</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, lean and fat. These are rather unusual qualities to attribute to colour. The Sânti Parvan passage gives more.

<sup>3</sup> Sic. Does it mean 'it is understood?' Cf. Pânini III, 3, 113.

<sup>4</sup> Tender=like the touch of a son, &c.; clear=like that of an excellent cloth, Nîlakantha; glutinous=like that of oil; smooth=like that of a gem; slippery=not really smooth, but appearing to be such, like that of saliva (?), Arguna Misra. The enumeration of these in the Sânti Parvan loc. cit. is again different.

and that is stated to be sound only. I will speak at length of the numerous qualities of sound. *Shadga*, *Rishabha*, together with *Gândhâra*, *Madhyama*, and likewise *Pañkama*, and beyond these should be understood to be *Nishâda* and *Dhaivata* likewise<sup>1</sup>; agreeable and disagreeable sound also, compact, and of (many) ingredients<sup>2</sup>. Thus sound, which is produced in space, should be understood to be of ten descriptions. Space is the highest element<sup>3</sup>, egoism is above that; above egoism is understanding, and above that understanding is the self<sup>4</sup>; above that is the unperceived, and above the unperceived is the being. One who knows which is superior and inferior among entities, and who knows the proper procedure in all actions, and who identifies himself with every being<sup>5</sup>, repairs to the imperishable self.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

Brahman said :

Since the mind is ruler of these five elements, in (the matter of) absorbing or bringing (them) forth<sup>6</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> This is the Hindu Gamut.

<sup>2</sup> These are not in the *Sânti Parvan*; of many ingredients = collection of sounds, *Arguna Misra*.

<sup>3</sup> Being all-pervading, *Arguna Misra*. Cf. its position at *Taittirîya*, p. 67.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Kaṭha*, pp. 114, 115, 149, and *Saṅkarâkârya*'s commentary there, for an explanation of the whole passage. And see *Saṅkhyasâra*, p. 16, as to what are here called self and understanding.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 64, where the words are identical.

<sup>6</sup> The elements are perceived or are not perceived by the senses under the direction of the mind; absorbing = destroying; bringing forth = producing, *Nîlakantha*. See p. 268 *supra*, and *Sânti Parvan* (*Moksha*), chap. 240, st. 12.

the mind itself is the individual self<sup>1</sup>. The mind always presides over the great elements. The understanding proclaims its power<sup>2</sup>, and it is called the *Kshetragña*. The mind yokes the senses as a charioteer (yokes) good horses. The senses, the mind, and the understanding are always joined to the *Kshetragña*<sup>3</sup>. That individual self, mounting the chariot to which big horses<sup>4</sup> are yoked, and in which the understanding is the drag<sup>5</sup>, drives about on all sides. The great chariot which is pervaded by the Brahman<sup>6</sup>, has the group of the senses yoked (to it), has the mind for a charioteer, and the understanding for a drag. That learned and talented person verily, who always understands thus the chariot pervaded by the Brahman, comes not by delusion in the midst of all entities<sup>7</sup>. This forest of the Brahman<sup>8</sup> begins with the unperceived, and ends with the gross objects<sup>9</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> The word is the same as at *Maitrî*, p. 41, the comment on which should be seen.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. the mind's power is to be perceived by itself, *Nîlakantha*. The meaning seems to be that the understanding can only operate on what the mind places before it.

<sup>3</sup> The passage at *Kaṭha*, p. 111 seq., and *Saṅkara's* commentary there, throw light on this, though the figure is not drawn out in the same way in both places. For a definition of *Kshetragña*, see *Sānti Parvan (Moksha)*, chap. 187, st. 23.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. the senses.

<sup>5</sup> I.e. that which holds the horses in check. *Nîlakantha* seems to render it by 'whip,' but that is not correct, I think.

<sup>6</sup> So *Arguna Misra*. *Nîlakantha* says, 'The senses, &c., when they turn towards the outer world make the self drive about as an individual self; when turned inwards they show him that he is the Brahman.' *Nîlakantha* thus likens this to the *Kaṭha* passage. See also p. 187 and notes there.

<sup>7</sup> Or it may mean, among all men.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 164 supra, note 2; and p. 285, note 4.

<sup>9</sup> That is to say, it includes all *Samsâra*, all the elements recognised by the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, save the Being or *Purusha*.

and includes movables and immovables, receives light from the radiance of the sun and moon, is adorned with planets and nakshatras, and is decked on all sides with nets of rivers and mountains, and always beautified likewise by various (descriptions of) waters; it is (the means of) subsistence for all entities<sup>1</sup>, and it is the goal of all living creatures. In this the Kshetragña always moves about. Whatever entities (there are) in this world, movable or immovable, they are the very first<sup>2</sup> to be dissolved; and next the developments produced from the elements<sup>3</sup>; and (after) these developments, all the elements. Such is the upward gradation<sup>4</sup> among entities. Gods, men, Gandharvas, Pisâkas, Asuras, Râkshasas, all have been created by nature<sup>5</sup>, not by actions, nor by a cause. These Brâhmanas<sup>6</sup>, the creators of the world, are born here again and again. And what-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 371 supra.

<sup>2</sup> Another reading means 'they are dissolved in the waters.' As to the order, cf. Vedânta Paribhâshâ, p. 48, and p. 335 supra.

<sup>3</sup> I take these to mean the gross elements of which things movable and immovable may be said to be made, if one may use a non-idealist phrase in the Sâṅkhya philosophy. Then the elements next spoken of are the subtle ones or tanmâtras. Cf. the references in note 2. As to developments, see p. 382, note 4.

<sup>4</sup> Viz. gross object, gross element, subtle element.

<sup>5</sup> The original is svabhâva, which Arguna Misra renders by Prakṛiti. 'Actions' both Nîlakantha and Arguna Misra take to mean sacrifices, &c., and 'cause' the former interprets by Brahman; the latter by tanmâtras or subtle elements, and adds, 'the sense is—not by sacrifice or tanmâtras only.' Nîlakantha says, 'The gods, &c., are produced by nature, as the gods, &c., seen in a dream.' The meaning seems to be that there are energies in nature which evolve these forms of being. Cf. also Gîtâ, p. 65.

<sup>6</sup> I presume this means that the patriarchs (Marîçi and others, says Nîlakantha) are also born again and again—that is to say, in different kalpas, I suppose—by nature only.

ever is produced from them<sup>1</sup> is dissolved in due time in those very five great elements, like billows in the ocean. The great elements are in every way (beyond) the elements that make up the world<sup>2</sup>. And he who is released, even from those five elements, goes to the highest goal. The Lord Pragâpati created all this by the mind<sup>3</sup> only. And in the same manner<sup>4</sup> the sages attained the godhead<sup>5</sup> by means of penance<sup>6</sup>. And in like manner, those who have achieved perfection, who have acquired concentration by a course of penance, and who likewise feed on fruits and roots, perceive the triple world,<sup>7</sup> here by penance. Medicines, and herbs, and the various sciences are all acquired<sup>8</sup> by means of penance alone. For all acquisition<sup>9</sup> has penance for its root. Whatever is difficult to obtain<sup>10</sup>, difficult to

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<sup>1</sup> I think this must mean the elements, though it might at first sight be referred to the Brâhmanas.

<sup>2</sup> I.e. the gross elements, I take it; the others are the tanmâtras.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. the meditation which constitutes true knowledge, Arguna Misra. But see Gîtâ, p. 87, note 1, and Sâṅkhya-sûtra.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. by the mind, as to which cf. Taittirîya, p. 89; Kaṭha, p. 164. Arguna Misra says, 'This apparent deviation from the ordinary modes of cause and effect is not altogether without parallel, so he adds this to show that.'

<sup>5</sup> Literally, 'the gods,' but the meaning seems to be that given in the text, as Arguna Misra says.

<sup>6</sup> This is only the concentration of mind and senses on one object, Nîlakantha. See p. 166, note 1 supra.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 174 supra.

<sup>8</sup> Literally, 'are accomplished,' which seems to mean that they are acquired so as to be practically at one's command when required.

<sup>9</sup> The original word is derived from the same root as the subject of the last note.

<sup>10</sup> Difficult to obtain=the seat of Indra, &c.; to learn=Vedas, &c.; to vanquish=fire, &c.; to pass through=a great deluge, &c.,

learn, difficult to vanquish, and difficult to pass through; all that can be accomplished by penance, for penance is difficult to overcome. One who drinks spirituous liquors, one who kills a Brâhmaṇa, one who steals, one who destroys an embryo, one who violates the bed of his preceptor<sup>1</sup>, is released from that sin only by penance well performed. (Those) men, Pitris, gods, (sacrificial) animals<sup>2</sup>, beasts and birds, and all other creatures movable or immovable, (who are) constantly devoted to penance, always reach perfection by penance. And in like manner the noble(-minded) gods went to heaven<sup>3</sup>. Those who without sloth perform actions with expectations, and being full of egoism, they go near Pragâpati<sup>4</sup>. Those high-souled ones who are devoid of (the thought that this or that is) mine, and devoid of egoism, by means of a pure concentration (of mind) on contemplation, obtain the great and highest world. Those who best understand the self, attaining concentration (of mind) on contemplation<sup>5</sup>, and having their minds always tranquil, enter into the unperceived accumulation of happiness<sup>6</sup>. Those

*Nilakantha*. Arguna Misra seems to interpret the last word, where his reading is doubtful, to mean 'difficult to do.'

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 361. Except the destruction of the embryo (see *Taitt. Âran.* p. 870, but at *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 795, Kaushîtaki, p. 77, and *Âpastamba* I, 6, 19, 16, the commentators render *Bhrûna* by 'learned Brâhmaṇa'), the rest are the great sins. But note that stealing gold, not theft generally, is mentioned as a great sin.

<sup>2</sup> Or, perhaps, cattle. The original is *pasu*.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 160 *supra*, and cf. p. 178.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. Kasyapa, as gods, &c. This seems to be Arguna Misra's interpretation. This condition is inferior to that described in the following sentence.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 162, note 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Nilakantha*'s rendering is 'that by which (worldly) happiness is

who are free from (all thought that this or that is) mine, and who are free from egoism, attaining concentration (of mind) on contemplation<sup>1</sup>, enter the highest world of the great, which is the unperceived. Born from that same unperceived<sup>2</sup> (principle), again acquiring knowledge, and getting rid of the (qualities of) passion and darkness, and resorting to the pure (quality of) goodness, a man gets rid of all sins, and abandons everything as fruitless. He should be understood to be the Kshetragña. He who understands him understands the Vedas<sup>3</sup>. Withdrawing from the mind the objects<sup>4</sup> of mental operations, a sage should sit down self-restrained. (He) necessarily (becomes) that on which his mind<sup>5</sup> (is fixed). This is the eternal mystery. That which begins with the unperceived and ends with the gross objects<sup>6</sup> is stated to be of the nature of ignorance<sup>7</sup>. But (you should) learn that whose nature is devoid

heightened.' He compares *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 816. See also *Taittirîya*, p. 112.

<sup>1</sup> See *Gîtâ*, p. 128, note 1, where *dhyâna* and *yoga* are taken separately. Here the compound is in the singular. *Nîlakantha's* reading is different.

<sup>2</sup> The sense here is not quite clear. It seems, however, to be this. The acquisitions mentioned in the preceding sentence take the acquirers to some temporary world from which they afterwards return; but when they get rid of the qualities, they get final emancipation. As to the unperceived, cf. *inter alia* *Gîtâ*, p. 112, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 111, and note 2 there. That seems to approach the question from the opposite point of view.

<sup>4</sup> So *Arguna Misra*. At *Gîtâ* XVI, 16, *kitta* means the operation itself. That also will do here.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 78; *Maitrî*, p. 178; *Prasna*, p. 194; and the quotations at *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> This phrase has occurred before; it means all the developments which make up worldly life. See *Sâṅkhya-sâra*, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> See ¶ 371 *supra*.



of qualities. Two syllables<sup>1</sup> are death; three syllables the eternal Brahman. Mine is death, and not mine is the eternal<sup>2</sup>. Some men of dull understandings extol action. But as to the high-souled ancients they do not extol action<sup>3</sup>. By action a creature is born with a body and made up of the sixteen<sup>4</sup>. Knowledge brings forth<sup>5</sup> the being, and that is acceptable and constitutes immortality. Therefore those who are far-sighted have no attachment to actions. This being is stated to be full of knowledge, not full of action<sup>6</sup>. The self-restrained man who thus understands the immortal, changeless, incomprehensible, and ever indestructible and unattached (principle), he dies not<sup>7</sup>. He who thus understands the self to which there is nothing prior, which is uncreated, changeless, unmoving<sup>8</sup>, which is incomprehensible (even) to those who feed on nectar, he certainly becomes immortal<sup>7</sup> and not to be restrained<sup>9</sup>, in consequence of these means<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See *Sânti Parvan* (*Râgadharma*) XIII, 4. Cf. *Maitrî*, p. 180. This means the two and three syllables of 'mama' and 'na mama,' mine and not mine. Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 970, and *Khândogya*, p. 118, and p. 548, for a similar conceit.

<sup>2</sup> Final emancipation follows on abandoning the idea of 'mine;' bondage on harbouring it. <sup>3</sup> See *Mundaka*, p. 279.

<sup>4</sup> The eleven organs and the five great elements which go to form the body. See *Sâṅkhya-kârikâ* 3, and comment thereon; *Sânti Parvan*, chap. 210, st. 32 seq.; chap. 242, st. 7 seq.; *Prasna*, p. 230.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. shows. <sup>6</sup> Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 118; *Sânti Parvan*, ch. 242, st. 15.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 367 supra, note 6; and cf. *Kaṭha*, pp. 155, 156.

<sup>8</sup> I. e. which remains unconcerned, cf. *Îsa*, p. 10. *Apûrvam* (to which there is nothing prior), *Arguna Misra* renders by 'not familiarly known,' and *Nilakanṭha* by 'not understood by any other means of knowledge.' See also *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 502, and *Saṅkara* on that.

<sup>9</sup> This is not very clear, but I suppose the meaning to be the same as that of 'unconquerable' at p. 161, and see p. 231.

<sup>10</sup> I. e. the means mentioned further on, says *Nilakanṭha*.

Expelling all impressions<sup>1</sup>, and restraining the self in the self<sup>2</sup>, he understands that holy Brahman, than which nothing greater exists. And when the understanding is clear, he attains tranquillity<sup>3</sup>. And the nature of tranquillity is as when one sees a dream<sup>4</sup>. This<sup>5</sup> is the goal of those emancipated ones who are intent on knowledge. And they see all the movements<sup>6</sup> which are produced by development. This is the goal of those who are indifferent (to the world). This is the eternal piety. This is what is acquired by men of knowledge. This is the uncensured (mode of) conduct. This goal can be reached by one who is alike to all beings<sup>7</sup>, who is without attachment, who is without expectations,

<sup>1</sup> Impressions from external causes. Cf. inter alia Sâṅkhya-sûtra III, 83; see, too, pp. 247-358 supra and notes there.

<sup>2</sup> I. e. restraining the mind in the lotus-like heart, Nîlakantha. Cf. as to this, pp. 248, 372 inter alia.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gîtâ, p. 51. See also Maitrî-upanishad, p. 176, and Mundaka, p. 314.

<sup>4</sup> Arguna Misra says, 'The nature of tranquillity is this, that in that state you perceive everything to be unreal like what is seen in a dream.' Nîlakantha says, 'The nature of tranquillity is this, that in that state the self abides without attachment to the body, and any external objects, but working within itself as in a dream.' But see on this Kaṭha, p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. tranquillity, Nîlakantha.

<sup>6</sup> I. e., says Nîlakantha, they see all worldly objects past and future. Arguna Misra, 'They see the actions performed for some wealth and so forth.' I am not satisfied with either meaning. Arguna Misra's is besides based on a reading different from that adopted in the text, namely, Parimâmagâh, instead of Parinâmagâh. I think 'parinâma' is the development which, according to the Sâṅkhya philosophy, produces the universe, and the movements are the actions which that development—namely, here the activity of egoism and its products—occasions. Cf. as to some extent supporting this, Sâṅkhya-sâra, p. 16.

<sup>7</sup> See inter alia Gîtâ, pp. 68-70.

and who looks alike on everything<sup>1</sup>. I have now declared everything to you, O best of Brâhmana sages! Act thus forthwith; then you will acquire perfection.

The preceptor said:

Thus instructed by the preceptor Brahman, those high-souled sages acted accordingly, and then attained to the worlds<sup>2</sup>. Do you, too, O noble person, of pure self! duly act according to the words of Brahman which I have stated. Then will you attain perfection.

Vâsudeva said:

That pupil thus instructed in the highest piety by the preceptor, did everything (accordingly), O son of Kuntî! and then attained final emancipation. And the pupil, having done all he should have done, attained to that seat, O supporter of the family of the Kauravas! going to which one grieves not<sup>3</sup>.

Arguna said:

Who, indeed, was that Brâhmana, O *Krishna*! and who the pupil, O *Ganârdana*! If this verily is fit to be heard by me, O Lord! then tell it me.

Vâsudeva said:

I<sup>4</sup> am the preceptor, O you of mighty arms! and

<sup>1</sup> See inter alia *Gîtâ*, pp. 68-70.

<sup>2</sup> I. e., I presume, *Bhûr* and the rest. But see also *Khândogya*, pp. 272, 541, 620, and *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, pp. 302, 608.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 285 supra, and cf. inter alia *Khândogya*, p. 550.

<sup>4</sup> I. e. I, the *Kshetragña*, am the preceptor, and the mind is that which has to be taught. This shows that one's instructor must be oneself, *Nîlakantha*. Arguna Misra says, 'I am the preceptor, the mind is the pupil. The meaning of this is that anybody who has not acquired knowledge is treated here as a pupil; there is no other special pupil intended.' Cf. also p. 310 supra.

know the mind to be my pupil. And, O Dhanañgaya! I have related this mystery to you out of love for you. If you have love for me, O supporter of the family of the Kauravas! then having heard this (instruction) relating to the self, always duly act<sup>1</sup> (according to it). Then when this piety is duly practised, you will attain the absolute final emancipation, getting rid of all sins. It was this same thing I stated to you before<sup>2</sup> when the time for battle had come, O you of mighty arms! Therefore fix your mind on this. And now<sup>3</sup>, O chief of the descendants of Bharata! it is long since I saw the lord my father. I wish to see him, with your consent, O Phâlguna<sup>4</sup>!

Vaisampâyana said:

When *Krishna* spoke these words, Dhanañgaya replied (saying), 'O *Krishna*! let us verily go to-day to the city of Gagasa<sup>5</sup>. Be pleased, O you who understand piety! to see there king Yudhishthira, who is of a devout heart, and after taking leave of him to go to your own city.'

<sup>1</sup> Nîlakantha interprets the words without supplying anything, thus 'be devoted to yama niyama,' &c. Yama &c. are the eight requisites for Yoga or concentration of mind as taught by Patañjali.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, in the Gîtâ.

<sup>3</sup> Here he takes up the thread of the story. In the first chapter it was hinted that *Krishna* was anxious to go to Dvârakâ.

<sup>4</sup> This is a name of Arjuna.

<sup>5</sup> I. e. Hastinâpur, the capital of the Pândavas. They were, when the dialogue was held, at Indraprastha. See p. 229 supra.